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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
N.J. ~IE_A_GHER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
-YS.-
UINTAH GAS COMPANY and 
\:ALLEY FlTEL SUPPLY COM-
pANY, Civil No. 7723 
Defendants, 
RA 1~ PHEBUS, ASHLEY \TALLEY 
OIL CO~IP ANY, PAUL STOCK 
AND JOE T. JUHAN, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS RAY PHEBUS, 
PAUL STOCK and JOE T. JUHAN 
This action, by reason of amendments made subse-
quent to the first appeal and the decision of this court 
herein, now involves the legal effect of a document desig-
nated "Release", Exhibit A-30, executed by appellant 
Stock in favor of respondent Meagher under date of 
October 21, 1944. These appellants contend that the 
document is a nullity and had no legal effect. The 
respondent contends that the document is effective to 
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2 
transfer from appellant Stock to respondent Meagher 
an undivided one-half interest in the oil mineral leasehold 
estate in 440 acres of land. An issue with regard to what 
is referred to in the record as the North Forty and like-
wise resolved in ·respondent's favor by the trial court 
will be presented separately by appellant Ashley Valley 
Oil Company in a separate brief and argument. The 
North Forty is a part of the leasehold which comprises 
in all 480 acres, of which ~the 440 acres first above men-
tioned is a part. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This action, a suit to quiet title to real property in 
Uintah County, Utah, commenced by the filing of a com-
plaint on October 17, 1944, was before this court in 
Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co. et al. (1947), 112 U~tah 149, 
185 P. 2d 747, and incidentally in Phebus et al. v. Dun-
ford, Judge, et al. (1948), 198 P. 2d 973. 
The first decision was on appeal from a decree quiet-
ing ~itle in favor of respondent Meagher, the trial court 
having held that the oil and gas lease of June 4, 1924, 
Exhibit A-1, as modified on May 21, 1927, Exhibit A-3, 
had terminated as 'to oil rights by the express provisions 
of the lease and had been abandoned as to gas rights. 
The trial court decreed on April 15, 1946 (R. 53) that 
the oil and gas lease of June 4, 1924 and modification 
agreement of May 21, 1927 were invalid and of no force 
or effect and cancelled, the defendants in the action, and 
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eaeh of them, being thereby perpetually enjoined fron1 
asserting any claim to the pre1nises or any part thereof. 
This court reversed the decision of the lower court and 
remanded the case for proceedings to conform to the 
opinion, holding, among other things, that the lessee had 
not given up the lease either by acts consistent with its 
forfeiture terms nor by acts that would justify a conclu-
sion of abandonment. Following the decision on the first 
appeal of this case a petition for re-hearing was filed and 
under date of March 15, 1948 denied. The remittitur was 
issued March 16, 1948 (R. 65). 
The case of Phebus et al. v. Dunford, Judge, et al., 
supra, was a mandamus proceeding arising out of the 
action taken by the trial court ostensibly pursuant to the 
decision of this court in the first appeal, the trial court 
having vacated and set aside its former decision except 
as to Ray Phebus, the petitioner in the mandamus pro-
ceeding. In the mandamus proceeding this court held that 
its decision (Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co. et al., supra), 
when filed in the lower court, automatically set aside 
in its entirety the lower court's decision and for the sake 
of clearing the record the lower court should enter an 
order setting aside without limitation its entire decision. 
Such an order was entered February 8, 1949 (R. 66). 
Oil was discovered in commercial quantities on Sep-
tember 18, 1948 (R. 255) on the property covererd by 
the original lease and modification agreement. S.uch dis-
covery was the result of drilling by Equity Oil Company, 
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4 
as operator, under an operating agreement with Weber 
Oil Company, Paul Stock and Joe T. Juhan, who claimed 
the working interests in the leas,ehold, Exhibit A-25. 
Weber Oil Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Equity Oil Company (R. 259). From September 18, 1948, 
date of discovery of oil (R. 255), and up to and including 
May 31, 1950 gross crude oil sales amounted to more than 
$672,000.00, from which amount something slightly over 
$105,600.00 had been withheld on account of royalties 
and approximately $574,000.00 on account of operations 
and expenditures; indicating substantial values apparent 
on the date of discovery, September 18, 1948. 
Meagher's original complaint filed October 17, 1944 
(R. 1), his amended complaint of February 19, 1945 (R. 
14) and the second amended complaint filed April 18, 
1945 (R. 17) were all on the theory that Meagher was the 
fee owner of the 480 acres involved in the controversy 
unencumbered by any leasehold. On October 10, 1945 
Meagher filed his verified reply (R. 41) alleging, in ef-
fect, that the lease of June 4, 1924 and the modification 
agreement of May 21, 1927 were void and of no force 
or effect due to the lessee's failure to fulfill the obliga-
tions thereof; that there had been no actual drilling for 
gas or oil for over fifteen years; that the lease and 
modification agreement had expired by the terms thereof; 
that the purposes and objects of the same had not been 
accomplished; and that the leasehold estate had been 
abandoned. The reply was directed to answers thereto-
fore filed by Ray Phebus, Ashley Valley Oil Company 
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and Joe T. Juhan, 'Yhich ans,Yers "\Vere practically identi-
cal in asserting that the lease of June --!, 1924 and the 
modification agreement of ~Iay 21, 1927 were in full force 
and effect and entitled the defendants to have the same 
confirmed and adjudicated as being in full force and 
effect as against Meagher and all persons claiming by, 
through or under him (R. 20-40). Ray Phebus was p·er-
mitted to adopt the answer of Joe T. Juhan at the first 
trial in January, 1946 (R. 43). Such were the pleadings 
at the time of the first trial, at the time of the decree 
entered April 15, 1946 and at the time of the remittitur 
from this court in connection with the first appeal on 
~Iareh 16, 1948 and, in fact, until August 3, 1949 when 
the court ordered the filing of an amended reply to the 
answers of Juhan, Phebus and Ashley Valley Oil Com-
pany (R. 85). By the amended reply Meagher claimed 
an undivided one-half interest in the oil mineral lease-
hold estate, which claim was later identified as being by 
virtue of Exhibit A-30. 
Prior to the date last mentioned Meagher served up-
on Juhan, Phebus and Ashley Valley Oil Company a 
notice of motion for order authorizing filing of a third 
amended complaint, attaching to the notice the proposed 
pleading (R. 67). On June 9, 1949 Meagher withdrew 
his motion to file the third amended complaint (R. 80) 
and on the same day served a motion for order authoriz-
ing filing of an amended reply to defendants' answers 
(R. 81). Objections were made to plaintiff's motion to 
re-open and to file the amended reply (R. 83) and on 
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August 3, 1949, by order dated on said day, the trial court 
overruled and denied the objections and permitted the 
filing of the amended reply. The order contained, among 
other things, the following: 
"It now appearing that further pleading on the 
part of the parties may be desired and that the 
regular setting of the trial calendar for the Fall 
term in Uintah County is to be held during ·the 
court session of the court at Vernal, Uintah 
C·ounty, Utah on the 19th day of August, begin-
ning at 10 o'clock a.m., and it appearing that there 
is no need for making a special setting in view of 
such facts, the motion for special setting is de-
nied." (Italics ours). 
The name Paul Stock was carried in the caption 
of 1the order of August 3, 1949 for the first time since 
after the filing of the amended complaint on February 
19, 1945 (R. 85). Stock was a party defendant as the 
case was originally filed and wa.s never dismissed out 
of the action. The order for publication of summons was 
filed October 17, 1944 (R. 11). The affidavit of attorney 
for plaintiff filed the same day (R. 10) states that to 
the knowledge of affiant the defendants Ray Phebus, 
Paul Stock and Joe T. Juhan reside outside, of the State 
of Utah. In the order for p·ublication of summons it is 
recited that the defendants are unlmown or either dead 
or reside outside of the State of Utah and cannot after 
' due diligence, be found therein, and directs summons to 
be served by publication. Publication of the summons 
' carrying the name of Paul Stock as one of the parties 
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defendant, was duly made, with the proof thereof filed 
February 7, 1945 (R. 13), the same stating, in due form, 
that the first publication was on the -1-th day of January, 
1945 and the last publication on the first da.y of Febru-
ary, 1945, in the \rernal Express, a newspap·er of general 
circulation published once each week at \Ternal, Utah. 
After ·the filing of the order of August 3, 1949 carry-
ing the name of Paul Stock as one of the defendants and 
the suggestion of further pleading "on the part of the 
parties," Stock, on the 17th day of August, 1949, filed his 
answer to plaintiff's second amended complaint, and in 
connection therewith a counterclaim praying that a pur-
ported release executed by him on the 21st day of October, 
1944, in favor of Meagher, be cancelled and decreed of 
record to be null and void and that it be decreed that 
the plaintiff and those claiming or to claim by, through 
or under him have no right, title or interest in or to the 
leasehold estate by reason of the purported release, or 
otherwise (R. 92). 
Juhan and Phebus demurred to Meagher's amended 
reply (R. 91) and Meagher, in turn, on the 15th day of 
October, 1949, served a reply to the Stock answer and 
counterclaim (R. 107) which latter pleading was there-
a£ter amended (R. 115). Stock demurred (R. 117) to the 
reply as amended and moved to strike portions thereof 
(R. 119). On November 25, 1949 Meagher served a second 
amended reply to the answer of the defendants Joe T. 
Juhan and Ray Phebus (R. 121) to which Juhan and 
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Phebus separately demurred (R. 125, 129) and separately 
moved to strike portions thereof (R. 127, 131). The de-
murrer of Stock to plaintiff's reply as amended, his mo-
tion to strike and the separate demurrers and motions 
to strike filed by Juhan and Phebus were overruled and 
denied bythe court on March 28,1950 (R. 134). 
The second trial of the action was tried to the court 
without a jury at Provo, Utah County, rather than art 
Vernal, Uintah County, on the 26th day of June, 1950 
(R. 135), at which time the court permitted the plaintiff 
to further amend his second amended complaint, introduc-
ing into the case for the first time an issue concerning 
a 2% landowners royalty. The court received in evidence 
the "A" series of exhibits, marked A-1 to A-62, both in-
clusive, with the exception of Exhibits A-43, A-44 and 
A-45, which were not presented to the court. The cause 
was presented largely upon the "A" series of exhibits 
offered and received in evidence, stipulations of counsel 
and the testimony of Paul Stock and Katherine M. Ivers. 
On March 6, 1951 the trial court filed a 55-page 
memorandum decision (R. 140). Proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law were submitted on behalf 
of Meagher and thereafter and on the 4th day of June, 
1951 adopted by the court (R. 200), notwithstanding ob-
jections to the proposed findings dated April 14, 1951 
(R. 196) and overruled and denied by a supplemental 
me1norandum dated June 4, 1951 (R. 197). The objec-
tions urged to the proposed findings were that they were 
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contrary to the evidence, facts and the law, and further 
that they \Yere contrary to the 55-page memorandum de-
cision. The inconsistency between the memorandum de-
cision and the proposed findings was conceded by plain-
tiff's counsel (R. 327). The decree from which this appeal 
is taken is dated June -±, 1951 and was filed in the office 
of the Clerk of the District Court, Uintah County, Utah, 
June 8, 1951 and entered on said day (R. 220). 
The "A" series of exhibits supplants the exhibits 
at the first trial and includes photostats and other stipu-
lated evidence relative to title, whether it be to surface 
rights, leasehold interests or the fee, in and to the 480 
acres of land in the Ashley Valley Oil Field, Uintah 
County, Utah, the subject of the litigation. The chain 
of the various titles is charted, for the convenience of 
the court, on Exhibit A-62, likewise on Exhibit A-57, 
both charts indicating the exhibit letter and number ap-
plicable to the specific title document. A copy of the 
chart, Exhibit A-62, is attached at the end of ~this brief 
to more readily illustrate the chain of title. 
Exhibit A-30 is a photostatic copy of the recorded 
document entitled "Release" dated October 21, 1944, ex-
ecuted by appellant Stock in favor of N. J. Meagher, and 
is one of the pivotal questions involved in this appeal. 
It is contended by the appellants Phebus, Stock and 
Juhan that the so-called release is ineffective as a convey-
ance, that to assert the same as such, under conditions 
to be hereinafter more particularly pointed out, con-
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stitutes fraud, that Meagher is decisively estopped and 
debarred from claiming the same as a transfe·r and that 
it is an abortive document so far as any relinquishment 
or surrender is concerned. 
Ashley Valley Oil Company is not concerned in the 
so-called Stock release but is concerned in maintaining 
its position as the holder and owner of the leasehold or 
working or operating interest in what is called the North 
Forty, or 1the NE~ of the SE1)t, of Section 15 of the lands 
involved. On the other hand Phebus, Stock and Juhan, 
or their assigns, can claim no direct interest in the oper-
ating right or working interest in the North F·orty by 
way of transfer or assignment. Weber Oil Company, 
Stock and Juhan claim to be the owners of the entire 
working interest by virtue of the lease and modification 
agreement, in all but the North Forty, with Equity Oil 
Company the operator thereof, all pursuant to Exhibit 
A-25 . 
.AJt the time of the execution of the Stock purported 
release on October 21, 1944, four days after the com-
mencement of this _action, Phebus had, of record, an un-
divided one-half of the oil mineral estate in 440 acres of 
the original lease, Stock the other one-half of the oil 
mineral estate and Juhan the entire gas mineral estate. 
The title exhibits in the "A" series supporting the state-
ment just made and in the order of the respective dates 
thereof are : 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 11, 15, 12, 13, 14 and 17. 
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rrhe title situation of the oil and gas lllineral estates 
up to October ~1, 19±4, the date of the alleged release, 
with reference to the chart, Exhibit A-62, was: R. C. Hill, 
the lessee in the lease dated Jlme 4, 1924, Exhibit A-1, 
sublet the sarne on October 30, 1924 to Utah Oil Refining 
Company, with the exception of the North Forty, Ex-
hibit A-2, reserving in addition to theN orth Forty certain 
interests which he assigned to Ashley Valley Oil Com-
pany under date of November 10, 1924, Exhibit A-3. On 
May 21, 1927 Ashley Valley Oil Company entered into the 
modification agreement with M. P. Smith, Exhibit A-5, 
in contemplation of the modification agreement of June 
9, 1927, Exhibit A-6, between it and Utah Oil Refining 
Company. On April 24, 1929 Utah Oil Refining Company, 
Exhibit A-11, by agreement, sublet the property to Ray 
Phebus and Paul Stock. On May 29th of that year, Ex-
hibit A-15, Ray Phebus and Paul Stock assigned the gas 
rights to Valley Fuel Supply Company. On April 30, 
1931, Exhibit A-12, Phebus and Stock assigned the oil 
rights to Standard Oil Company of California, which, 
in turn, and under date of December 31, 1931, assigned 
the same to The California Company, Exhibit A-13, which 
latter company assigned back to Stock and Phebus on 
March 21, 1934, Exhibit A-14. In the meantime, on Octo-
ber 30, 1930, Edward Watson, Trustee, successor to R. C. 
Hill, assigned the North Forty to Ashley Valley Oil 
Company, Exhibit A-16. On November 7, 1941 Valley 
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Fuel Supply Company assigned the gas rights to Juhan, 
Exhibit A-17. Thus the title to the mineral estate stood 
at the time of the Stock release dated October 21, 1944, 
Exhibit A-30. 
Subsequent assignments of the original leasehold, 
with the exception of the North Forty, after October 21, 
1944 are evidenced, in order of their date, by the "A" 
series of exhibits numbered 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 23 and 25. 
Restating the various exhibits, Ray Phebus, by quitclaim 
and assignment, transferred whatever interest he had 
to Juhan. This was on January 19, 1945, Exhibit A-18. 
On April 14, 1945 Paul Stock, by a similar document, 
transferred whatever rights he had to Charles S. Hill, 
Exhibit A-19. Hill in turn, by a similar document dated 
January 5, 1946, transferred his interest to Juhan, Ex-
hibit A-20. At the time of the first trial, January 8, 1946, 
when Phebus adopted the answer of Juhan, and exclud-
ing the North Forty and giving no effect whatsoever 
to the so-called Stock release of October 21, 1944, Juhan 
was the holder and owner of the entire oil and gas mineral 
estates. 
At the time of the en try of the decree on April 15, 
1946 (later reversed) the title picture, so far as the lease-
hold pertaining to the oil and gas mineral estates was 
concerned, had changed by Juhan's quitclaim and assign-
ment of an undivided one-half interest to Equity Oil 
Company on January 11, 1946, Exhibit A-21. Equity Oil 
Company under date of December 30, 1947, by a similar 
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docmnent, Exhibit A-~4, assigned its interest to Weber 
Oil Company, its "'"holly owned subsidiary. On July 12, 
1948 Juhan quitclaimed a one-fourth interest to Stock, 
Exhibit ... ~-:23, to be followed on December 30, 1948 by 
an operating agree1nent of that date, Exhibit A-25, where-
in and an1ong other things it was agreed between Weber, 
Stock and Juhan that the working interests in and to the 
entire leasehold were held 50% by Weber, 25% by Stock 
and 257o by Juhan, with Equity Oil Company as operator. 
Thus 'vas the record status of the oil and gas leasehold 
estates, excluding the North Forty and giving no effect 
to the so-called Stock release as of the time of the second 
trial, June 26, 1950, and at the time of the quitclaim deed 
from Meagher to his children dated January 27, 1948, 
Exhibit A-22, and concerning which instrument we will 
have more to say. 
On the other side of the chart, Exhibit A-62, the fee 
title was in the Sheridans et al. on June 4, 1924, the date 
of the R. C. Hill lease, by which lease a landowners 
royalty of 120% was reserved in favor of the lessors, 
the Sheridans et al. On November 14, 1924, by a warranty 
deed, Exhibit A-4, the Sheridans conveyed toM. P. Smith. 
Out of the landowners royalty Smith proceeded to carve 
out royalty interests by way of covenants running with 
the land totaling 120% in all, evidenced by assignments 
and agreements of which Exhibit A-46 is not only an 
example but gives to Meagher a royalty interest of 1%. 
Meagher thereafter, as evidenced by Exhibit A-52, se-
cured an additional 1% royalty interest from T. G. 
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Alexander. The two exhibits last mentioned are not 
shown on the chart but disclose two of the royalty in-
' terests referred to in the modification agreement of May 
21, 1927. The latter instrument accounts for the entire 
so-called landowners royalty converted into the form of 
covenants and disposed of by Smith before the modifica-
tion agreement and before a quitclaim of an undivided 
one-fifth interest, with exceptions and reservations, to 
T. G. Alexander, Exhibit A-8, and a quitclaim of an un-
divided four-fifths interest with the same exceptions and 
reservations ~to Meagher, Exhibit A-7. These documents 
are shown on the chart and are both dated December 19, 
1927. 
Exhibits A-7 and A-8, with the exceptions and reser-
vations therein contained, will be analyzed at some length. 
They are important in determining the nature of 
Meagher's interest as the owner of surface rights as dis-
tinguished from possible future reversions, the nature 
of the interest quitclaimed by Meagher to his children 
on June 27, 1948, Exhibit A-22, and the effectiveness of 
the Stock instrument of October 21, 1944 as a surrender, 
relinquishment or release. It can be said, however, that 
Meagher, at the time of the commencement of this action 
·on October 17, 1944 and at the time of the so-called Stock 
release on October 21, 1944 and up to the quitclaim of 
January 27, 1948, was the owner of at least surface rights 
subject to the lease of June 4, 1924 as modified by the 
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agreen1ent of niny 21, 19~7. On January 27, 1948 the 
children of N. J. ~Ieagher becan1e the owners of at least 
surfaee rights by virtue of the quitclai1n deed of that 
day. 
When the trial court per1nitted Meagher to amend 
his reply by the order of ~\. ugust 3, 1949, practically ele-
ven months after the discovery of oil, a new eleinent was 
injected into the case. Meagher claims, and the trial 
court has so held, ihe Stock release to be a conveyance 
of the oil rights possessed by Stock on Oct.ober 21, 1944. 
If ~leagher obtained any right by reason of the release 
it was a right acquired after the commencement of this 
action. Over objections the court permi,tted the new mat-
ter to be so litigated, considering the amended reply to 
l)e germane to the cause of action or complaint as ori-
ginally filed. The injection of the new issue after the 
first appeal to this court, and after the discovery of oil, 
is perhaps a question preliminary to consideration of the 
release itself. 
At the time of the trial on June 26, 1950 Meagher 
further amended his second amended complaint (R. 230), 
the effect of which was to reduce the outstanding oil 
royalty interests carved out of the landowners royalty 
by M. P. Smith to 100% rather than 12lj2 % on the theory 
that Meagher, at the time of the trial, was the owner of 
a 2% royalty interest merging in his claim of ownership 
to the entire property, interjecting for the first time this 
issue into the case but with the understanding that the 
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defendants, 'vithout the necessity of arnendment or fur-
ther pleading, should be deemed to have controverted 
any assertion resulting from the amendments and that 
they might raise any legal or equitable defense which, by 
any manner of pleading, could have been brought into the 
case (R. 232. ) Plaintiff's counsel stated, for the record, 
that the issue with respect to the royalty, as brought in 
by amendment, is whether Meagher is entitled to 2% 
or to 1-1/3% oil royalty interest, and this for the reason 
that, as counsel stated, if plaintiff did not assert such 
position that he might be subjected to the doctrine of res 
judicata ( R. 233). 
The royalty issue comes about by a reduction of 
outstanding oil royalty interests, as evidenced by Exhibit 
A-40, whereby Meagher assigned erne-third of his 2% 
oil royalty interest to Stock and Phebus. There is no 
prayer for specific performance in any of plaintiff's 
pleadings and the controlling issue, with regard to the 
one-third of 2% oil royalty interest claimed by Meagher, 
is whether he can claim the same in an action to quiet 
title such as we have here or whether his proper remedy, 
if any he has, is that of specific performance, where is-
sues of laches, estoppel, performance and the like can 
be litigated. 
Among the "A" series of exhibits, in the order of 
their date, is correspondence between Meagher on the 
one hand, or on his behalf, and Stock, Phebus and Juhan 
or some of them on the other hand, or on their behalf 
' 
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Exhibits _._-\.-26 to A-39, both inclusive . The theory of the 
exhibits just Inentioned is that through the1n, or some of 
the1n, will appear a situation that "\Vould Inake it a fraud 
for ~Ieagher to clain1 the Stock instru1nent of October 21, 
19-!-l: as a tran:5fer or conveyance of interest, and through 
'vhich exhibits, or some of them, appears one or more 
of the various estoppels relied upon defensively by Stock. 
Attached at the end of this brief is a chronology 
under Appendix "B" of events which we trust will be of 
help to the court by way of ready reference to our state-
ment of the case and aid the court in putting each event 
in its proper chronological setting, thus demonstrating 
the equities in favor of these appellants and the inequit-
able position of respondent. 
Upon the record showing the position of the parties, 
the inducement, lack of consideration in connection with 
the so-called Stock release, the stale demands attempted 
to be asserted by Meagher, the inconsistent position taken 
by Meagher's pleadings and Meagher's utter lack of 
any position of equity in the premises, the attack upon 
the decree appealed from and the findings and conclu-. 
sions follows : 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The court erred in permitting Meagher to amend 
his reply and to assert in this action a purported 
title acquired after the commencement thereof. 
2. Meagher is not the real party in interest. 
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3. Meagher is guilty of laches and is . otherwi~e 
estopped by his conduct to assert an tnterest tn 
the leasehold mineral estate. 
4. Under the undisputed facts in the case the asser-
tion of the Stock release as a conveyance or 
transfer of interest constitutes fraud. 
5. Exhibit A-30 lacks consideration. 
6. A-30 should be cancelled on the ground of mis-
take. 
7. A-30 is abortive as a surrender or relinquish-
ment. 
(a) The purported surrender is not to all of the 
oil mineral estate as required by A -5. 
(b) The purported surrender lacks considera-
tion. 
(c) Stock did not have the power to surrender 
a portion of the oil mineral leasehold estate, 
even if that was his intention. 
(d) Meagher is not a reversioner of the oil or 
gas mineral estate. 
8. A-30 is not effective as a transfer. 
9. Meagher's alleged oil royalty interest cannot 
be adjudicated in this action. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING MEAGHER 
TO AMEND HIS REPLY AND TO ASSERT IN THIS 
ACTION A PURPORTED TITLE ACQUIRED AFTER 
THE COMMENCEMENT THEREOF. 
Throughout the entire case, and until ·the decision 
of this court on the first appeal in 1947, and after the 
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discovery of oil in 1948, l\Ieagher's position was that he 
was the owner in fee of the lands involved unencumbered 
by any oil and gas lease. The amended reply ordered 
filed August 3, 1949 was a little less than eleven months 
after the discovery of oil and more than sixteen months 
after the filing of the remittitur on the first appeal, 
wherein this court held that the lands involved were sub-
ject to and encumbered by the lease of June 4, 1924 and 
the modification agreement of May 21, 1927. The 
amended reply alleged ownership of an undivided one-
half interest in the leasehold, a position inconsistent with 
and a complete departure from Meagher's p-revious plead-
ings in this action, and particularly the verified reply 
that he filed on October 10, 1945 (R. 41), wherein he took 
the position that the lease and modification thereof had 
terminated by their express terms, had been forfeited and 
abandoned and were otherwise null and void. The dis-
covery of oil on the premises, pursuant to the activities 
of Equity Oil Company, made Meagher's situation a 
desperate one and caused him to reach out for anything, 
no matter how ill conceived or inconsistent, so as to 
benefit by the capital and resourcefulness of others. 
Meagher is now, and during all of these proceedings has 
been, a banker of Vernal, Utah. 
The attempt to inject the new issue by the amended 
reply was met by specific objections (R. 83), which were 
denied and overruled, the ruling resulting in the order 
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of August 3, 1949. These maneuvers all occurred prior to 
the adoption of the present Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 
The principle that one cannot, by amendment or by 
reply, introduce a new or different cause of action is 
well established. As to an amended complaint this court 
in Marshall v. Salt Lake City e{ al. (1943), 105 Utah 111, 
141 P. 2d 704, said : "Of course, it is fundamental that 
an amendment which states an entirely new and different 
cause of action should not be permitted." As to a reply 
this court in Combined Metals, Inc., et al. v. Bastian et al. 
(1928), 71 Utah 535, 267 P. 1020, had the following to say: 
"The reply thus was not only inconsistent 
within itself, but stated a different cause, on a 
different theory, on a different ground, and on a 
different contract from that stated in the com-
plaint, and was a complete departure therefrom. 
It, of course, is familiar doctrine that where al-
legations of a declaration are repugnant to and 
inconsistent with each other, they thereby neutra-
lize each other and render the declaration bad on 
general demurrer; that a cause of action alleged 
in an amended petition, though founded on the 
same grievance or injury as that described in the 
original, is a different cause of action, if it is de-
pendent upon different grounds for holding the 
defendant responsible for the wrong alleged; and 
that the power of a court to permit an amendment 
of ~ p!eading ~oes not authorize an importation 
which In effect Introduces a new or different cause 
of action. Hancock v. Luke, 46 Utah, 26, 148 P. 
452; Johnson v. American S. & R. Co., 80 Neb. 
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255, 116 N.W. 517; Kirton v. Atlantic Coast Line 
R. R., 57 Fla. 79, 87, -±9 So. 1024; Herlihy v. Little, 
200 Mass. 284, 86 N.E. 294; Altpeter v. Postal Tel. 
Cable Co., 26 Cal. App. 705, 148 P. 241; Blair v. 
Brailey (C.C.A.) 221 F. 7." 
To the same effect are the cases of Graham v. Street et al. 
(1946), 109 lTtah 460, 166 P. 2d 524, Hartford Accident & 
Indemnity Co. v. Clegg (1943), 103 Utah 414, 135 P. 2d 
919, Johnson et ux. v. Brinkerhoff et al. (1936), 89 Utah 
530, 57 P. 2d 1132 and Straw v. Temple et al. (1916), 48 
Utah 258, 159 P. 44. 
The statutory provision in effect at the time of the 
filing of the amended reply was that a reply could not be 
inconsistent with the complaint. We quote from sub-
section (b) of Section 104-11-1, Utah Code Annotated 
1943 on the contents of a reply, as follows: 
"Any new matter not inconsistent with the 
complaint, constituting a defense to the matter 
alleged in the answer; or the matter in the answer 
may be confessed, and any new matter alleged, 
not inconsistent with the complaint, which avoids 
the same." (Italics ours). 
The inconsistency of Meagher's position is obvious. 
The entire title theory of his complaint including the 
second amended complaint has been entirely abandoned. 
He no longer seeks to quiet title to 440 acres of the land 
involved, but now seeks, through the medium of his 
amended reply to say that the lease, which he said before 
did not exist, does exist and that he has an undivided 
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interest therein. Furthermore, the right that Meagher 
now asserts was acquired after the commencement of 
this action and still further and before the amendment 
' 
the same was quitclaimed to his children on January 27, 
1948, Exhibit A-22, which leads us to the next point. 
2. MEAGHER IS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN IN-
TEREST. 
That respondent Meagher is not the real party in 
interest was raised by objections to plaintiff's motion to 
re-open and file amended reply (R. 83), and concerning 
which the affidavit of J. W. Ensign, with exhibit attached, 
was in the record, having been filed May 9, 1949 (R. 75). 
The exhibit attached to the Ensign affidavit is a certi-
fied copy of the photostat received in evidence as Ex-
hibit A-22. Katherine Meagher Ivers, one of the grantees 
named in ·the deed, testified that she claimed to be one 
of the beneficial owners of the working interest in the 
leasehold estate by virtue of the quitclaim (R. 310). 
Meagher, by paragraph 6 of his reply to answer and 
counterclaim of defendant Paul Stock (R. 110), served 
October 15, 1949, alleges that "plaintiff and his said gran-
tees have thus far elected to continue this action in the 
name of plaintiff." No testimony was adduced at the trial 
by Meagher that the action was being maintained as al-
leged. In that regard Finding of Fact numbered 45 is 
entirely unsupported by the evidence. 
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'\"'"hile '\Ye do not concede that a leasehold interest 
ean be transferred by quitclaiin deed, the question of the 
respondent not being the real party in interest was 
argued and the point overruled and denied on the theory 
that the quitclaim was an efficient document for the 
transfer pendente lite of respondent's alleged interest 
in the leasehold to his children and that he maintains the 
action in his own name for the benefit of his grantees 
under Section 104-3-19, Utah Code Annotated 1943. The 
section is as follows : 
"An action or proceeding does not abate by 
the death or any disability of a party, or by the 
transfer of any interest therein, if the cause of 
action or proceeding survives or continues. In 
case of the death or any disability of a party, the 
court, on motion, may allow the action or proceed-
ing to be continued by or against his representa-
tive or successor in interest. In the case of any 
other transfer of interest, the action or proceeding 
may be continued in the name of the original 
party, or the court may allow the person to whom 
the transfer is made to be substituted in the action 
or proceeding." 
The foregoing statute was in effect at the time of the 
quitclaim and at the time the matter was raised in a pro--
cedural way. The section has been re-written under our 
present Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 25 (c), as 
follows: 
" (c) In case of any transfer of interest, the 
action may be continued by or against the original 
party, unless the court upon motion directs the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
person to whom the interest is transferred .t~· be 
substituted in the action or joined with the original 
party * * * ." 
We believe that respondent contends Exhibit A-22 
to be an effective document assigning, transferring and 
setting over unto his children, the grantees· named there-
in, whatever interest he acquired from Stock through the 
medium of Exhibit A-30. Assuming, for the purpose of 
argument, but not conceding the efficiency of the docu-
ment for the purpose stated, these appellants take the 
position that the plaintiff is not no"v the real party in 
interest nor has he been since the quitclaim in favor of 
his children, either under Section 104-3-1, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, in effect at the time of the conveyance or 
under rule 17 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, now in 
effect, by which latter provision it is required that every 
action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party 
in interest. The abatement statute or the statute or rule 
providing for the continuance of an action in the name 
of the original party, even though there is a transfer of 
interest pendente lite, can only apply to a matter then in 
litigation and cannot be applicable to a si~tuation such 
as the one we have where the alleged right became 
vested in the transferror, the plaintiff in the action, after 
the commencement of the suit and was transferred by 
him prior to the amendment. Meagher, did not acquire 
any right from Stock under any conceivable theory until 
October 21, 1944, nor did he assert the alleged right until 
his proposed third amended complaint on April 22, 1949. 
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In the meantiiue he quitelailned to his children on J anu-
ary 27, 1948 and his children, as the record shows, claim 
to be the beneficial owners of the interest respondent 
claims to have obtained from Stock, yet they are not 
parties to this action. 
The proposition that ~Ieagher is not the real party in 
interest tmder the existing circumstances is well illus-
trated by the New York case of Foster v. Central Nat~ 
Bank of Boston et al. (1906), 76 N. E. 338. Briefly stated, 
Foster in 189~ brought an action against the bank 
and others praying as relief that the enforcement of a 
judgment theretofore obtained in the United States Cir-
cuit Court be perpetually enjoined and restrained and 
also that the judgment be discharged and satisfied. On 
the 13th day of March, 1901, the action still pending, 
Foster served an amended complaint in which, instead of 
praying for injunctive relief, he demanded judgment for 
the recovery of sums paid by himself and another to cer-
tain certificate holders on account of the judgment in the 
United States Court. The answer of the defendant al-
leged, and the trial court found, !that in 1896 the plaintiff 
Foster made a general assignment of his property for 
the benefit of his creditors to one Pell W. Foster and that 
on the 12th day of March, 1901, one day prior to the 
amended complaint, Pell W. Foster, the assignee, sold the 
claim, the subject of the amendment, to a third party. 
The trial court held that the plaintiff was not entitled 
to maintain the action and rendered a judgment dismiss-
ing the complaint. 
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The New York Court of Appeals called attention 
to the code of that state, which requires an action to be 
brought by the real party in interest, and to the code 
provision that "in case of a transfer of interest, or devo-
lution of liability, the action may be continued, by or 
against the original party; unless the court directs the 
person, to whom the interest is transferred, or upon 
whom the liability is devolved, to be substituted in the 
action, or joined with the original party, as the case re-
quires." The court pointed out that the original cause 
of action and that presented by the amended complaint 
upon which the cause proceeded to trial were essentially 
different; the one being to restrain the enforcement of 
a judgment, and the other to recover monies paid. As 
to the situation, which we point out is strikingly in point 
with the case at bar, the court had the following to say: 
"But granting the power of amendment to the 
greatest extent, that is to say, that a plaintiff by 
bringing an action on one claim may keep alive, 
despite any lapse of time, every other claim that 
he may have of the same character against a 
party, or if the claims be of a different character, 
on abandoning th.e first, he may substitute for it 
any other claim * * * theTe must be some limit to 
the doctrine. That limit is that at the time he seeks 
to bring in different causes of action he must be 
the owner of the causes of action. Any other rule 
would lead to injustice and gross inco.nsistency if 
not t~ ab~ur~ ~on~equences. If one chooses to buy 
a claim In litigation he necessarily assumes the 
risk of such litigation. The Code allows him to 
come into the action and prosecute his rights. If 
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fered through the neglect of his assignor, the fault 
is his o"\vn. But it \Yould seen1 manifestly unjust 
that the purchaser of a chose in action, which is 
not in litigation, of \vhich assignment he gives 
notice to the debtor, can be affected by the sub-
sequent acts of his assignor. Take the present case. 
If the purchaser fro1n the general assignee cannot 
be concluded by any decision on the merits in this 
suit, then the defendant should not be subjected 
to it. On 110 theory can we justify the prosecution 
through the an~endment of an existing suit of a 
claim in which, under the findings of the court, 
the plaintiff has no interest, and which, until the 
time of the amendment, was not in litigation. The 
assertion of such a claim must be left exclusively 
to its owner, who may deal with it as he will." 
(Italics ours). 
In the instant case the Stock release was not in exist-
ence at the time the action was commenced. A suit to 
quiet title and to remove as a cloud the lease of June 4, 
1924 and the subsequent modification agreement is ut-
terly inconsistent with the contention that Meagher is 
the owner of an interest in the leasehold estate through 
the medium of the Stock release. Then we add to this the 
quitclaim to the children,. not parties to this action, which 
Meagher treats as an assignment of the interest that he 
says he obtained from S:tock, to be followed a year or 
more later by the assertion of that claim for the first time 
in this action, which brings the case strictly within the 
rule in the Foster case. Meagher is attempting, through 
his amended reply in the present action, to assert a claim 
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which, until the time of the amendment, was not in litiga-
tion and which claim he had assigned, according to his 
own evidence, to his children prior to rthe amendment. 
As in the Foster case the assertion of such a claim, if any 
there be, must be left exclusively to its owners who may 
deal with it as they will. 
At the time Meagher quitclaimed to his children on 
January 27, 1948 he was still asserting by his petition for 
rehearing pending in this court that a leasehold did not 
exist. He is hardly in a position to say that he anticipated 
an adverse ruling on his petition and that he had in mind 
an interest in the leasehold when he made ithe conveyance. 
The document itself, unorthodox in its form as a transfer 
of an oil and gas leasehold interest, made at the time it 
was, negatives an intent on the part of Meagher to trans-
fer that which he later and on August 3, 1949 said existed. 
He made no mention of a leasehold interest. His intent 
evidenced by surrounding circumstances, (1) the failure 
to previously assert under the instrument of October 21, 
1944, (2) the decision of this court in October 1947, (3) 
the filing of a petition for rehearing on the theory that 
a leasehold did not exist, and ( 4) the form of the instru-
ment itself wi!th the only chose in action e·xcluded being 
that of a royalty, was not to transfer with the quitclaim 
an interest in the leasehold. 
If we are correct in what has just been said, it might 
well be ~that this point, that Meagher is not the real party 
in interest, is not well taken. Furthermore, the technical 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
argument raised by point nurubered 1 might well be re-
solved against us by our argtunent hereafter that Mea-
gher is debarred by the doctrine of laches or estoppel 
to assert a leasehold estate arising before the quitclaim 
to the children, or by our further argument, as will ap-
pear, that the Stock instrument transferred nothing. 
3. MEAGHER IS GUILTY OF LACHES AND IS OTHER-
WISE ESTOPPED BY HIS CONDUCT TO ASSERT 
AN INTEREST IN THE LEASEHOLD MINERAL 
ESTATE. 
If Meagher had the right to amend his reply on 
August 3, 1949, almost eleven n1onths after the discovery 
of oil, to allege the Stock instrument of October 21, 1944 
as a transfer, he had the right to amend his ·pleadings 
iinmediately upon receiving the instrument, four days 
after the commencement of the action. Meagher remained 
silent from October 21, 1944 until August 3, 1949 in claim-
ing that the instrument was effective for any purpose. 
As a matter of fact, he did not particularize as to his 
general allegations of transfer until October 17, 1949, 
the date of his reply to the answer and counterclaim of 
Stock (R. 107), when he at~tempted to earmark the Stock 
instrument as a quitclaim, assignment or transfer of 
interest in support of his previous general allegations. 
The assertion of interest is too late; it falls into thecate-
gory of a stale demand. 
On April 14, 1945 by a quitclaim deed and assign-
rnent, Exhibit A-19, recorded in the office of the County 
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Recorder, Uintah County, on April 25th of the same year, 
Stock repudiated A-30 as an instrument of conveyance. 
The quitclaim and assignment was in favor of Charles 
S. Hill and concerning which Meagher not only had con-
structive but actual knowledge. The fact ~hat he had ac-
tual knowledge is evidenced by his letter to Stock under 
date of June 18, 1945, Exhibit A-39, wherein he says in 
part: 
"I was surprised to find that you gave a quit-
claim deed to one Chas. Hill of Denver for your 
intere.sts in the 480 acres of land, which I own and 
have owned." 
Uintah County is a sparsely populated locality. It is 
a matter of general knowledge that the well drilled by 
Equity Oil Company on the property in question, ten 
miles southeast of Vernal, resulted in the first commer-
cial discovery of oil in this state. The record shows the 
date to have been September 18, 1948. Meagher, a banker 
of Vernal, the county seat of Uintah County, with an 
admitted surface interest in the property, could hardly 
say that he was unaware of what was going on. He made 
no effort to explain the delay. 
Meagher turned his back on the Stock instrument as 
a transfer or conveyance, or as a document effective for 
any purpose ( 1) when he failed to assert thereunder upon 
receipt of the same, four days after the commencement 
of this action, (2) when he took the position by his first 
reply, verified on September 1, 1945, that the oil and gas 
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lease had ceased to exist, 'vas null and void and had been 
abandoned, (3) 'Yhen he accepted the fruits of the first 
decree, 'Yhich restrained and enjoined the appellants and 
those clainring under the1n, or any of them, fron1 entering 
upon the property for the purpose of further drilling, 
(-!) \Yhen he failed to ti1nely assert under the said Stock 
docun1ent after the first opinion of this court, October 
27, 19-!7, ( 5) "\vhen he quitclaimed to his children, and ( 6) 
when he permitted Equity Oil Company to go into pos-
session on _A __ ugust 1, 1948, commence drilling operations 
on that day, successfully complete the well on the follow-
ing September 18th, sitting by in silence, not only during 
the drilling operations but until August of 1949 after 
the enterprise had resulted in financial success, and, in 
the interim, avoiding the financial risks of the venture. 
In a preliminary way, we remark that the burden 
was upon respondent to show excuse, if any he had, for 
his failure to assert his claim promptly. As is said in 
30 C.J.S., Page 544, Article "Equity", Section 120: 
"Where the delay is apparently unreasonable, 
the burden of showing an excuse therefor rests on 
plaintiff, the presumption being that the delay is 
inexcusable if the lapse of time is a long one, or if 
complainant does not avail himself of an oppor-
tunity to explain his unusual delay;** *." 
We must always keep in mind that equity seeks to do 
justice and avoid injustice, and acts only in accordance 
with good faith and fair dealing (30 C.J.S., Page 456, 
Article "Equity", Section 89). 
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Laches of course is such delay in asserting one's 
' ' rights as works disadvantage or prejudice to another. 
The reason for the equitable estoppel rule is much the 
same as laches. The facts here support both laches and 
equitable estoppel, and they are considered together. 
Equity demands of everyone the duty required of an 
honest man. 
These appellants at every moment acted in good 
faith as reasonable men, willing to risk their money, 
their work and their skill in a speculative enterprise. 
They successfully defended their title against the attempt 
to destroy it. Relying upon that good title so won, they 
proceeded with development, the expensive and very 
risky drilling of a well, the wildest of wildcats, distant 
perhaps fifty miles from the nearest oil well in Colorado, 
and in a state and a large region where oil had never been 
found before. Yes, they knew of the so-called "Release" 
(Juhan and Equity had constructive knowledge by re-
cord), but they also knew that Stock, who executed this 
release, repudiated it on April 14, 1945 by his deed to 
Hill, and it was also repudiated by the subsequent trans-
actions between these appellants, leading to the drilling 
of the well. They knew that Stock had given the instru-
ment under misapprehension, that it was without con-
sideration, that respondent in the long litigation concern-
ing the title to :the lease, never made the slightest claim 
under the same, and that though this court on October 
27, 1947 decided against respondent on the question of 
the existence of the lease, respondent did not about 
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.J..\.ugust 1, 1948, the day the well was started, and indeed 
not until more than a year thereafter had elapsed, assert 
any clain1 through the instrument. They also knew that 
respondent obtained the so-called "Release" on the prenl-
ise that neither Stock nor Phebus had any title, a clear 
Inistake, as later determined by this court. There is not 
a scintilla of evidence to put in question their good faith 
and honest purpose, and as well their large expenditures 
and the risks they faced. 
As to respondent, he tries to gain something upon 
what was undoubtedly an afterthought, based on a writ-
ing almost forgotten, repudiated by respondent's efforts 
to procure title by an inconsistent position. N otwith-
standing it was repudiated by Stock six months after it 
was obtained, still respondent made no complaint. It was 
a writing he had obtained gratuitously. It was obtained 
from Stock without the slightest consideration. From be.-
ginning to end respondent did not risk anything, he did 
not spend anything and is not prejudiced. 
When Equity, Stock and Juhan took possession on 
August 1, 1948 and started the drilling of the well, they 
gave notice to all the world of all their claims, whether 
such claims be legal or equitable. See Note 13 L.R.A.-N. 
S. 49, quoted and approved in 105 A.L.R. 845. Perhaps 
there was no occasion for respondent to assert his claim 
as again Hill immediately upon notice of the Hill deed. 
But when the parties took possession and started to drill, 
it became his positive duty to assert the same. 
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Respond~nt did not even assert his claim when the 
discovery well came in on Septe1nber 18, 1948-not until 
August 3, 1949, presumably to be sure that by subsequent 
drilling and additional large expenditures by appellants, 
he would be sure to win a fabulous reward. 
Respondent's conduct falls within the condemnation 
of every court. There can be nothing more abhorrent to 
equity than for a man to silently watch his neighbor drill 
an oil well on land claimed or owned by him, with the 
intent to claim the well as his if it is a producer; other-
wise to continue silent. So to do is not honest as man to 
man. In equity, the doctrine of laches requires the man 
who has such a claim to assert it promptly, especially 
when the claim concerns speculative property being de-
veloped by the other party. There is no dissent whatever 
among the authorities as to the applicable rule. 
In Scott v. Crouch (1902), 24 Utah 377, 67 P. 1068, 
it was held that equity will not aid stale demands -or act 
without showing of conscience, good faith, and reasonable 
diligence. In Ruthrauff et al. v. Silver King Western 
Min. & Mill. Co. et al. (1938), 95 Utah 279, 80 P. 2d 338, 
this court again committed itself to the rule. The delay 
in this case has worked a disadvantage to these appel-
lants. So far as the record is concerned Meagher makes 
no effort to justify his conduct or his delay and treats 
the situation as if he enjoyed, as a matter of right, the 
position of being able to say to the court at this late date 
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that not having succeeded on one theory in getting the 
\vhole apple he ean turn around and succeed on an in-
consistent theory and get half an apple. 
In lllary Jane Stevens Co. v. First Nat. Bldg. Co. 
(1936), 89 Utah 456, 57 P. 2d 1099, this court said: 
~'Laches is usually not mere delay, but stand-
ing by "~atching one change his position or delay 
for such length of time that it amounts to an ac-
quiescence." (Italics ours). 
In the instant case this court held against the con-
tention originally made by Meagher when it held that the 
leasehold of June 4, 1924, as modified, was in full force 
and effect. Equity Oil Company was in possession of the 
land in question on August 1, 1948 when it commenced 
the discovery well, which resulted in commercial produc-
tion of oil on September 18th of that year. The operating 
agreement, Exhibit A-25, was a matter of public record on 
January 6, 1949, the date of the recording thereof in 
Uintah County. Meagher's prolonged silence was acqui-
escence to the adverse claims of Stock, Juhan, Weber and 
Equity Oil Company in and to the leasehold. 
Meagher's conduct comes clearly within the expres-
sion of the court in Alexander v. Phillips Petroleum Co. 
et al., 130 F. 2d 593, 605, (lOth C.C.A. 1942): 
"A person may not withhold his claim await-
ing the outcome of a doubtful enterprise and, after 
the enterprise has resulted in financial success 
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favorable to the claimant, assert his interes~, es-
pecially where he has thus avoided the risks of the 
enterprise. The injustice of permitting one, hold-
ing the right to as~ert an interest i~ prope~ty of 
a speculative character, to voluntarily await the 
event and then decide, when the danger is over and 
the risk has been that of another, to come in and 
share the profit, is obvious. In such circumstances, 
persons having claims to property are bound to 
use the utmost diligence in enforcing them. 
A substantial increase in the value of the 
property involved, where the right could have been 
asserted before such increase and the granting of 
relief would work inequity, is a circumstance 
which may be considered in applying the doctrine 
of laches. 
Where a plaintiff, with knowledge of the 
relevant facts, acquiesces for an unreasonable 
length of time in the assertion of a right adverse 
to his own, the court may presume assent to the 
adverse right, and the consequent waiver of the 
right sought to be enforced." 
The Alexander case, supra, cites with approval the 
Tenth Circuit case of Winn et al. v. Shugart et al. (1940), 
112 F. 2d 617: 
"The duty to act with dispatch is especially 
imperative where one claims an interest in prop-
erty that is highly speculative. One may not with-
hold his claim to a highly speculative venture such 
as was involved in these wildcat oil and gas ieases 
and permits, to await the outcome of an effort to 
develop them put forth by another, and then when 
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his efforts are crowned \vith apparent ~uccess, 
rome in and claim the fruits thereof. Such a course 
does not eon1mend itself to a court of equity." 
The recent decision of the Tenth Circuit in Pfister 
et al. v. Cow Gulch Oil Co. et al., 189 F. 2d 311, decided 
~Iay 18, 1951, is in point on the principle stated. The 
lessor stood by and watched the assignee of the lessee 
commence, drill and complete a valuable oil well without 
making objection or making any claim that the lease had 
terminated. After the well was completed as a producer 
the appellant, the lessor, asserted the claim of termina-
tion. The appellee claimed laches. The delay was ap-
proximately three months. While the court decided that 
the lease did not automatically terminate and, "\vhile the 
facts are somewhat different, the court, however, did say 
that laches depends upon the equities of the case and not 
merely on the lapse of time, stating in this particular: 
. 
"Silence under such circumstances when, ac-
cording to the ordinary experience and habits of 
men, one would naturally speak if he did not con-
sent, is evidence from which assent may be in-
ferred. Where a plaintiff, with knowledge of the 
relevant facts, acquiesces for an unreasonable 
length of time in the assertion of a right adverse 
to his own, the court may presume assent to the 
adverse right, and the consequent waiver of the 
right sought to be enforced." 
This court in Migliaccio v. Davis et al., 232 P. 2d 
195 (Utah), decided June 8, 1951, voices its approval of 
the rule stated in 19 Am. Jur., Estoppel, paragraph 133, 
page 787: 
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" 'Numerous decisions predicating the exist-
ence of an estoppel to assert an interest in real 
property have been based up?n evidence wh~ch 
included the element of non-disclosure of an In-
terest at the time when the contract for the con-
veyance of the property in question was being 
consummated and also the element of a continued 
silence after the grantee had entered into posses-
sion of the property and expended money in im-
proving it. In most of the cases in which the doc-
trine of estoppel has been adopted, the money of 
the party alleging the estoppel has been applied 
to the making of tangible improvements; and it 
is a rule almost of universal application that one 
who stands by and sees another purchase land or 
enter upon it under a claim of right and permits 
such other to make expenditures or improvements 
under circumstances which would call for notice 
or protest cannot afterward assert his own title 
against such person. As some of the authorities 
broadly state the principle, one who knowingly 
and silently permits another to expend money on 
land under a belief that he had title will not be 
permitted to set up his own right to the exclusion 
of the rights of the one who made such improve· 
ments * * * .' " (Italics ours). 
In the Migliaccio case it is said that an "exception 
to this rule is applied to one who improves or expends 
the money when he is acquainted with the true character 
of his title or with the fact that he has none." F·rom this 
it may be argued that the Stock instrument was of record 
and that, if effective as a conveyance, appellants should 
have been aware of such construction. It must be borne 
in mind, however, that Meagher himself had placed no 
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such interpretation upon the document and that his as-
sertion in that regard caine long after the discovery of 
oil and after his disclaimer to his children by way of his 
quitclaim deed to them. Furthermore, as previously 
shown, Stock repudiated the so-called release, and of this, 
respondent had knowledge. Whether Stock was right or 
wrong, it cannot be said of Stock that he spent his share 
of money 'vhen he knew that he had no title. All the 
testimony in the case is convincing that not only Stock, 
but his associates, believed or had reason to believe that 
their title was good. 
The court also said in the Migliaccio case : 
"The general rule of equitable estoppel is set 
forth in the following language in 19 Am. Jur., 
page 634, Sec. 34: '* * * Equitable estoppel or 
estoppel in pais is the principal by which a party 
who knows or should know the truth is absolutely 
precluded, both at law and in equity, from deny-
ing or asserting :the contrary of, any material fact, 
which, by his words or conduct, affirmative or 
negative, intentionally or through culpable negli-
gence, he has induced another, who was excusably 
ignorant of the true facts and who had a right to 
rely upon such words and conduct, to believe and 
act upon them thereby, as a consequence reason-
ably to be anticipated, changing his position in 
such a way that he would suffer injury if such 
denial or contrary assertion were allowed.'" 
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And further : 
"In addition it would appear contrary to com-
' . . . 
mon sense for respondent to invest In a mining 
venture without some memorandum in writing if 
1 . " he knew he had no interest on the c aims. 
The case is also valuable because the court con-
sidered the argument that the party claiming estoppel 
had knowledge of a prior unrecorded deed, before he ob-
tained his claimed interest in the property, and by reason 
of this knowledge as to the title situation, he is precluded 
from relying on the doctrine of estoppel. In spite of 
this argument, the court said: 
"It ill behooves appellant to contend now that 
respondent should suffer the loss because he was 
inexcusably negligent in not ferreting out the un-
disclosed truth. If appellant knew of the deed 
in Hammond's possession an honest disclosure of 
that fact by him at any time before August 9, 
1948, might have permitted respondent to protect 
his investment by other methods." 
Another very recent case is by th~ Supreme Court of 
Colorado, Johnson et al. v. Neel (1951), 229 P. 2d 939. 
While the facts are not analogous, the statement of the 
rule certainly commends itself to the court. 
-=-Portions of the syllabi say: 
"Doctrine of estoppel in pais is founded on 
principles of fair dealing and is designed to aid 
law in administration of justice where without 
its aid injustice might result. · 
* * * * 
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Generally, equitable estoppel is a rule of 
justice which in its proper field prevails over all 
other rules and doctrine Inay be invoked to cut 
off rights of privileges conferred by statute, and 
constitutional rights Inay he effectively waived by 
conduct consisting of action or failure to act. 
* * * * 
Parties who remain silent when they ought, 
in exercise of good faith, to speak, will not be 
heard to speak when in exercise of same good faith 
they ought to remain silent." 
Perhaps the leading case by the United States Su-
preme Court is Johnson v. Standard Mining Co. (1893), 
148 U. S. 360, 13 S. Ct. 360, 37 L. Ed. 480, where the 
court said: 
"While there is no direct or positive testimony 
that plaintiff had knowledge of what was taking 
place with respect to the title or development of 
the property, the circumstances were such as to 
put him upon inquiry; and the law is well settled 
that where the question of laches is in issue the 
plaintiff is chargeable with such knowledge as he 
might have obtained upon inquiry, provided the 
facts already known by him were such as to put 
upon a man of ordinary intelligence the duty of 
Inquiry. 
* * * * 
The duty of inquiry was all the more per-
emptory in this case from the fact that the prop-
erty of itself was of uncertain character, and was 
liable, as is most mining property, to suddenly 
develop an enormous increase in value. This is 
actually what took place in this case. A property 
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which, in October, 1880, plaintiff sold to Cha.tfie~d 
upon the basis of $4,800 for the whole mine IS 
charged, in a bill filed October. 21, 1887, to be 
worth $1,000,000, exclusive of Its accumulated 
profits. Under such circumstances, where prop-
erty has been developed by the courage and energy 
and at the expense of the defendants, courts will 
look with disfavor upon the claims of those who 
have lain idle while awaiting the results of this 
development, and will require not only clear proof 
of fraud, but prompt assertion of plaintiff's 
rights.* * * 
The language of Mr. Justice Miller in Twin 
Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 592, with 
regard to the fluctuating value of oil wells, is 
equally applicable to mining lodes: 'Property 
worth thousands to-day is worth nothing to-
morrow; and that which to-day would sell for a 
thousand dollars, at its fair value, may, by the 
natural changes of a week or the energy and cour-
age of desperate enterprise, in the same time be 
made to yield that much every day. The injustice, 
therefore, i~ obvious of permitting one holding the 
right to assert an ownership in such property to 
voluntarily await the event, and then decide, when 
the danger which is over has been at the risk of 
another, to come in and share the profit.'" 
As to equitable estoppel, relief is granted without 
any reference whatever as to time. As to laches, time is 
often an element. However, so far as this case is con-
cerned, there is no difference in the equitable principles 
involved. In respect to laches, our ease satisfies every 
possible time consideration. The delay in the assertion of 
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title \Yas nearly fiYe year~. The delay dt1ring the period 
of actual "'"ell-drilling \Yas approximately seven weeks . 
.... \nother case in \Yhich a clai1nant was silent and did 
not speak during the drilling of a \vell, where the drilling 
ti1ne \Vas particularly short, was the case of Merrill et al. 
v. Rocky lllo,unta,in Cattle Co. et al. (1919), 181 P. 964 
(\V.yo.). In this case, the exact dates are not given, but 
the right accrued in August and oil was discovered in 
October. In that case the right of the plaintiffs accrued, 
if at all, in August 1914, and during ..._~ugust 1914 they 
made a demand upon defendants. The defendants did not 
accede to the demand but on the contrary, at about the 
san1e time, granted a lease to the Ohio Oil Company, 
\vhich took possession of the disputed land, and placed 
casing thereon on September 21, 1914. They drilled a 
well which came in during October, 1914. Suit was 
brought February 13, 1915. In the Merrill case the drill-
ing occupied about a month, whereas in the present case 
it continued about seven weeks. The court, in a learned 
opinion, held the short time element was not important 
in view of the fact that the adverse claimant did not 
assert any adverse claim during the period when the oil 
and gas lease was being developed at great expense. 
Another important case is Hertzel v. Weber, 283 
F. 921 (8th C.C.A. 1922), a decision by Judge Lewis. 
The essential facts are almost identical with the case at 
bar. The so-called grantee permitted another party to 
develop certain land without denying the other party's 
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right to do so. The property involved was an oil lease-
hold. It was not until after oil was discovered that the 
so-called grantee denied the other party's right to drill 
the land. Of course the so-called grantee was estopped. 
The following sentence from the opinion is important. 
Referring to the so-called grantee the court said: 
"He knew from the beginning that Weber 
claimed to be in possession by right, operating 
the property under valid contracts with the les-
sees." 
And again: 
"There is no testimony showing that he noti-
fied W eher at any time until he brought this suit 
* * * that he claimed that Weber was in possession 
without right under void contracts, and that he 
intended to oust him. He sat by and permitted 
Weber to continue in the hazardous venture of 
mining operations, which may be profitable one 
day and disastrous the next. * * * After such con-
duct he should be estopped on familiar principles 
from thereafter asserting the contrary. * * * The 
doctrine of estoppel in pais 'proceeds upon the 
ground that he who has been silent as to his al-
leged rights when he ought in good faith to have 
spoken, shall not be heard to speak when he ought 
to be silent.' " 
Another case is Given v. Times-Republican Printing 
Co. et al., 114 F. 92, (8th C.C.A. 1902). This decision was 
by Judge Sanborn. In this case it was said: 
"No principle is more universal in the juris-
prudence of civilized nations, no principle is more 
equitable in itself or more salutary in its effects, 
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than that one \Yho, by his acts or representations, 
or by his silence \Yhen he ought to speak out, in-
tentionally or through culpable negligence induces 
another to believe certain facts to exist, and the 
latter rightfully acts on such a belief, so that he 
will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to 
deny the existence of such facts, is thereby con-
clusively estopped to interpose such denial." 
In Dickerson r. Colgrove et al. (1880), 100 U. S. 578, 
25 L. Ed. 618, the court said : 
"The estoppel here relied upon is known as an 
equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais. The law 
upon the subject ·is well settled. The vital princi-
ple is, that he who, by his language or conduct, 
leads another to do what he would not otherwise 
have done, shall not subject such person to loss or 
injury by disappointing the expectations upon 
which he acted. Such a change of position is 
sternly forbidden. It involves fraud and false-
hood, and the law abhors both. This remedy is 
always so applied as to pron1ote the ends of 
justice." 
Crane Co. v. James McHugh Sons, Inc., et al., 108 
F. 2d 55 (lOth C.C.A. 1939), a decision by Judge Phillips, 
where it is said that silence when according to the ordi-
nary experience and habits of men, one would naturally 
'speak out if he did not consent, is evidence from which 
consent may be inferred. 
Another important case is Transcontinental Oil Co. 
v. Spencer et al., 6 F. 2d 866 (5th C.C.A. 1925). This 
case involved the construction of an "unless" lease, al-
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though in this case a well was commenced and drilled 
in time, and discovered gas in one sand and salt water in 
a deeper sand. The lessors claimed that thereafter lessee 
did not prosecute their work with diligence. The court 
said that the evidence disclosed that at least one of the 
lessors, with full knowledge of suspension of operations, 
stood by without raising any question as to the continued 
existence of the lease and of the lessee's rights there-
under, while the latter resumed operations and prose-
cuted them until they resulted in the bringing in of a 
paying gas well. The court held that a lessor is not en-
titled to occupy the inconsistent position of acquiescence 
in the lessee going on under the lease, and at the same 
time retaining the right to rescind for a known breach of 
a condition by the lessee. 
Meagher has estopped himself by the record in this 
case to assert the Stock instrument as a conveyance. The 
reply that he verified on September 1, 1945 was a dis-
claimer of the Stock release as a conveyance because in 
the reply Meagher took the position that the lease did 
not exist. 
Furthermore, Mrs. Ivers, then Katherine C. Mea-
gher, acting on behalf of her father, by her letter of No-
vember 9, 1944 (R. 12), placed a construction upon the 
instrument as that of a release and not a conveyance and 
stated, in effect, that the release was but one of several 
to be obtained before the suit could be settled. Consistent 
with our theory, as will be hereinafter more particularly 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
47 
pointed out, the Stork instrun1ent was abortive for any 
purpose until the seenring ''of all the necessary releases 
of interest," the language used by ~frs. Ivers in the letter 
to the Judge of the Fourth Judicial Court under the date 
above indicated. :il[eagher is in no position to say that 
these appellants might have been acquainted with his 
clai1n of O\Ynership of one-half of the oil mineral lease-
hold estate \vhen he, himself, took no such position but, 
in fact, took the position of record that no lease existed-
the extreme opposite. 
That appellants Stock, Juhan and Weber changed 
their position by reason of the delay and the acts of 
Meagher, whose claim is now inconsistent with his former 
position, is obvious from the operating agreement, Ex-
hibit A-25, where, as owners of the working interests, 
they obligated themselves in a number of particulars to 
Equity Oil Company, as operator, including the payment 
or reimbursement for all operating costs, 50% by Weber, 
25% by Juhan and 25% by Stock. Operating expenses 
to May 31, 1950 were in excess of $580,000.00 (R. 255-
256). Furthermore, Stock obligated himself on July 9, 
1948, Exhibit A-51, to pay Juhan $19,500.00 for 3/16ths 
of the working interest in the leasehold, of which amount 
of money $6,500.00 was to go to Phebus. On the same day 
Equity Oil Company committed itself to a joint venture 
agreement with Stock and Juhan to prospect and develop 
the property involved, Exhibit A-52. 
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The existence of the leasehold having been deter-
mined by this court in its opinion of October 27, 1947, 
the same having become final by the remittitur issued 
under date of March 16, 1948, and Meagher, in the mean-
time, having disclaimed further interest in the property 
by his quitclaim to his children on January 27, 1948, ex-
cept for a royalty, and the Stock instrument not having 
been a previous issue in the case, and, so far as the record 
discloses, the Meagher children asserting no rights, all 
combine to reasonably suggest the course of action taken 
by Stock, Juhan, Weber and Equity Oil Company in the 
wildcat venture, making it inequitable for Meagher to 
now assert the contrary position, which is the basis of 
the doctrine of laches and estoppel. 
The failure of Meagher to assert under the circum-
stances in this case, which would require the utmost dili-. 
gence on his part in the enforcement of his alleged rights, 
presumes assent to the adverse right and the consequent 
waiver of the right sought to be enforced. Finding of 
Fact numbered 36 which negatives action or non-action 
attributable to Meagher, and Finding of Fact nun1bered 
37 that neither drilling operations nor expenditures were 
induced by or were undertaken in reliance upon anything 
attributable to Meagher, and that Stock and all other 
parties to this action dealt with the property subject to 
the exigencies of this litigation, with full knowledge that 
Meagher's interests were substantially in conflict with 
the claims of each defendant, and Finding of Fact num-
bered 41 that there has been no undue or substantial de-
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lay in the asssertion of the Meagher clailn, or in the pro-
seeution of this litigation by him, are contrary to the fact 
and to the la"T' as is like\vise Conclusion of Law num-
bered 15. 
The laches and estoppel by conduct and silence dis-
closed by the record can be clai1ned by Phebus and Juhan 
and those clai1ning by, through and under them, as well 
as by Stock. As to Phebus and Juhan the matter of- fur-
ther pleading by them was brought to an end by Mea-
gher's amended reply ordered filed August 3, 1949. Pos-
session taken on August 1, 1948 and the recording of 
Exhibit A-25 on January 6, 1949 were notice to the world 
of the drilling operations, the continuity of possession 
and the basis of the claim thereof. Furthermore, actual 
knowledge is charged to Meagher, as stated above, by his 
letter to Stock of June 18, 1945, Exhibit A-39, pertaining 
to the Stock-Hill instrument, Exhibit A-19. 
Meagher has not only barred himself by not having 
timely asserted his rights, if any, but to assert under the 
Stock instrument an interest in the leasehold constitutes 
a fraud, which brings us to the next point. 
4. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS IN THE CASE 
THE ASSERTION OF THE STOCK RELEASE AS 
A CONVEYANCE OR TRANSFER OF INTEREST 
CONSTITUTES FRAUD. 
Meagher did not take the witness stand nor did he 
in any way attempt to explain the clear import of written 
communications surrounding the execution of Exhibit 
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A-30. The writings are in evidence without objection and 
the problem of weight or credibility to be given oral 
testimony, so often found where there is an issue of 
fraud, is not present here. 
On January 7, 1944, on the letterhead of Bank of 
Vernal, Vernal, Utah, Meagher wrote to Stock at Cody, 
Wyoming, Exhibit A-26, as follows: 
"Dear Mr. Stock: 
Years ago I bought all of the interests of M. 
P. Smith and others to the 'Gas Well Ranch'-480 
acres lying about ten miles BE of Vernal, subject 
to 12¥2% outstanding royalties and the lease that 
existed. 
I find the records show the lease assignments 
running to you, then your agreement with the 
Stand~rd of Calif. for a drilling operation. The 
Standard of Calif. re-assigned the lease to you 
and Ray Phebus, but Archie Lewies (Lewis) 
never recorded any instrument· from you and 
Ray. He has abandoned the field,-gas exhausted, 
-and he sold the pipe, etc. to Jos. Juhan, who 
pulled the pipe and sold it. 
My trouble is to clear the title of the lease 
and the records stop with the above. Archie 
Lewis says he got all of the interest you and Ray 
had, and he says he turned all to Juhan. I can get " 
Archie to sign any instrument needed to clear my 
title, if necessary, but the record is what must be 
cleared. 
I am writing Ray, addressing my letter to 
him to Thermopolis. I know he is not there, but 
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I am taking a chance it will be forwarded to him. 
Do you kn(nY his address J? Will you please send it 
to Ine~ 
If you are willing to execute a release I shall 
have one prepared and submitted to you, and I 
will yery much appreciate your help . 
.. A .. Yery hap·py New Year to you and all my 
good wishes." (Italics ours) . 
On the same day 1feagher wrote to Phebus, Exhibit 
A-31, at Thermopolis, Wyoming, as follows: 
"Dear Mr. Phebus: 
First of all let me wish you and Mrs. Phebus 
a very happy New Year. It is a long time since 
you both used to be in .the 'Gas office' here,-
a long time since I have seen you. 
Perhaps you know that Archie Lewis no 
longer srnpplies gas to Vernal City,-on acco~tnt 
of the field being exhausted,-and he sold the 
line, etc. to J os. Juhan who pulled the pipe and 
sold it. 
The object of my letter is to ask if you are 
willing to give a quit-claim deed or release or 
some instrument that is proper to clear my title 
to the land. I own the land and bought from 
M. P. Smith years ago all interests, subject to 
the lease and agreement, - except outstanding 
royalties totaling 12¥2%. These royalties remain. 
All I want is a release from you and Paul Stock, 
Archie Lewis and Jos. Juhan,-successors to you. 
The trouble is after you agreed with the Standard 
of California for a drilling operation, which they 
surrendered the assignment of the lease to you 
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remains of record for oil. You assigned for gas 
to the Ashley Valley Oil Co. or the Valley Fuel 
Supply Co., or some one of those comp~ni~s w~th 
(which) Archie Lewis controlled. Archi~ Is will-
ing to do anything desired to clear my title. My 
attorney advises to clear it by a quiet-title suit, 
but that is not needed, if I can get quit-claim 
deeds he advises. If I shall have such instrument 
as is necessary prepared for this purpose are 
you willing to execute it~ If so, I shall then have 
it prepared and submitted to you. 
I am still holding down this corner and 
though not making money in banking at present 
still we are making a little progress one year 
after another. 
Again my very best wishes to you." (Italics 
ours). 
The letter that immediately preceded the signing 
of the Stock instrument was dated October 16, 1944, 
Exhibit A-27, directed to Stock at Cody, Wyoming, and 
signed by Katherine C. Meagher, the attorney daughter 
of N. J. Meagher, as follows: 
"Dear Mr. Stock : 
As attorney for my father, Mr. N.J. Meagher, 
I have started a quiet title suit in the district 
court of Uintah County, but I have been assured 
that you do not claim any interest of any sort 
in the Ashley Oil Field and will sign a release 
of any interests you had in the past, so the release 
may be recorded. 
The release is enclosed, and would you mind 
please signing it and returning it to me by return 
mail~ 
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~\lthough I do not kno'v you, Mr. Stock, I've 
heard so 1nany nice things about both you and 
~Ir. Phebus from my father that I almost feel as 
if you are an old friend of 1nine as well. 
''rith kindest personal regards, I am," (Italics 
ours). 
The construction that Meagher placed upon the 
entire situation is found in a letter, Exhibit A-28, on 
the stationery of Bank of \..,.ernal, Vernal, Utah, Novem-
ber 9, 194-±, directed to Phebus at Englewood, Cali-
fornia, signed by N. J. Meagher, as follows: 
"Dear ~fr. Phebus: 
I have been requested for a lease on the 480 
acres of land which I own and which you will 
recollect as the place where you obtained gas_ for 
Vernal City. Archie Lewis was here for the past 
two weeks and he executed releases for the Uintah 
Gas Co. and Valley Fuel Supply Co. I also ob-
tained a release from Paul Stock. All of these are 
recorded. 
My daughter advised me that she heard from 
you, though I have not your letter, and that you 
wished to have the opinion of your attorney re-
garding the release. Of course, that is all right. 
On the other hand your attorney may not be fully 
advised of the facts; that the lease carries re-
quirements which have not been fulfilled; that 
no oil in commercial quantities was ever dis-
covered there, and that only gas was developed 
and sold, but the two companies,-V alley Fuel 
Supply Co. and Uintah Gas Co.,-ceased their 
operations over two years ago. The gas line was 
sold to one Juhan, who pulled all the pipe from 
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the wells to Vernal and pulled the connections 
into the homes here. The State Utilities Commis-
sion granted a permit to Arch Lewis to cease pro-
duction there over two years ago and Arch Lewis 
got a decree of court dissolving both the corpora-
tions -Uintah Gas Co. and Valley Fuel Supply 
Co. There is also a requirement in the lease that 
on failure to do certain things the holder of the 
lease rights is required to release the land. Under 
these conditions will you, therefore, kindly send 
in the release promptly, as I have a possibility 
of getting the area drilled. Any one shies from 
an area on which a lease is recorded as they do 
not care to have any mixup or possibility of a 
mixup if production were obtained. 
I believe. you know I wo·uld not ask for sur-
render of anybody's rights without payment, but 
in this instance actually no rights exist for any-
body through that old lease of 1924. I would 
therefore appreciate your kind consideration of 
my request and send the release to me or to my 
daughter as soon as possible. If your attorney 
has not returned the release to you I shall have 
another made, exactly as Paul Stock signed or as 
Arch Lewis signed, except that yours is individual 
and Arch's is for the corporations. There is no 
responsibility attached to your giving the release; 
it is merely that you have no interest in it and 
any interest you had may have been assigned, 
but in your releasing no instrument that you 
gave of conveyance is affected. It is like giving 
a quit-claim deed (not a warranty of title) which 
indicates you have no interest in it. Of course, 
you consulted your attorney whose advice it is 
proper to follow, if he has the facts on which 
to base his decision. 
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Ray, have you got an abstract to that prop-
erty'? I have only a partial one. I wonder if you 
furnished an abstrart to the Standard of Calif. 
Those leases and assignments are quite lengthy 
and they clutter up the title a lot, so if there 
is an abstract that I can obtain without having 
the expense of that history in full, I should like 
to obtain it. 
I see you are enjoying a better climate than 
we usually have, but I cannot object to the kind 
of weather we have had during the past few 
months,-just grand. 
If you ever drive through this way do not 
pass me by. I am at the same old stand and I shall 
always be very glad to see you. 
My best wishes to you always." (Italics ours). 
Stock first met Meagher at Vernal in 1928 when 
Phebus and Stock were building a gas line. During that 
time both Phebus and Stock were in and out of Vernal, 
and then after leaving Vernal they would see Meagher 
on occasional visits to that part of the country. Stock 
knew Meagher to be a banker of repute in that vicinity 
and had never had occasion until after October of 1944 
to question anything that Meagher might have repre-
sented to be a fact (R. 293-294). 
The letter that Meagher wrote to Stock on January 
7, 1944 was answered on Stock's behalf under date of 
January 17th of that year, Exhibit A-32. Confusing 
a royalty situation with Meagher's request for a release, 
L. G. Hinkley, who wrote the letter to Meagher on behalf 
of Stock, stated the following: 
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"Dear Mr. Meagher : 
Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of 
January 7 addressed to Mr. Paul Stock at Cody, 
Wyoming. This letter has been handed to me 
for reply. 
Mr. Stock advises that if you will prepare the 
necessary instrument to clear the outstanding 
royalties on the lease mentioned in your letter 
that he will sign this instrument and return the 
same to you which will enable you to record same 
and clear the title. I would suggest that the 
instrument be prepared for the signature of Paul 
Stock only, as Ray Phebus is not in this part 
of the Country. I believe his address is some-
where in Illinois. 
If you will write to Mr. Robert Connaghan, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming, I am sure he will be able 
to give you Mr. Phebus' correct address." (Italics, 
ours). 
The Hinkley letter is consistent with Stock's uncon-
tradicted testimony on direct-examination when called 
as a witness·for Meagher: 
"Q (By Mr. Wheat) Now when you signed 
this release, this Exhibit A-30, did you under-
stand it to be a release of all of your inter-
ests in the oil lease covering the lands in-
volved in this suit~ 
A No, sir. (R. 262). 
Q. (By Mr. Wheat) Now Mr. Stock, tell us in 
your own words what your understanding was 
with respect to that document. (R. 264). 
;A I thought that I was releasing to Mr. Meaghe·r 
a royalty that we had obtained from him to 
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drill a well. There was son1e overriding roy-
alty and ",.e wanted to reduce the royalty, 
"~hich "~e did do. And this, the overriding 
royalty, amounted to so much, and if we 
didn't drill the well, we had-I don't kno~ 
'vhether we legally give it back, we intended 
to give hin1 back his royalty if we didn't 
drill the well, but we did later drill the well. 
·Q. (By Mr. Wheat) But in any event, the state 
of your mind at the time you executed that 
document was that you were giving back to 
~feagher the royalties he had transferred to 
you and Mr. Phebus in order to cut down 
the outstanding royalties at the time you 
transferred the lease to the Standard Oil 
Company, isn't that right~ 
A That was right." (R. 265). 
The recitals contained in Exhibit A-30, the Stock 
release, are consistent with the representations made by 
Meagher in his correspondence. Divorcing for the 
moment any question of mistake of either fact or law, 
or both, we have a clear continuity of representation 
by Meagher that no interest existed and that nothing 
was asked for by way of interest, all coupled with the 
statement that the requested document was contract-
ually required for ;the purpose of removing a cloud 
upon a title that Meagher represented as already owning. 
It was under those circumstances, and without considera-
tion, that the release was executed. Meagher's position 
as a banker in Uintah County, respected by Stock, put 
him into the position of being able to assert, as a fact, 
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that Stock had no interest and that he, Meagher, had 
the right to require of Stock something by way of con-
tract. This is clearly stated in the release, a document 
prepared by Meagher's daughter (R. 297), as follows: 
"Whereas the lessee and his assigns agreed 
that upon failure to fulfill the terms of the lease, 
'The lessee hereby agrees to relinquish, cancel 
and surrender the same to the lessors and to clear 
the record title of said lands from the lien or 
burden of said lease by making, executing, ac-
knowledging and delivering a proper conveyance 
or release thereof and causing the same to be 
recorded in the office of the County Clerk and 
Recorder of the County where the said lands are 
situated, without expense to the lessors.' " 
Meagher, as one of the holders of a royalty, con-
sented to the modification agreement of May 21, 1927, 
Exhibit A-5, and is presumed to have known the con-
tents thereof. The modification agreement of the date 
mentioned, by its express terms, paragraph III thereof, 
"fully discharged, superseded and replaced" the portion 
of the lease of June 4, 1924 quoted in the above recital. 
The release is so drafted that, by even the most casual 
inspection, one could not say other than that the release 
was required from Stock as a matter of contractual 
stipulation, when in truth and in fact such did not exist. 
Meagher took further advantage in purposely stating 
by the additional recital: 
"Whereas, Paul Stock derived his interests 
by virtue of an assignment of the rights under 
this original lease;" 
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'vithout 1naking any reference to the n1odification agree-
Inent, kno"\\ying, or being in a position "\vhere he should 
haYe kno\vn, that Stock, a ren1ote assignee of the rights 
existent by virtue of the 1nodification agreement, was 
not under the recited contractual disability of the orig-
inal R. C. l{illlease of June -±, 1924. 
Thus, :Jieagher secured the execution of the Stock 
release under date of October 21, 1944, and he now, in 
the face of the record and the uncontroverted document-
ary evidence, claims the same as a conveyance or transfer 
of one-half of the oil mineral estate under the lease, as 
modified-after this court has held the leasehold to exist. 
The position of }feagher is unconscionable and his asser-
tion spells fraud. The relationship of the parties, the 
lack of any consideration, the overreaching and the mis-
statement of the factual situation can mean nothing 
else. 
What has been said with reference to point 3, as 
to change of position and the specific findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in connection therewith, are equally 
applicable to this point. Furthermore, Finding of Fact 
numbered 38, as follows: 
"Meagher did not defraud or deceive Stock 
by .previously asserting that the lease was can-
celled and that Stock had no interest therein, 
although Meagher now claims an interest in the 
lessee's rights and contends that he acquired an 
interest in the lessee's rights from Stock. The 
aforesaid erroneous assertion by Meagher was not 
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made with the intent to deceive or mislead Stock, 
and did not deceive or mislead Stock, nor did 
Stock rely thereon. No facts have been proved 
upon which any fraudulent or deceitful conduct 
can be attributed to Meagher with respect to Stock 
or any other party to this action.", 
and that portion of Finding of F·act numbered 39, as 
follows: 
"The recitals in A30 are attributable to 
Meagher, but none were made with the intent to 
deceive or mislead Stock, and said recitals did 
not deceive or mislead Stock, and were not relied 
upon by Stock.", 
are not supported by the evidence but are contrary to 
the evidence and to law. Likewise is Conclusion of Law 
numbered 16 to the effect that neither Stock nor any 
other defendant is entitled to rescind the alleged trans-
fer from Stock to Meagher, document A-30, on any basis. 
The recitals in A-30 are, in and of themselves, evidence 
of fraud and certainly in the more charitable vein clearly 
indicative of mistake. 
The court in its memorandum decision considered 
the question of recitals as an aid to interpretation-
something which we will discuss later-but did not con-
sider them as evidence of mistake or fraud in the induce-
ment of the making of the instrument. While no cases 
have come to our attention like this one on their facts, 
some statements of general principles in certain decided 
cases, and the tacit treatment of a recital in at least one 
case, may be of some assistance. 
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In considering the effect of a recital in an action 
brought upon 1nistake of la"T or fact, the nature of 
recitals, and their purpose, should not be overlooked. 
In :2 Devlin on Real Estate (3rd Ed.), Section 992, 
it is said: 
'~Recitals are introduced for the purpose of 
explaining 'vhy the deed is executed, or of show-
ing circumstances which preserve the connection 
in the chain of title, and are considered as being 
of two kinds, particular and general." 
In Jones Legal Forn~s (Annotated), Chapter 22, 
Form 22-4, it is said : 
"A brief statement of the circumstances giv-
ing rise to the agreement will often serve to 
clarify other,vise doubtful provisions. Such state-
ments are usually made in a preamble, introduced 
by the word 'whereas.' " 
And see 3 Nichols Cyclopedia of Legal Forms, Con-
tracts, Section 3.14: 
"It is often advisable to begin the contract, 
after its formal commencement, with recitals pre-
ceded by the words 'whereas', to show the exact 
condition of the parties, the subject matter, the 
purpose of the contract, etc." 
As said in 4 Nichols Cyclopedia of Legal Forms, 
Deeds, page 66, n. 7 4: 
"Recitals in a deed are often included to 
show the reason for the conveyance, to further 
identify the parties, to explain the grantor's 
claim of title, etc. They are for the purpose of 
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explaining why the deed is executed or of sh~"\v­
ing circumstances which preserve the connection 
in the chain of title." 
And in 6 Thompson on Real Property, Section 3186, 
page 346, it is said: 
"The office of narrative recitals is ·to state 
the facts and instruments through which the 
grantor's title is deduced; and the office of intro-
ductory recitals is to explain the motive of the 
grantor in making the conveyance." 
The authorities above quoted indicate that a recital 
IS often used to show the motive (i.e. inducement) of 
a transaction. In basing a case upon mistake or mis-
representation it, of course, must be shown that the 
grantor was mistaken as to a fact, and that the fact 
induced the contract or whatever we have here. That 
the facts were not true, we have a Supreme Court 
decision, the law o{ the case, to show this. But is 1the 
judge justified in finding that the mistake did not induce 
the transaction~ 
Wigmore, in speaking of the difference between 
contracts or transactions which are void, and those which 
are voidable, in IX Wigmore on Evidence (3rd Ed.) 
Section 2423, says : 
"So far, then, as an act is held to be void-
able, it must be for some other reason than one 
of the foregoing elements, that is, some reason 
which concedes that the act is jural and lawful 
in its subject, intelligible and definite in its terms, 
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and final in its utterance, and that in all these 
respects there existed in the actor an intention 
to do the act, or a volition having consequences 
equivalent to intention. 
The inquiry, therefore, is, What is the dis-
tinction between these elements, the lack of which 
leaves the act void, and those other elements 
'vhich 1nerely make the act voidable? 
The other ele1nents are all reducible finally 
to a single consideration, namely, that of motive, 
-i.e. the relation between the actor's state of 
mind and some fact external to himself and his 
act. This consideration of Motive falls under 
three general heads : 
1. When the fact creating the motive is 
somewhere mentioned in the terms of the act, it 
is commonly spoken of as a Condition, i.e. a 
reservation of an option to annul. Conditions may 
be established by express stipulation in the act, 
or by implication of law. Of the latter sort may 
be, for example, in contracts, a description of a 
horse's pedigree; in deeds, a description of land 
as containing specified buildings; in wills, a re-
cital (incorrectly) of the death of an elder son 
as the reason for devising to a younger one. * * *" 
A statement which seems to fit in with the general 
discussion here IS that found in Holmes, The Common 
Law, page 326: 
"It is not then true, as it is sometimes said, 
that the law does not concern itself with the 
motives for making contracts. On the contrary, 
the whole scope of fraud outside the contract is 
the creation of false motives and the removal of 
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true ones. And this consideration will afford a 
reasonable test of the cases in which fraud will 
warrant rescission. It is said that a fraudulent 
representation must be material to have that 
effect. But how are we to decide whether it is 
material or not~ If the above argument is cor-
rect it must be by an appeal to ordinary experience 
to decide whether a belief that the fact was as 
represented would naturally have led to, or a 
contrary belief would naturally have prevented, 
the making of the contract." 
In A.dam.son et ux. v. Brockbank et al. (1947), 112 
Utah 52, 185 P. 2d 264, one of the~rockhanks importuned 
respondents to sign a quitclaim deed, after repeatedly 
informing them that the sole purpose of the deed was 
to clear up a discrepancy in the boundary line between 
appellants' and respondents' property. In order to 
finance a construction program originating with the 
Brockbanks, who with others were appellants, it was 
necessary to secure title insurance which could not be 
done until the title to the strip in dispute was cleared. 
One of the appellants, repeatedly informed respondents 
that the sole purpose of the deed was to clear up the 
discrepancy in the boundary and thereupon respond-
ents executed the deed. No consideration was paid for 
the deed and no discussion was had with respect to 
releasing respondents' rights to the use of a ditch, the 
subject of the action, and for the destruction of which · 
the respondents were seeking damages against the ap-
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pellants as well as cancellation of the quitclaim. As 
to Brockbank's (one of the grantors) intention, the 
court said: 
" .. A .. ppellant Brockbank never considered that 
respondents had quitclaimed their right to the 
use of the ditch until he discussed it with his 
attorney, and if Alan E. Brockbank intended to 
obtain more than a correction of an erroneous 
description, then he misrepresented his intentions 
to respondents." 
The court points out that respondents did not under-
stand that their rights to the use of the· ditch were 
included in the deed and that they relied on the state-
ments of the appellant Brockbank to the effect that the 
deed was only for the purpose of clearing up the dis-
crepancy; further, Brockbank, one of the appellants, 
had knowledge of the existence of the easement and he 
knew that his representations as to the purpose and 
effect of the quitclaim were not true. The trial court 
set aside the deed and this court sustained the ruling. 
On the question raised by appellants that the alleged 
fraud and misrepresentation did not support the action 
of the trial court this court said : 
"* * * appellant Brockbank made a repre-
sentation of a material fact in that he represented 
that the purpose of the deed was solely to clear 
up the discrepancy in the boundaries. That such 
representation was false is amply supported by 
the acts and conduct of appellant Brockbank. He 
was in the real estate business, had handled 
many conveyances of property, was familiar with 
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the legal effect of deeds, prepared the deed so it 
covered more property than was intended, denied 
he intended to include the rights to the use of 
the ditch, and yet later insisted that the deed 
has extinguished respondents' rights. The court 
found that during the time Brockbank was nego-
tiating with respondents for this quitclaim deed 
he had knowledge of the existence of the ease-
ment, and although he testified to the contrary, 
the court was fully justified in disbelieving his 
testimony. * * * When Brockbank made the state-
ment to respondents that the only effect of the 
deed was to clear up the existing discrepancy in 
the boundary lines, he did not actually believe, 
upon reasonable grounds, that the representation 
was true. The representation was made with 
intention that it would be acted upon, and was 
acted upon by respondents to their detriment. 
Furthermore, respondents were obviously ignor-
ant of its falsity, yet reasonably believed it to be 
true. These facts, under the rules of law previ-
ously announced by this court, clearly makes out 
a case of fraud and misrepresentation." 
The case of Burton v. Haden et al. (1908), 60 S.E. 
736 (Va.), is an oft-cited case in the field of restitution. 
The action was one to set aside and annul a conveyance 
of real property because of the mutual mistake as to 
the interest and title of the grantor in the tract con-
veyed. In discussing the question of mistake the court 
said: 
"It appears from the deed itself that the 
grantor was of opinion that she had title to only 
an undivided one-third interest, and that E. H. 
Burton, the grantee, already had title to the re-
maining two-thirds interest." 
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The defense 'Yas that the deed was a compromise 
of doubtful rights and that the n1istake, if any, was· one 
of la'v. Said the court : 
''We do not think the claim that the deed 
was the result of compromise of doubtful rights 
can be maintained. It presents none of the ele-
ments of a compromise. The grantee claimed a 
two-thirds interest in this tract of land, and 
obtained the whole of it. The grantor, under a 
mistake as to her rights, undertook to convey 
an undivided one-third interest, for which she 
received rather more than half of its value. It 
is true that the language of the deed is very 
clear: 'It is conceded by said Eugenia L. Haden, 
party of the first part, that said E. H. Burton 
has title to an undivided two-thirds interest in 
the above-described property. And the said 
Eugenia L. Haden hereby disclaims any interest 
or claim to the said undivided two-thirds hereby 
admitted to be vested in said E. H. Burton.' 
That is not the language of the compromise of 
a doubtful right; but is the recognition of an 
undisputed right which she, acting under a mis-
take as to her title, was of opinion had already 
vested in her grantee, and in which she, there-
fore, had no interest, and over which she had no 
control. It is true that the deed continues: 'But 
whatever be the interest of the said Eugenia L. 
Haden in and to said tract of land, it is the intent 
of this deed to convey the whole of her said inter-
est, be the same one-third or more, to the said 
E. H. Burton.' But the deed is to be construed 
as a whole; and it is inconceivable that the 
grantee, with knowledge as to the condition of 
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her title and that she was the owner in fee simple 
of the e~tire tract, would have parted with it for 
the consideration named in the deed." (Italics 
ours). 
In the present case it is inconceivable that Stock, 
knowing that Meagher had no right to a release or sur-
render, and knowing that he was under no obligation 
to release and of the construction now placed upon the 
instrument, would have transferred or conveyed his 
rights without consideration. In Burton v. Haden, supra, 
the court recognized the rule that a mistake of an 
antecedent legal right is ground for relief in equity and 
cancelled the instrument. 
The cases dealing with the evidential value of 
recitals are important read in the light of purposes of 
recitals. The recitals in the instrument are attributable 
to ~Ieagher, he having prepared the same. He put words 
into Stock's mouth, in effect: "I am under duty to give 
you this release, therefore, I am giving it." 
The Wigmore quotations, supra, come close to what 
we have here, namely: a motive mentioned in the terms 
of the act. Showing that the condition failed to exist 
as a fact, that Stock was not under duty to release to 
Meagher, renders the act at least voidable if not void. 
Meagher was responsible for creating in Stock the men-
tal attitude shown by the recitals in A-30. The motive 
expressed as a condition, proven to be wrong and shown 
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to have originated with }.Ieagher, the thing itself, A-30, 
is void. ''Thether it be called fraud or rnistake is of little 
consequence-the result is the same. 
There 'Yas no thought in Stock's mind, and this is 
supported by the recitals, that anything of virility was 
passing from him to Meagher. Meagher, the scrivener 
of the release, by its mere presentation to Stock, said, 
in effect, that nothing of virility existed. For Meagher to 
turn around now and say, in the face of the recitals 
and his letters, that he, Meagher, had a different inten-
tion, would be to permit the perpetration of a fraud. 
That is true if the law does concern itself with the 
motives for making contracts and if "the whole scope 
of fraud outside the contract is the creation of false 
motives and the removal of true ones" as stated by 
Holmes, The Common Law, supra. 
In the case of Adamson v. Brockbank, supra, this 
court said: 
"To insist that respondents conveyed away 
a right as valuable as the one herein involved, 
without consideration, shocks one's sense of 
justice, and the court should scrutinize all the 
facts to determine whether the conveyance was 
obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, or trick-
ery." 
The principle apparent _from the record in our case 
is parallel with several of the principles announced in 
the Brockbank case, including the expression of the court 
therein, as follows : 
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"In considering the last of the principles 
above quoted, it is sufficient to state t~at appel-
lant Brockbank, by virtue of hjs superior knowl-
edge; by his act of taking respondents .to the 
courthouse and pointing out the plats which re-
vealed the existing discrepancy; by assuring re-
spondents he would satisfy their mortgagee that 
the quitclaim deed was only for the purpose of 
clearing up the discrepancy; by obtaining clear-
ances from the mortgagee of respondents' proper-
ty; and by having a representative of the title 
insurance company further assure them of the 
necessity and purpose of the deed; all these were 
such circumstances as justified respondents in 
relying on Brockbank's representations without 
making an independent investigation." 
Just as in the Brockbank case we have a situation 
here where 
"* * * we are not concerned with the rights 
of bona fide purchasers ; we are only concerned 
with the rights between the parties to the tran-
saction." 
The letters from Meagher and his daughter, the 
release pointing out in its recitals the book and page 
in the recorder's office of that portion of the June 4, 
1924 lease, later abrogated, no reference made to the 
modification of May 21, 1927, the position of Meagher 
in the community, his immediate access to the county 
records and Stock's presence at Cody, Wyoming, many 
miles distant, make a striking parallel to the portions 
of the Brockbank case quoted above, and also the further 
expression of this court in that case as follows: 
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Hln the situation confronting us we have 
other circumstances and conditions. We need not 
go into these, as the representation here was one 
of fact, i.e., that the purpose and effect of the 
deed was only to fix the boundary. If appellant, 
Alan Brockbank, was falsely intending to obtain 
more under the deed, then this was a misrepre-
sentation as to his intentions. This is the case of 
a grantee inducing the grantor to execute a deed 
which, unbeknown to the grantor because of his 
ignorance of such matters, conveyed much more 
than the grantor intended it to convey." (Italics 
ours). 
5. EXHIBIT A-30 LACKS CONSIDERATION. 
Finding of Fact numbered 42 as follows: 
"In consideration of the transfer A30 from 
Stock to Meagher, Meagher relinquished his right 
to require Stock to perform the obligations of 
the lessee which Stock was bound to perform 
previous to Meagher's acceptance of said traris-. 
fer.", 
IS the only finding of consideration. This finding, we 
contend, is not supported by, but contrary to, the evi-
dence and law. There was no consideration for the so-
called release, A -30. 
The court does not point out the obligations of the 
lessee which Stock was allegedly bound to perform 
previous to Meagher's acceptance of A-30, nor what 
Meagher relinquished by way of right against Stock. 
It must be borne in mind that the lease, as modified, 
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is a unit so far as performance is concerned. Meagher 
could not relinquish a portion of performance any Inore 
than Stock could effectively relinquish a portion of the 
lease. This court has said, in effect, in its former deci-
sion, that the consideration for the lease had been earned 
long prior to A-30. 
If Meagher was in the position of the landlord, 
which he was not, he still would have had to contend 
with Juhan, the owner of all of the gas mineralleaseho~d 
estate, and with Phebus, the owner of one-half of the 
oil mineral estate. There was no obligation singled out 
for Stock to perform that Meagher could waive or fore-
go by way of consideration. There was no privity 
between Meagher and Phebus, or between Meagher and 
Juhan. They, and particularly Juhan, had the right to 
the enjoyment of their respective mineral estates irre-
spective of Meagher. Carried to the P-xtreme, the finding 
treats the situation as if Stock were the sole lessee and 
under obligation to Meagher the landlord in the matter 
of performance and as if Meagher l1ad released Stock 
of his obligations. None of these things existed nor was 
such bargained for. 
In a pretrial conference held at Vernal on Novem-
ber 12, 1949, (p. 50, A-58), counsel for Meagher stipu-
lated that there was no cash or money paid for the 
document of October 21, 1944. On page 94 of the exhibit 
counsel states, in effect, the substance of the above 
finding and said in part: 
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•·r an1 not trying to assert at this ti1ne that 
there ":ras a violation of those things to do by 
Stock, but most any lessee, as long as he is a 
lessee, is subjected to obligations. And when he 
surrenders and the landlord accepts the surren-
der he is freed of those obligations, and from 
ti1ne im1nen1orial that has been considered suffi-
cient legal consideration to support a surrender 
even though no money or other things of value 
are involved." 
The foregoing might well be true if Stock was the 
owner of the entire oil and gas mineral estate. But this 
was not the fact. Some argument might be made if there 
was an obligation of performance for which Stock could 
singly be made accountable, but such is not the case. 
The contention is confused with the normal surrender 
clause where the surrender is made by the lessee hold-
ing the entire mineral estate to a landlord who is en-
titled to receive the same, resulting in a merger of title. 
The idea of consideration, as expressed by counsel and 
as reflected in the above finding, is but a play upon words 
because there was, in fact, no consideration. The docu-
ment recites no consideration. It is conceded that no 
money or cash was paid for the same and Meagher, in 
his letter to Phebus on November 9, 1944, said"/ believe 
you know I would not ask for surrender of anybody's 
rights without payment, but in this instance actually 
no rights exist for anybody through that old .Zease of 
1924." (Italics ours). 
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Gross crude oil sales from the property arnounted 
to more than $672,000.00 from September 18, 1948 up 
to and including May 31, 1950 (R. 255). Meagher would 
contend that the nebulous theory of consideration, as 
outlined above, supports A-30 as a transfer or convey-
ance of one-half of values immediate and prospective 
as so indicated, less royalty. Inadequacy of considera-
tion may be so gross as to shock the conscience and 
common sense of all men and may amount both at law 
and in equity to proof of fraud. This was the statement 
of the Washington court in Sova v. First Nat. Bank 
of Ferndale (1943), 138 P. 2d 181, 190, where it is 
stated: 
"And in 12 Am. Jur. p. 617, section 122, 
appears the following text: '* * * Doubtless, 
however, the inadequacy may be so flagrant as of 
itself to afford a presumption of fraud, as, for 
instance, if the contract is, in the language of 
Lord Hardwicke, such as no man in his senses 
and not under delusion would make on the one 
hand, and as no honest or fair man would accept 
on the other.' " 
In the instant case we go even further. There was 
no consideration. There was no bargain for an interest 
and nothing intended to be conveyed or transferred. 
There was no donative intent so a gift cannot be spelled 
out of the transaction. Divorcing from the transaction 
reflected by A-30, the construction that Meagher, sheerly 
out of . self-interest, would now place upon the same, 
the situation resolves itself into the simple equation-
Meagher represented and Stock believed as shown by 
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his signature to the docu1nent that the lease of June 4-, 
19~4 \\Tas cancelled by ternlination of production of oil 
and gas "in accordance \vi th the terms of the lease," 
and that Stock \\Tas ron'tractually bound under the cir-
cumstances to execute the release. Both of these propo-
sitions \\Tere untrue. The contractual stipulation found 
in the lease of J nne -1, 19:2-1 had been annulled and 
abrogated by the modification agree1nent of May 21, 
1927 and Stock was not under a contractual duty to 
release. The lease of June -1, 1924, as modified by the 
agreement of ~lay 21, 1927, was not cancelled by ter-
mination of production of oil and gas, or otherwise, 
as decided by this court in its decision of Oetober 27, 
1947. To make a transfer or conveyance out of the 
instrument is as unrealistic as finding numbered 42, 
which reaches out into thin air to find a consideration 
to support such theory. For convenience we quote the 
entire release, Exhibit A-30, omitting the acknowledg-
ment and recording data, as follows: 
"RELEASE 
Whereas, a certain oil and gas lease dated 
the 4th day of June, 1924, given by James Wash 
Sheridan and Iva H. Sheridan, his wife, and 
Francis Hamilton Sheridan, lessors, to R. C. 
Hill, lessee, and covering the following described 
land in the County of Uintah, and State of Utah, 
to-wit: 
Section 15-EV2 of SElJ!; Section 22-E¥2 
of NEl!J,; NE14 of SE14; Section 23-NW14 of 
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N\tVl!t ; Slf2 of NW1,4 ; Nlf2 of SW:J4 ; SW1;4 of 
NEI)!; NW14 of SEl;i, all in Township 5 South, 
Range 22 East, Salt Lake Meridian. 
was recorded on the 25th day of July, 1924, in 
Book 3 of Miscellaneous Records at pages 313-
318, of the records in the office of the County 
Recorder of Uintah County, Utah, and 
Whereas the lessee and his assigns agreed 
that upon failure to fulfill the terms of the lease, 
'The lessee hereby agrees to relinquish, cancel 
and surrender the same to the lessors and to 
clear the record title of said lands from the lien 
or burden of said lease by making, executing, 
acknowledging and delivering a proper convey-
ance or release thereof and causing the same 
to be recorded in the office of the County Clerk 
and Recorder of the County where the said lands 
are situated, without expense to the lessors.' 
( P. 317, Book 3, Miscellaneous records) ; 
Whereas, Paul Stock derived his interests by 
virtue of an assignment of the rights under this 
original lease; 
Whereas, the said lease and all rights there-
to or incidental thereto are now owned by N. J. 
Meagher by virtue of cancellation of the lease 
by termination of production of oil and gas in 
accordance with the terms of the lease; 
Now, therefore, know all men by these pres-
ents, that Paul Stock does hereby cancel, release, 
relinquish and surrender to N. J. Meagher, his 
heirs and assigns, all of his right, title and 
interest in and to the said oil and) gas lease, and 
all of his right, ti~tle and interest in and to the 
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::;aid oil and gas lease in so far as it conveys the 
lands above described. 
In ,, ... itness '\""hereof, the said Paul Stock has 
set his hand this 21st day of October, 1944. 
Paul Stock." 
By reason of the so-called release n{eagher_ 1s 
claiming one-half of the oil rights in property unpro-
ductive, so far as the oil mineral estate is concerned, 
until September 1948, but which produced, after the 
expenditure of substantial risk capital in a locality 
previously unproductive of oil, more than $672,000.00 
from September 18, 1948 to and including May 31, 1950 
and in the potentialities of future earnings indicated by 
such a production record. The fact that Meagher paid 
nothing for the interest that he claims was transferred 
by the foregoing instrument does indeed shock the 
conscience of all fair-minded men and is in and of 
itself sufficient to compel the intervention of a court 
of equity. The lack of consideration is evidence of the 
fraud heretofore said to have been perpetrated. In 
this connection we again quote from Adamson v. Brock-
bank, supra, as follows : 
"The testimony indicates there was no con-
sideration for the deed. This is at variance with 
the stated consideration of $10; however, no 
United States revenue stamps appear on the 
deed, and this is consistent with no consideration. 
16 Am. Jur. p. 456 sets forth the general rule 
with respect to the effect of inadequacy or want 
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of consideration. The 'text states: '* * :x· I-Io"\\7-
ever if the inadequacy of consideration is so 
glaring as to stamp the transaction with fraud 
and to shock the common sense of honesty, a 
court of equity will intervene. If the considera-
tion is grossly inadequate, equity in any case 
\vill lay hold of slight circumstances of oppres-
sion, fraud, or duress, in order to rescind the 
conveyance. Inadequacy of consideration tends 
to show fraud, where other circumstances point 
to misrepresentation, imposition, undue influence, 
oppression, abuse of a confidential relationship, 
etc. * •X< *' 
Granted that a quitclaim deed given io cor-
rect a boundary discrepancy may recite a nom-
inal consideration and yet be legally effective; 
however, whe.n, as here, a party claims a valuable 
and additional right was released or quitclaimed, 
then the adequacy of the consideration becomes 
important." (Italics ours). 
6. A-30 SHOULD BE CANCELLED ON THE GROUND 
OF MISTAKE. 
We take the position that the so-called Stock release 
was not effective for any purpose. Assuming, for the 
purpose of argument, that the instrument had some 
vitality, which, of course, we do not admit, it is obvious 
,that the same was executed by Stock under a mistake 
as to his preexisting right. Meagher now takes the 
position, after the decision of this court, that he was 
also mistaken as to the existence of the lease, as modi-
fied. He says that, notwithstanding his pr-evious asser-
. 
tion of record that the lease had ceased to exist, he can 
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say that he was 1nistaken as to the fact and as to the 
la,v, ur either, and ~dopt a construction as best serves 
his purpose. 
In light of all of the circumstances it is clearly 
evident that Stock 'vas 1nistaken as to the contractual 
obligation to release as 'Yas Meagher, unless, of course, 
~Ieagher acted fraudulently. The authorities that fol-
low demonstrate the proposition that the release should 
be cancelled 'vhether the mistake of the preexisting right 
be one of fact or one of law: 
Restatement, Restitution, Section 18: 
"A person who has ~ntered into a contract 
binding upon him and has paid money to the 
other party thereto under an erroneous belief 
induced by a mistake of fact that the terms of 
the contract required such payment, is entitled 
to restitution from the other, except where the 
mistake is only as to the time of payment. 
Comment a. The rule stated in this Section 
applies to situations where the contract is com-
pletely effective but where an event or condition 
upon 'vhich payment was to be made by the terms 
of the contract has not happened or does not 
exist. It is applicable, not only where there has 
been a failure of performance by the payee, but 
also where a condition precedent to payment, 
although not part of the payee's performance, 
has not occurred. It is applicable also to situa-
tions where an initial liabili·ty to pay has ter-
minated and where payment is made because of 
a supposed but non-existent breach of contract 
by the payor." 
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The above section deals with the payn1ent of 1noney. 
But section 39 of the Restatement ·ties section 18 in with 
the transfer of other things. Under section 18 it can 
be argued that Stock was 1nistaken as to the occurrence 
of a condition precedent to his duty to perform, i.e., 
the failure to drill for oil. It can also be asserted that 
an initial liability had terminated because of the fulfill-
ment of all promises in the amended lease. 
Restatement, Restitution, Section 39: 
"Except as stated in sections 41 and 42, a 
person is entitled to restitution from another 
because of n1istake of fact if he has transferred 
to ~the other land, chattels, negotiable instruments 
or choses in action under such circumstances that, 
had he paid money to the other, he would have 
been entitled to restitution." 
This section would bring the instant case within 
the rule of section 18. 
Restatement, Restitution, Section 59: 
"A person who has conferred a benefit upon 
another by mistake is not precluded from main-
taining an action for restitution by the fact that 
the mistake was due to his lack of care." 
Tuttle v. Doty (1918), 168 N.W. 990 (Mich.):· 
A mother believed that stock certificates had been 
stolen by her grandson. Because of this belief she made 
out to her daughter a transfer of her interest in the 
stock, the daughter to have complete title when the 
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stock 'vas found or the transfer con1pleted on the com-
pany books. The grandson had not stolen the stock. 
It appeared that the 1nother had delivered the stock 
to her daughter to keep for her, a fact that both the 
IUOther and daughter had forgotten. rrhe COUrt held 
that but for the 1nistake of the n1other as to the vvhere-
abouts of the stock the transfer would not have been 
made. Rescission 'vas allowed. Here there was no con-
tract, but a gift 'vhich was motivated by a mistake of 
fact. 
Johnson v. Saum (1904), 98 N.W. 599 (Iowa): 
In consideration of defendant's becoming a surety 
for him, plaintiff gave defendant a promissory note 
secured by a chattel mortgage. Defendant sold the 
mortgaged property and paid plaintiff's obligation. 
There were further dealings between the parties and 
plaintiff came to owe some more money to the defendant. 
The defendant presented a bill to plaintiff demanding 
$500-which sum included the debt already satisfied. 
In settlement of the claim the plaintiff delivered a horse 
to the defendant. The court held that the plaintiff wa.s 
entitled to restitution of the amount paid twice to the 
defendant. 
Restatement, Restitution, Section 49, paragraph 
(1) : 
'~A person is entitled to restitution from an-
other to whom gratuitously and induced thereto 
by a mistake of law he has given land or other 
things or has surrendered a claim if the 1nistake 
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(a) Was caused by fraud or material mis-
representation, or 
(b) Was as to the identity or relationship 
of the donee or was some other basic mistake, or 
(c) Caused the donor to give other or more 
than he intended to." 
Restatement, Restitution, Section 50: 
"If a person has transferred to another his 
interest in property in the performance of an 
· agreement based upon an assumption that the 
transferror's interest was smaller than it was, 
the assumption being due to a mistake of law 
either shared by both parties or known to the 
grantee, he is entitled to restitution upon the re-
turn of what he has received, or to restitution of 
the excess, or to other relief, as the equities of the 
situation may require." 
Our situation seems to come within the idea of both 
of the above sections. 
Renard v. Clink (1892), 51 N.W. 692, (Mich.): 
An assignee of a mortgagee had brought action to 
foreclose a mortgage, and in the action had received 
a deed. The foreclosure action, however, was legally 
ineffectual. Thereafter the mortgagor tendered to the 
assignee the amount due on the mortgage, but not includ-
ing the costs of the former suit. The rule of law was that 
refusal of a tender without good excuse discharged the 
mortgage. Under this rule the mortgagor asserted that 
the refusal of the tender extinguished the rights of the 
mortgagee's assignee in the mortgaged property. The 
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court held that the assignee's mistake as to the legal 
effect of the first foreclosure relieved hin1 of the result 
of the refusal of tender, although his mistake was based 
upon a 1nistake of la\v. It \Vas said that relief is granted 
where a Inistake of law is with respect to one's "own 
antecedent and existing private legal rights." 
Gerdine v. Menage (1889), 43 N.W. 91 (Minn.): 
This \Vas an action to set aside foreclosure proceed-
ings. The defendant had attempted to foreclose certain 
mortgages and, thinking he had complied with the law, 
and that he had become owner of the mortgaged prem-
ises, recorded a satisfaction of the mortgages. In this 
action the mistake was pleaded and the appellate court 
directed that the satisfaction be purged from the records. 
Although the mistake was as to the lawfulness of the 
prior procedure, the court said: 
"Such mistakes are classed with mistakes of 
fact, and are frequently relieved from, where the 
equity is clear. They are to be distinguished from 
mistakes or ignorance of general rules of law, 
and from cases where the parties mistake the 
legal effect of a contract or transaction they have 
made or entered into, of the terms or particulars 
of which there is no misunderstanding. A person 
may be ignorant or mistaken as to his own ante-
cedent legal rights or interests, while he clearly 
understands the scope of the transaction into 
which he enters." 
Swedesboro Loan & Bldg. Assn. v. Gans (1903), 55 
Atl. 82 (N.J.Eq.): 
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Mortgagor died. The mortgagee, believing that 
property descended to the father of a decedent, obtained 
a deed from the mortgagor's father, along with a release 
of dower by the. decedent's wife. Under statutes of de-
scent and distribution property did not descend to 
fathers. But the mortgagee, believing upon the advice 
of a scrivener that he had acquired the equity of redemp-
tion, cancelled the mortgage. In this action the court 
reinstated the mortgage and allowed a foreclosure 
against the heirs of the mortgagor, although the mort-
gage was cancelled because of a mistake of law. 
This case contains a review of earlier English au-
thorities allowing cancellation for mistake of law. Any 
dicta in the case to the effect that negligence of the 
grantor or releasor may prevent relief in equity is 
clarified· by Restatement, Section 59, supra. 
Peter v. Peter (1931), 175 N.E. 846, 75 A.L.R. 890 
(Ill.) : 
Wife of deceased failed to have will probated be-
cause of a belief that she had acquired good title to the 
same property by way of a warranty deed given by her 
husband prior to his death. The deed was not valid. The 
court in this action held that this mistake as to the valid-
ity of the deed was sufficient to allow relief in equity, 
and a reopening of probate for the benefit of successors 
to the wife-although the mistake was one of law. The 
court said (75 A.L.R. 893 et seq.): 
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·~counsel for appellees argue that, though the 
\vido\v "Tas Inistaken in believing that the deeds 
fron1 her husband Yested the property in her, her 
1nistake \Vas one of la\v, and that equity will not 
relieve against a n1istake of law. While it has 
been stated as a general rule that a 1nistake of law 
pure and sin1ple is not adequate ground for relief 
in equity, yet, even when the 1nistake is one of 
la,v, equity someti1nes intervenes. Moore v. Shook, 
27G Ill. -±7, 114 N.E. 592. Courts of equity have 
aided Inistaken parties because of the demands of 
justice. Private legal rights, interests, duties, or 
liabilities are al\vays more or less complex, par-
ticularly to the layman. They depend upon condi-
tions of fact as well as rules of law, and a concrete 
notion of a private legal right, interest, or lia-
bility is not readily separated from the facts on 
which it depends. Such mistakes may therefore 
be, and frequently are, properly considered as 
mistakes of fact. There is no fact relating to 
private rights, interests, estates, or liabilities that 
does not more or less involve rules of law, as 
where A proves that he is the owner of certain 
real estate. Such is proved as a fact; yet this fact 
rests upon the law relating to the sufficiency of 
the conveyance, the competency of the grantor 
to convey, and in some instances the form of the 
instrument, but A does not the less prove a fact 
because that fact involves some relation of law. 
To say that because it involves a legal relation 
it is not a fact would seem to arise from a confu-
sion of ideas. One may be ignorant or mistaken 
as to his own antecedent legal existing rights, in-
terests, duties, or liabilities though he accurately 
understands the legal scope of the transaction 
into which he enters and its effect upon his rights 
and liabilities. There are many well-considered 
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decisions in which relief has been awarded 
against mistakes pure and simple of this char-
acter though not always based on the ground that equit~ will relieve against a mistake of law." 
Following this case there is an Annotation in 75 
A.L.R. 896, in which the cases predominantly support the 
view that mistakes of law of this type may be the 
ground for relief in equity. 
Freeman v. Curtis (1862), 51 Me. 140: 
The defendant told the plaintiffs that there was 
some question concerning the distribution of decedent's 
property-whether it would go to the cousins or to plain-
tiffs, an uncle and aunt. The rule of descent was that 
the property would go to uncle and aunt. The defendant 
asserted that he intended to contest a will; and showed 
to the plaintiffs deeds of release from the cousins of 
decedent. The defendant then promised to give to plain-
tiff's 1/12 of all the property recovered from the estate 
in consideration of the plaintiffs deeding to him all their 
interest in the estate. In this action the defendant was 
ordered to convey to the plaintiffs all he had received. 
The court said : 
"And whenever money can be recovered back 
at law, on the ground that it has been paid by 
mistake, other propery may be recovered back at 
law, or in equity." 
The court recognized the rule that relief may sometimes 
be grounded on a mistake of law, and said: 
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"If the defend ant was as ,ignorant as the 
plaintiffs, the mistake was mutual. If he was not 
ignorant, then he knolvingly took advantage of 
their ignorance, and obtained the deeds fraudu-
lently.'' (Italics ours). 
Goff v. Gott (1858), 5 Sneed 562, 37 Tenn. 294: 
Defendant had been defrauded of a horse by a third 
person who had in turn sold the horse to plaintiff, a 
bona fide purchaser for value without notice. When de-
fendant learned of the fraud he demanded the return of 
the horse by plaintiff who, thinking that the defendant 
had a right to it, gave it up. In an action of detinue the 
plaintiff was allowed to recover. The court discounted 
the defenses of (1) gift; and (2) mistake of law. Quoting 
from Story, Eq. Jur. Vol. I, Section 122, the court said: 
" 'Where the party acts upon the misappre-
hension, that he has no title at all in the property, 
it seems to involve, in some measure, a mistake 
of fact, that is, of the fact of ownership, arising 
from a mistake of law.'" 
Barnett v. Kunkle, 256 Fed. 644 (8th C.C.A. 1919): 
Barnett conveyed an entire parcel by warranty deed, 
believing (1) that the deed was only for ¥2 (he couldn't 
read English), and (2) that he owned only ¥2 of the 
property. His belief as to his ownership was based upon 
a mistake as to the devolution of property by inheritance 
in Oklahoma. The court held he was entitled to relief 
from the instrument on either of three grounds: (1) The 
deed was given under a material mistake as to the extent 
of the grantor's interest in the land; or (2) The deed 
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' h" h " "d d was given under a mistake of Barnett s w 1c was a1 e 
and confirmed by the statement of l\1oore that Barnett 
owned only a ¥2 interest." or (3) Both parties believed 
Barnett only owned a :1f2 interest, and that was all in-
tended to be conveyed. Thus the deed did not express the 
intent of the parties. 
Bronson v. Leibold (1913), 87 Atl. 979 (Conn.): 
Defendant was purchasing real estate under a con-
ditional sales contract from the plaintiff. He fell in 
arrears in his payments and, thinking that his rights had 
been forfeited because of his defaults, he executed a 
quitclaim deed to the plaintiff vendor. He later con-
sulted an attorney and learned that foreclosure was 
necessary in such a contract, and that his rights had 
not been forfeited. Thereafter he tendered the amount 
due under the contract and demanded a deed. The plain-
tiff refused. The vendor later brought this action for 
rent and defendant counterclaimed for cancellation of 
the quitclaim deed and for a reconveyance of the prop-
erty to him. The pla1ntiff pleaded that the mistake was 
not (1) material; (2) mutual, or (3) one of fact-but of 
law. Said the court: 
"The defendant believed that he had lost his 
rights in this property, and as a consequence that 
the plaintiff would eject him. He did not know he 
had the right to tender the amount of his debt 
and demand a deed which the plaintiff must give. 
The plaintiff and his attorneys entertained a 
similar belief that the defendant had forfeited 
his rights under the contract, and they confirmed 
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the defendant in this belief. No fraud was prac-
ticed and none was necessary to be alleged or 
proved to secure the relief sought. The mutual 
1nistake 'vas as to the legal rights of the defend-
ant arising out of the contract. 
Though this were held to be purely a mis-
take of -law, the defendant would not, under the 
circumstances of the case, be denied relief upon 
that ground." 
In the case last cited both parties did what they 
thought they were obligated to do. As in the case at bar, 
if there was a mistake it was "confirmed" by the other 
party. The Meagher letters show that. 
In Love et al. v. Phillips et al. (1922), 60 Utah 329, 
208 P. 882, it was held that equity had jurisdiction to 
grant relief from the consequences of mistake as to ante-
cedent existing legal rights. The trial court was of the 
opinion that the fact that the plaintiffs were mistaken 
as to the legal effect of certain deeds did not entitle them 
to any relief. This was on the theory, as the trial court 
conceived it, that a mistake must be a mutual mistake 
or the acts induced by fraud on the part of the party 
against whom relief is sought. This court on the appeal 
of the case held otherwise, stating : 
"We are thoroughly convinced that the plain-
tiffs executed the quitclaim deeds in 1907 under 
a misapprehension or mistake as to their legal 
rights in the property of their father's estate. 
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The question for determination is: Has a 
court of equity, by reason of s~ch facts as ap~ear 
in this record, power or authority to grant rehef? 
We are of opinion that it has, and, further, that 
it is the duty of such court to grant the parties 
relief. There was no consideration for the execu-
tion of any of the quitclaim deeds except the re-
lease or conveyance by the other heirs to the 
parties executing ~uch quitclaim deeds of their 
interest in the lands belonging to the father's 
estate. This is therefore a case in which a court 
can, without injury to others, relieve the parties 
from their mistake and therefore do justice to all 
concerned." (Italics ours). 
This court quoted with approval from 2 Pomeroy 
Eq. Jur. (3d Ed.), Section 849 as follows: 
" 'I therefore venture to formulate the fol-
lowing general rule as being eminently just and 
based on principle, and furnishing a simple cri-
terion defining the extent of the jurisdiction. 
The number of decisions which support it, and 
which it explains, is very great. Wherever a per-
son is ignorant or mistaken with respect to his 
own antecedent and existing private legal rights, 
interests, estates, duties, liabilities, or other re-
lation, either of property or contract or personal 
status, and enters into some transaction the legal 
scope and operation of which he correctly ap-
prehends and understands, for the purpose of af-
fecting such assumed rights, interests, or rela-
tions, or of carrying out such assumed duties or 
liabilities, equity will grant its relief, defensive 
or affirmative, treating the mistake as analogous 
to, if not identical with, a 1nistake of fact.'" 
(Italics ours). 
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On the related subject of fraud, related by the cir-
cumstances of the transaction as in the case at bar, the 
court said: 
H If the parties had voltmtarily entered into 
an agree1nent, uninfluenced by the father's deeds, 
for a division of the property left by the father, 
then a different question would be presented~ 
Clearly such \Vas not the intent of any of the par-
ties in Inaking or receiving the quitclaim deeds. 
The plaintiffs, believing that their rights were 
fixed by the deeds of the parents, were to that 
extent at least mistaken as to their legal rights-. 
If the defendants were advised. and knew that 
the deeds of the parents were invalid and con-
veyed no title and at the same time knew or had 
reason to believe that the plaintiffs were ignorant 
of such fact, then failure on the part of defend-
ants to disclose and make known the rights of 
plaintiffs would be actual fraud." 
In Adamson v. Brockbank, supra, this court again 
recognized the principle laid down in the Love case that 
a court of equity can set aside a deed where there has 
been mutual mistake as to the interest of the grantor in 
the property conveyed, whether it be a mistake of fact 
or law. At pretrial, page 32, Exhibit A-58, Meagher 
readily conceded that in the "early phases" of this trial 
he asserted that the oil and gas lease was of no force 
and effect, having been abandoned. He conceded that he 
"was wrong on that point." The so-called release was 
obtained four days after the commencement of the action, 
by which document Stock also said that the lease had 
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been cancelled, but assigned as the reason "termination 
of production of oil and gas in accordance with the tern1s 
of the lease." Meagher was urging his contention of 
abandonment and termination of the lease, not only in 
the "early phases" of the case commencing in October 
1944 but also until after the decision of this court in 
October 1947 when he filed a petition for rehearing, 
which was not overruled and denied until the following 
March. 
While we assert that self-interest prompted the 
change of heart on the part of Meagher after he was 
ruled out by the decision of this court,. nevertheless, it is 
obvious that both Meagher and Stock were mistaken 
at the time of the release as to the existence and vitality 
of the June 4, 1924 lease and the modification agreement 
of May 21, 1927. Whether the mistake be one of fact 
or one of law is of no consequence as equity will afford 
relief under both conditions under the circumstances of 
this case. Going back to the Brockbank case, and in this 
connection, the court said : 
"The trial court could have resolved this 
question against the appellants on one of two 
grounds : Firstly, if the court found that appel-
lant, Brockbank, had no knowledge of the exist-
ence of the ditch and none of the parties to the 
deed had any intention of dealing with the rights 
to the .ditch, then it would have been a case of 
mutual mistake as to the extent of the property 
conveyed. A court of equity can set aside a deed 
where there has been mutual mistake as to the 
interest of the grantor in the property conveyed, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
93 
\\¥hether it be a 1nistake of faet or hnv-. (See 2G 
C.J.S., Deeds, ~ection 55, page 272). As said in 
16 Am. J ur. 466 : 'in other words, if a deed does 
not expre~s the agree1nent of the parties to it, 
if there is such an agree1nent, it is imn1aterial 
\\¥hether a n1istake therein 1nade is one of law or 
fact.' " 
In Finding of Fact nun1bered 36? referring to the 
document .. A .. -30, the court finds ~~nor did any defendant 
take, or refrain from taking, any action due to any n1is-
conception of fact or of law." In Conclusion of Law 
numbered 14 the court concludes that the document A-30 
"is sufficient to transfer to Meagher all of the sai(d 
lessee's rights then owned by Stock," and in Conclusion 
of Law numbered 16 that "Neither Stock nor any other 
defendant is entitled to rescind the transfer from Stock 
to Meagher, document A-30, on any basis, * * *." We 
have demonstrated the incorrectness of the specific find-
ings and conclusions. 
Either Meagher defrauded Stock or there was a 
n1utual mistake of fact in one or more particulars, viz., 
(a) that termination of production of oil and gas can-
celled the lease, (b) that Stock was under contractual 
obligation to relinquish, (c) that Stock derived his in-
terest by virtue of an assignment of the rights under the 
lease of June 4, 1924, and (d) that the modification agree-
Inent of May 21, 1927 was not controlling (it was not 
mentioned or referred to in the release) ; or there was 
a mistake of law as to Stock's antecedent legal rights. 
There being a total lack of consideration and Meagher 
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not having, by the record, changed his position or given 
up anything to Stock by reason of A-30, there was no-
thing that Stock could do by way of tender back. There-
fore, every element necessary for rescission and cancel-
lation of the instrument of October 21, 1944 exists, all 
as prayed for by the counterclaim of Stock. 
The defenses of fraud, mistake, lack of considera-
tion, laches and estoppel, clearly shown by the record, 
are properly urged, at the same time, by Juhan and 
Phebus, as well as Stock, and those claiming by, through 
or under them. The negative findings and conclusions 
should be rejected and, as pointed out above, the Stock 
instrument, A-30, should be cancelled and annulled of 
record, the proper findings and conclusions being di-
rected for that purpose. 
Aside from the affirmative defenses so indicated, 
and the Stock counterclaim, Meagher, in order to prevail, 
must persuade this court that document A-30 is in and 
of itself a transfer, assignment or conveyance, the theory 
upon which the findings are drawn, or a surrender, the 
theory upon which the trial court's fifty-five page memo-
randum decision was based; therefore, the next point. 
7. A-30 IS ABORTIVE AS A SURRENDER OR RE-
LINQUISHMENT. 
The so-called Stock release purports to "cancel, re-
lease, relinquish and surrender to N. J. Meagher, his 
heirs and assigns, all of his (Stock's) right, title and in-
terest in and to the said oil and gas lease, and all of his 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
95 
right, title and interest in and to the said oil and gas 
lease in so far as it conyeys the lands above described." 
Finding of Fact nun1bered 35 finds that by the docu-
ment .. A .. -30 Stock tra-nsferred to l\Jeagher an undivided 
one-half interest in the lessee's right with respect to 
oil in the -±-±0 acre parcel. The ":ord "transferred" is 
also found in Findings 39, 40 and 42. In Finding of Fact 
numbered 43 it is stated, n1ore as a conclusion, that it 
is not necessary to determine "whether document A-30 
constituted an assignment or surrender of Stock's in-
terests in the lessee's rights, since in either event, as be-
tween Stock and Meagher, it was a transfer to Meagher 
of all interest in the lessee's rights owned by Stock." 
Conclusion of Law numbered 14 is that the granting 
clause contained in document A-30 is· sufficient to trans-
fer to Meagher all of the lessee's rights then owned by 
Stock. 
The trial court's extended memorandum decision, 
with some inconsistencies, divided the lease in half so 
far as oil is concerned, excepting only so-called land-
owners royalties and gave the Stock portion, as so di-
vided, to Meagher. The court premised its decision upon 
a "surrender" effective as against even one-half of the 
overriding royalty, originally 6%, in favor of Ashley 
Valley Oil Company. Note particularly R. 173. 
When objections were urged that Meagher's pro-
posed findings, later adopted, were inconsistent with the 
memorandum decision, the inconsistency was conceded 
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by counsel (R. 327, 331). The whole matter was there-
after resolved, at least to the trial court's satisfaction, 
by its supplemental decision to the effect that it makes 
no difference whether A-30 is a "surrender" or a "con-
veyance," stating : 
"The question, as the Court conceived it and 
now conceives it, is as to whether, under any 
theory, A-30 was sufficient to take from Stock 
and place in Meagher what rights Stock then had 
under A-1 - A-5. The Court felt, and now feels, 
that it has that effect, whether it is a conveyance 
or is merely a surrender. The Findings of Fact, 
paragraphs 35, 39, 40, 42, at least, describe it as 
a 'transfer' of Stock's interest to Meagher. That 
expression is sufficiently specific in the Court's 
judgment without designating whether such trans-
fer resulted from a conveyance or a surrender." 
(R. 197 -198) .. 
While we are convinced that this court will readily 
discern the distinction and marked difference between 
"surrender," as that term is contractually used in the 
controlling documents, and "transfer," as the term is 
used in the findings and conclusions, we, nevertheless, 
feel it important to analyze the document A-30 from both 
viewpoints, if only to more clearly point out, if possible, 
the error upon which the trial court predicates the tak-
ing from Stock and placing in Meagher the rights that 
Stock had under A-1 - A-5 "under any theory," which 
is practically tantamount to saying "no matter upon what 
theory." 
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vV· e have atte1npted to epitomize the lllOdification 
agreeruent of ~Iay :21, 19:27, Exhibit A-5, in what is 
denominated as .. :\.ppendix H.._\." attached to this brief, 
w·ith en1phasis upon paragraphs 20 and 28 thereof, which 
give the lessee a lin1ited right of surrender. By refer-
ring to the specific paragraphs and to the exhibit itself, 
.A .. -5, it will be noted that a surrender can only be made 
after the Sundance forrnation has b~en pierced, as pro-
vided by paragraph 4 of the agreement, and then only to 
the whole leasehold interest, unless the lessee desires to 
surrender the ·zrhole oil mineral leasehold estate, retain-
ing the gas rights. He can thereafter surrender . the 
u;hole of the gas mineral leasehold estate. 
The consent of the royalty owners holding 111;2% 
is attached to the modification agreement, A-5. By stipu-
lation (R. 256) it was agreed that Lucius A. Dick and 
J. N. Wyman by separate documents consented to and 
ratified each and all of the terms and provisions of Ex-
hibit A-5, accounting for all of the outstanding royalty 
interests at the date thereof. Omitting signatures, in-
cluding that of N. J. Meagher, the consent is as follows: 
"CONSENT OF ROYALTY OWNERS 
For a good and valuable consideration, re-
ceipt whereof from the parties to the above agree-
ment is hereby acknowledged, we the undersigned 
ow:n~rs of royalties on production frorn the lands 
thH' subject of the foregoing agreement, do here-
by approve of and consent to said agreement and 
all of the terrns thereof. 
Dated June ________________ , 1927." 
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At this point it should be noted from the decision 
in Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co., supra, that the lessee had 
complied with the specific provisions of the lease, the 
"consideration" for the right to the continuing interest 
in the oil and gas mineral estates, and that the "Sundance 
formation" was penetrated by operations under the lease 
with no condition arising subsequent to that time that 
called for further exploration for oil. Furthermore, as 
pointed out in the former opinion, gas in commercial 
quantities had be~n discovered upon the land at the time 
of the execution of Exhibit A-5. 
We again invite attention, to the fact that the quoted 
portion of the R. C. Hill lease of June 4, 1924, as found 
in the second "whereas" clause of the release, A-30, the 
same language with but one minor exception, commenc-
ing about the middle of the fifth line from the end of 
paragraph numbered 21 of the June 4, 1924 lease, A-1, is 
not found in A-5, the same having been superseded and 
replaced by paragraphs numbered 2 to 29 thereof, both 
inclusive. 
(a) THE PURPORTED SURRENDER IS NOT TO ALL OF THE OIL 
MINERAL ESTATE AS REQUIRED BY A-5. 
Briefly stated the lessee had the privilege under A-5 
of surrendering, after piercing the Sundance formation, 
(a) the entire oil and gas mineral estate and other mat-
ters incident to the lease, or (b) the entire oil mineral 
estate and (c) after having pierced the Sundance forma-
tion and having surrendered the whole oil mineral estate 
to surrender the whole gas mineral estate. 
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In the former decision of this court, Meagher v. 
Uintah Gas Co., supra, speaking of the modification 
agreement, it was said : 
~·\r e are called upon to interpret a contract. 
That contract bears the name of an 'oil and gas 
lease.' However, such nomenclature should not 
induce us consciously or unconsciously to unduly 
restrict its interpretation within pre-conceived 
classification limits." 
The parties having contracted on the subject of 
surrender, the surrender must be in accordance with 
the contractual stipulation~. There is ample authority 
to that effect. 
In 2 Summers on Oil and Gas (Perm. Ed.), Section 
336, page 209, the author states : 
"The manner in which a lessee may exercise 
the power to surrender depends upon the provi-
sions of the lease. Where a lease expressly pro-
vides for the manner in which surrender is to be 
made by the lessee, the surrender cannot be made 
in any other manner, without the consent of the 
lessor." 
To the same effect are: Benson v. Nyman (1932), 
16 P. 2d 963 (Kan.); McKee v. Grimm et al. (1925), 238 
P. 835 (Okl.); Cohn v. Clark (1915), 150 P. 467 (Okl.); 
Lamar v. Farmer (1915), 109 N.E. 791 (Ind.); McKee 
v. Grimm (1916), 157 P. 308 (Okl.); Roberts v. Be:ttman 
(1898), 30 S.E. 95 (W.Va.); Ardizzonne et al. v. Archer · 
(1916), 160 P. 446 (Okl.); White v. United States Fi-
delity & Guaranty Co. (1932), 13 P. 2d 186 (Okl.); and 
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Ward et ux. v. Tripple State Natural Gas Co. (1909), 
115 S.W. 819 (Ky.). In the last case the court said: 
''There must be a surrender in fact, a giving 
up of the premises for every purpose for which 
they were used under the lease. The lessor and 
the lessee must, after the surrender, occupy to-
wards the leased premises the same relation they 
did before the lease was entered into. Richardso_n 
v. Chenault, 31 S.W. 143, 17 Ky. Law Rep. 372; 
Ormsby Coal Company v. Bestwick, 129 Pa. 592, 
18 A tl. 538." 
These cases hold that the Stock instrument did 
not have the effect of terminating the lease. The lease 
provided the manner in which surrender might be made. 
The instrument executed by Stock was just one of the 
steps necessary to be performed before the lessee could 
be relieved of his obligations under the lease. The lease 
itself as modified provides that the "surrender shall not 
become effective until the Lessee shall have delivered" 
all necessary instruments of transfer. A partial release 
or surrender, by the very terms of the contract,-- could 
not be made. 
If it can be said that surrender may be made other 
than as provided in the lease if there is a consent to such 
arrangement, then it would follow that a surrender not 
according to the provisions of the lease cannot he un-
ilateral. The consent of the lessor must be shown. The 
only act of Meagher, in this case, upon receiving the 
instrument is the recording of it. This does not show 
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consent "Then his conduct is examined in the light of the 
surrender provisions of the lease. The letters explain 
his conduct and 'vould indicate that he was proceeding 
to obtain all necessary instru1nents of transfer-which he 
failed to do. There is nothing to shovv that he bargained 
away any right to enforce covenants and conditions 
against the lessees. If this were an action for rent or 
to force the lessees to pay taxes on the property, it is 
doubtful that Stock would be relieved because of the 
execution of the instrument in question. 
There was no surrender under the surrender pro-
vision of the lease because the purported surrender was 
not in accordance with its terms and there was no agree-
ment to accept a surrender from one of the co-lessees in a 
manner othe.r than that provided in t;he lease . 
. (b) THE PURPORTED SURRENDER LACKS CONSIDERATION 
The trial court, in its memorandum decision, ap-
parently takes the position that the holder of the rever-
sion could bargain with one of the lessees or sub-
assignees to modify the terms of the lease and thus bar-
gain away the right to insist upon the execution of all 
necessary instruments to give the rights of exclusive 
possession and control. But there is no evidence of any 
bargain in the record. In Restatement, Contracts, 
Section 75, it is said that nothing is ever consideration, 
either sufficient or insufficient, unless it is bargained for 
by the promisor as exchange for his promise. Holmes, 
The Common Law, page 293, states: 
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"It is said that consideration must not be 
confounded with motive. It is true that it must 
not be confounded with what may be the prevail-
ing or chief motive in actual fact. A man may 
promise to paint a picture for five hundred dol-
lars, while his chief motive may be his desire for 
fame. A consideration may be given and accepted, 
in fact, solely for the purpose of making a prom-
ise binding. But, nevertheless, it is the essence 
of a consideration, that, by the terms of the agree-
ment, it is given and accepted as the move or 
inducement of the promise. Conversely, the 
promise must be made and accepted as the con-
ventional motive or inducement for furnishing the 
consideration. The root of the whole matter is the 
relation of reciprocal conventional inducement, 
each for the other, between consideration and 
promise." 
In 1 C o·rbin on Contracts, Section 132, page 408, the 
writer says : 
"Of course, the surrender of a right, or the 
extinguishment of any other beneficial legal re-
lation, is a sufficient consideration when bar-
gained for by the promisor." (Italics ours). 
In Smith v. Brown (1917), 50 Utah 27, 165 P. 468, 
it is said: 
"As a matter of law, therefore, he could not 
impose new conditions upon the defendant. It is 
elementary that where a party is already bound 
to do a particular thing, but refuses to do it until 
the adverse party enters into a new promise with-
out any additional independent consideration, the 
latter promise is not binding, since it is without 
consideration." 
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The expressions in the Bro\Yn case are but another 
way of stating the doctrine of Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. 
Cas. 605 (Eng.), decided by the Houae of Lords in 1884, 
a leading case on the proposition that payment by the 
debtor of a sun1 less than the whole amount of the debt 
will not extinguish the debt, there being no considera-
tion other than the performance of a portion of a pre-
existing duty. The Stock instrument fell far short of 
what Stock was required to do, if he elected to surrender 
under the terms of A-5. Furthermore, there was no 
bargain or new consideration for Stock to do less than he 
was contractually required to do, leaving Meagher in a 
position to still look to Stock for perforinance, assuming, 
only for the purpose of argument and not conceding 
such to be the fact, Meagher to be the reversioner. What 
has been said about the case of Adamson v. Brockbank, 
supra, is equally applicable here. 
(c) STOCK DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO SURRENDER A PORTION 
OF THE OIL MINERAL LEASEHOLD ESTATE, EVEN IF THAT 
WAS HIS INTENTION. 
The general rule relating to who may surrender is 
found in most standard texts on real property. In 4 
Tiffany on Real Property (3rd Ed.), Section 960, page 
17, it is said : 
"In order that a surrender may be effected 
the estate surrendered must be no greater in 
quantum than the estate of the surrenderee, since 
otherwise it can't merge therein. And furthermore 
it must immediately precede the latter estate as 
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estate intervening. Consequently, if A leases to 
B for years and B leases to C, the subtenant C 
cannot surrender to A, and if p·roperty is devised 
to A for life, with remainder to B for life, with 
remainder to C in fee, A cannot, though B can, 
surrender to C. * * *" 
And it is said in W oodfall' s Law of Landlord and 
Tenant (19th Ed.), page 347: 
"In order to make a good surrender of lands 
by deed, and to make them pass by such sur-
render, these things are requisite :-1. That the 
surrenderor be a person able to surrender, and 
that he have an estate in possession of the thing 
surrendered at the time of the surrender made. 
2. That the surrender be to him who has the next 
immediate estate in remainder or reversion, and 
that there be no intervening estate coming be-
tween. 3. That there be a privity of estafe between 
the surrenderor and the surrenderee. * * *" 
The point that we 1nake here is that the Ashley Val-
ley Oil Company-Utah Oil Refining Company modifica-
tion agreement of June 9, 1927, Exhibit A-6, is in reality 
a sublease and that between the estate of Stock, an 
assignee of Utah Oil Refining Company, Exhibit A-11, 
and Meagher there is an intervening estate, namely: 
that of Ashley Valley Oil Company. 
In 32 Am. Jur., Landlord and Tenant, Section 314, 
it is said: 
·"The distinction between an assignment of a 
lease and the subletting of the premises lies in the 
quantity of interest that passes by the transfer, 
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and not upon the extent of the pre1nises involved. 
Pri1narily, the test is ""hether, by the transaction, 
the lessee conveys his entire ter1n or retains a 
reversionary interest, ho,vever small." 
This problen1 is also treated in an Annotation 1n 
82 ... \.L.R. 1273. There the annotator refers to Sunburst 
Oil d!; Ref. Co. v. Callender (1929), 274 P. 834 (Mont.), 
for the proposition that: 
"* * * an assignment of a lease signifies a 
parting with the whole tern1, which includes not 
only the whole of the unexpired term, but also 
the whole estate of the assignor~-all his interes!t 
in the lease. Anything short of this is not an 
assignment, but a sublease; also McNamer Realty 
Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co. (1926), 76 Mont. 
332, 247 Pac. 166, defining an assignment to he 
a transfer of title or interest by writing as of a 
lease, bond, note, or bill of exchange, carrying 
the whole interest of the assignor. An assign-
ment of the lease signifies a parting with the 
whole term; whereas no matter by what name 
it is called, if, by an instrument in writing, a 
lessee grants an interest less than his own, retain-
ing for himself a reversion, it is a sub-lease, and 
not an assignment of his lease." 
The Montana Court in Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co. v. 
Callender and McNamer Realty Co. v. Sunburst Oil & 
Gas Co., supra, took the view that reservation of an over-
riding royalty interest in the original lessee makes the 
subordinate grant a sublease instead of an assignment. 
In Exhibit A-6 by paragraph numbered 7, there is 
reserved a royalty of 6% of the value of all oil and gas 
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produced from the 440 acre tract. This override is in 
addition to the royalties required to be paid by para-
graphs 11 and 12 of the modification agreement, S-mith-
Ashley Valley Oil Company of May 21, 1927, referred 
to as Exhibit "A" in A-6. This is specifically provided 
for by paragraphs 6 and 7 of A-6. 
Paragraph 10 of A-6 requires Utah Oil, in the event 
of its election to relinquish or surrender, to give Ashley 
Valley "reasonable notice" of such intention in order that 
Ashley Valley may have an opportunity of saving to it-
self the rights which Utah Oil is desirous of relinquish-
ing. This is in the nature of an option so far as Ashley 
Valley is concerned. 
Paragraph 11 of A-6 makes the terms, proVIsions 
and conditions thereof binding upon the respective suc-
cessors and assigns of the parties. Stock is one of the 
assignees of Utah Oil, Exhibit A-11, by the terms of 
which (paragraph numbered 1) he agreed to save Utah 
Oil harmless in language : 
"* * * to keep and perform any and all of the 
terms and/or covenants of any of said agree-
ments, as to the above described lands; second 
parties, (Stock and Phebus) however, as to the 
lands last above described ( 440 acres), to have 
the right to avail themselves of any right or 
privilege which said Utah Oil Refining Company 
could or might have availed itself of if this assign-
ment had not been made." 
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And in paragraph nu1nbered -± of A-ll Stock and 
Phebus expressly covenanted and agreed to fulfill and 
perform all of the covenants and agreements contained 
in the Ashley-Utah Oil modification agree1nent, A-6, 
which lTtah Oil would be required to perform if the 
assignment were not 1nade, and accepted the assignment 
subject to all of the terms, conditions and obligations 
thereof. Exhibit A-ll was recorded May 13, 1929 in the 
office of the County Recorder, Uintah County, Utah, 
which recording charges Meagher with notice of the inter-
vening estate of Ashley Valley Oil Co1npany and its 
right to protect its override in the event of an attempted 
surrender. 
The reservation of the override and the option in 
favor of Ashley Valley to reacquire the lease rights 
make Stock a sublessee and a surrender by him, without 
previous notice to Ashley Valley, an impossibility. There 
is nothing in the record to show compliance with the legal 
and contractual rights in favor of Ashley Valley. Stock 
did not have, under the circumstances, the power to 
surrender. 
The trial court's fifty-five page memorandum deci-
sion ignores the record and the contractual commitments 
with respect to surrender and would permit Stock to 
wipe out the intervening estate in favor of Ashley Val-
ley by dealing direct with Meagher. The expressions of 
the trial court in those particulars, announcing a princi-
ple so completely in disharmony with the law pertain-
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ing to intervening estates, and to the express commit-
ments of the parties themselves, must have motivated 
counsel in submitting findings resulting in the decree, 
from which this appeal is taken, on the theory that A-30 
was a transfer rather than a surrender-a position not 
taken by the trial court. 
The Ashley Valley-Utah Oil instrument requires 
that the lessor could not be revested with full ownership 
without giving to Ashley Valley the first right to exer-
cise its option to take up the interest of Utah Oil. This 
is the way Ashley Valley contracted to save its override, 
which royalty was dependent upon the continued exist-
ence of the lease. The lower court recognized this, but 
held it to be a mere personal covenant not binding upon 
Meagher, even though the instrument was recorded. 
Yet the right of Ashley Valley cannot be disregarded. 
In 1 Corbin on Contracts, Section 272, it is said: 
"But as against a third person who is not an 
innocent purchaser for value, the option holder 
should have exactly the same rights and remedies 
as has any other person who has a contract to buy 
the land; the existence of the 'option'-the privi-
lege to perform or not to perform . the condi-
tions-should make no difference. This is sup-
ported by the greater number of decisions. The 
reason is not that the option holder has an 'in-
terest' in the land, but because he has contract 
rights that ought to be respected by third per-
sons. It is as a result of this and not as a reason 
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for it, that \Ye Inay properly say that the option 
contrart has ereated an equitable interest in the 
land." (Italics ours). 
:Jieagher is seeking equitable relief in his action 
to quiet title and should not be allowed an equitable 
decree based upon his O\vn violation of the rights of a 
third person. 
1 Corbin on Contracts, page 910 states: 
HI£ the option contract is properly recorded, 
the recording statutes make such record construc-
tive notice to all subsequent purchasers, so that 
the rights of the option holder are superior to 
those of such a purchaser even though he paid 
value and did not know of the option." 
In the present case Meagher neither paid value, 
nor did he take the Stock instrument without notice of 
the rights of Ashley Valley. 
We again refer to the position taken by the trial 
court in its supplemental memorandum decision, where-
in it is stated, in effect, that A-30 was sufficient to take 
from Stock and place in Meagher what rights Stock then 
had under A-1 - A-5, whether "it is a conveyance or is 
merely a surrender," and that the word transfer "is 
sufficiently specific in the Court's judgment without 
designating whether such transfer resulted from a con-
veyance or a surrender." The solemnity of contract 
cannot be so abruptly brushed aside. 
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(d) MEAGHER IS NOT A REVERSiONER OF THE OIL OR GAS 
MINERAL ESTATE. 
The trial court's memorandum was erroneously 
premised, we believe, upon the proposition that Meagher 
stood in the shoes of M. P. Smith as being the one en-
ti tied to receive a surrender. It will be noted that in 
paragraphs 20 and 28 of the modification agreement, 
Exhibit A-5, repeated reference is made to "M. P. Smith 
or to said Smith's nominees," and that the surrender 
should not become effective until the lessee shall have 
delivered "to said M. P. Smith or his order properly 
executed all necessary instruments of transfer and do all 
necessary things in order to fully vest said Smith or his 
nominees" with all of the rights and privileges so sur-
rendered. 
In the chain of title passing to 'Meagher, and which 
we concede to be surface rights excluding the mineral 
estate, and which surface rights are in turn encumbered 
by the leasehold as it affects the use of the surface, there 
appears the two quitclaims, Exhibits A-7 and A-8. A-7 
is of a four-fifths interest to Meagher and A-8 is of a 
one-fifth interest to Alexander. Both documents are 
dated December 19, 1927 and are virtually identical, ex-
cept as to the percentage of interest and the names of 
the grantees. We will treat them as one with emphasis 
upon A-7. We briefly summarize the same as follows: 
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1. The grantors ( S1nith and 'Yife) for the sum of 
$1.00 "and the covenants, agreen1ents, stipulations and 
conditions hereinafter set forth to be duly paid, kept 
and perfor1ned" by ~Ieagher, his heirs, personal repre-
sentatives and assigns, and for other good and valuable 
consideration "do, subject however to the exceptions, 
reservations and conditions hereinafter contained" quit-
claim the entire 480 acres. 
2. The grantors expressly save, except and reserve 
from and out of the grant the oil, gas and casing head 
gas in said lands contained by whomsoever thereafter 
produced therefrom by virtue of the agreements there-
after in the instrument described, to which agreements 
the grant is expressly made subject. 
3. The instruments except from the grant, by speci-
fic reference, the June 4, 1924 oil and gas lease, the 
various royalty assignments totaling 12¥2% and the 
modification agreement of May 21, 1927, all separately 
set forth and referred to in subparagraphs designa:ted 
(a) to ( i), both inclusive. 
4. ~1eagher, Exhibit A-7, and Alexander, Exhibit 
A-8, entered into covenants or warranties with Smith 
and his assigns of quiet or peaceable possession and en-
joyment of the estates created by the several excepted 
documents, in language, using A-7 as the example, as 
follows: 
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"And I, the undersigned, said N. J. Meagher, 
grantee herein, in consideration of the above and. 
of the execution and delivery hereof by said M. P. 
Smith and EHen M. Smith, and for other good 
and valuable considerations, do hereby, for my-
self, my heirs, executors, administrators and as-
signs, assume and agree to perform and/or pay 
Four-fifths of all the joint and/ or several obli-
gations of said M. P. Smith and Ellen M. Smith 
by them and/or either of the (m), undertaking 
and/ or for which they are and/ or each of them is 
legally liable, under and by virtue of every and all 
the instru1nents hereinabove in subparagraphs 
' ( a ) ', ' ( b ) ', ' (c) ', ' ( d) ', ' ( e ) ', ' ( f) ', ' ( g) ', ' (h) ' and 
' ( i)' described, and covenant and agree with said 
M. P. Smith and Ellen M. Smith and with each of 
them,- to save, keep and hold them and each of 
them, their respective heirs, executors, and ad-
ministrators and their joint and several assigns 
harmless from, and to indemnify them and each 
of them for, four-fifths of any and all loss and/ or 
damage by reason of every and all default in the 
performance of said joint and/or several obliga-
tions of said M. P. Smith and Ellen M. Smith 
and/or any thereof." 
The date of the death of M. P. Smith is not in the 
record but his widow, Ellen M. Smith, and others con-
veyed whatever interest they or their ancestor might 
have had in the property to Clyde S. Johnson, Exhibit 
A-60. Clyde S. Johnson in turn conveyed to Edward F. 
Richards, Exhibit A-61. The granting clause after the 
decription of the entire 480 acres contained the follow-
mg: 
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"Together \Yi th all and singular the tene-
Inents, hereditainents and appurtenances there-
unto belonging or in any\vise appertaining, the 
reversion and reYersions,. re1nainder and re-
nlainders, rents, issues and profits thereof, and 
all estate, right, title and interest in and to the 
said property, as \vell in law as in equity, of the 
said grantors, * * * ." 
Not only did the trial court consider Meagher to be 
the reversioner so as to receive the purported surrender 
from Stock, but the last paragraph of Finding of F·act 
nu1nbered 22, the last paragraph of Finding of Fact 
numbered 23, the last sentence of Finding of Fact num-
bered 27, paragraph numbered 3 of paragraph A of the 
Conclusions of Law, paragraph numbered 11 thereof and 
paragraph numbered 1 of the Judgment and Decree are 
all on the theory that Meagher was and is the reversioner 
-none supported by the record and all contrary to law. 
It having been held and it being the law of the case 
that the lease, as modified, is in existence and not can-
celled or abandoned, the technical question of reversion 
seems to us to be moot. 
This court, in its former opinion, has held the lease, 
as modified, to be in full force and effect, and that there 
has been no violation on the part of tlie lessee of any 
provision of the lease, upon which termination of the 
lease might be founded nor has any notice of termination 
been given by the lessors in an effort to accomplish such 
a ter1nina tion of the lease in accordance with its terms. 
Furthermore, the idea of reversion in favor of Meagher 
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applying to the North Forty, as well as to the 440 acres, 
is prompted by self-interest after the decision of this 
court in 194 7. And still further the lease of June 4, 1924, 
with its terms, provisions, covenants, agreements, stipu-
lations and conditions, whether of forfe~ture, surrender 
or otherwise, was excluded from Smith's grants to 
Meagher and Alexander, A-7 and A-8. Meagher, by his 
consent to the modification agreement, A-5, approved of 
and consented to all of the terms thereof, which consent 
and approval estops him to say that the lands the sub-
ject of this agreement mean anything less than the 480 
acres specifically described therein, which includes the 
North Forty. 
There has been no reversion to any part of the 480 
acre tract nor does Meagher stand in the shoes of Smith 
by any possible construction of being his nomine·e so as 
to receive a surrender no matter how imperfectly made. 
The North Forty is included in the modification so far 
as Meagher and those claiming or to claim under hin1 
are concerned. Ashley Valley, in any event, perfected 
its title by the Watson deed of October 30, 1930, Ex-
hibit A-16, Watson acting as trustee, successor to R. C. 
Hill, and no question being raised as to his power to 
convey, page 8, Exhibit A-58. 
Meagher's letters to Stock and Phebus, already 
referred to, his letter to Juhan, Exhibit A-34, the letter 
from Katherine Meagher Ivers to the judge of the court 
(R. 12), the recitals in the so-called Stock release, A-30, 
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with nieagher's kno"\vledge, as indicated, that the oil and 
gas mineral estates had been separated and were sepa-
rately held, the provision of A-5, to which Meagher 
committed hin1self, rnaking the 480 acres "the subject 
of this agreement" and by the terms thereof making the 
Stock instrument ineffective as a surrender, if in fact one 
was elected to be made, the cornplete lack of any consid-
eration for surrender, the intervening estate in favor 
of Ashley \Talley, "\Yhich company, by privity of contract 
it was Stock's duty to recognize before dealing with 
}feagher, and the fact that Meagher was not the rever-
sioner and entitled to receive surrender as such, all 
combined are, or each of said items when considered 
separately and regardless of any other factor is, suffi-
cient to sustain the point that, in any event, A-30 is 
abortive as a surrender or relinquishment. 
8. A-30 IS NOT EFFECTIVE AS A TRANSFER. 
The Stock "release" uses the words "does hereby 
cancel, release, relinquish and surrender to N. J. Mea-
gher, his heirs and assigns, all of his right, title and in-
terest in and to the said oil and gas lease, and all of his 
right, title and interest in and to the said oil and gas 
lease in so far as it conveys the lands above described." 
The trial court held that these words were sufficient 
to operate as a conveyance or transfer. The circum-
stances surrounding the use of the particular words are 
conclusive to the effect that there was no intention to 
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convey anything to Meagher. The circumstances, as 
heretofore pointed out, surrounding the making of the 
instrument cannot be disregarded. 
In 3 Corbin on Contracts, Section 536, page 19, the 
author says: 
"In view of all this, it can hardly be insisted 
on too often or too vigorously that language at its 
best is always a defective and uncertain instru-
ment, that words do not define themselves, that 
terms and sentences in a contract, a deed, or a will 
do not apply themselves to external objects and 
performances, that the meaning of such terms 
and sentences consists of the ideas that they in-
duce in the mind of some individual person who 
uses or hears or reads them, and that seldom in a 
litigated case do the words of a contract convey 
one identical meaning to the two contracting par-
ties or to third p·ersons. Therefore, it is invari-
ably necessary, before a court can give any mean-
ing to the words of a contract and can select one 
1neaning rather than other possible ones as the 
basis for the determination of rights and other 
legal effects, that extrinsic evidence shall be heard 
to make the court aware of the 'surrounding cir-
cumstances,' including the persons, objects, and 
events to which the words can be applied and 
which caused the words to be used. This is true, 
whether the court is trying to discover the mean-
ing that the user of the words gave them, or the 
meaning that some hearer or reader gave then1 
in the past, or the meaning that 'a norn1al speaker 
of English' would have given them, or the mean-
ing that a resonable and prudent and intelligent 
man would have given them." 
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Meagher now asserts that the meaning of the in-
strument 'vas to convey to hin1 an interest in the lease-
hold, but all of the surrounding circu1nstances indicate 
that this 'vas not his original position. Originally he 
asserted that his only purpose was to clear up the record 
title. This is demonstrated by: (a) the letters from 
:Jieagher to Stock and others, (b) the recitals in the in-
strument, (c) the fact that there had been no oil or gas 
pr9duction on the premises for some time, and (d) the 
disclaimer of any leasehold by Meagher's quitclaim to 
his children on January 27, 1948. 
Among the letters referred to above is Exhibit A-28, 
the letter from Meagher to Phebus under date of No-
vember 9, 1944. The date of the letter to Phebus is so 
close to the Stock instrument of October 21, 1944 as to 
make any expression therein evidence of Meagher's state 
of mind not only when he obtained the Stock instrument 
but when he had it in his possession and recorded it on 
November 3, 1944. To Phebus on November 9, 1944 he 
said in part : 
"I have been requested for a lease on the 480 
acres of land which I own * * * I believe you know 
I would not ask for surrender of anybody's rights 
without payment, but in this instance actually no 
rights exist for anybody through that old lease 
of 1924." 
The implication of the above cannot be denied or brushed 
aside. Meagher was not asking for a transfer of interest 
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nor did he believe the Stock instrument, which he had 
placed of record six days before, to be a transfer or a 
surrender. 
The point at issue is the state of Meagher's mind 
in obtaining the Stock release of October 21, 1944. The 
state of a man's mind is as much a question of fact as 
the state of his digestion. The state of Meagher's mind 
at this time is unequivocally demonstrated by the words 
he used in his letter to Phebus quoted above, and con-
clusively demonstrates that he had no intention during 
any of this time of acquiring either a transfer or a 
surrender of any portion of the leasehold estate. His 
only purpose at that time was to clear the title of what 
he thought to be dead timber. 
It is our contention that the thought of a transfer 
or a surrender of a portion of the leasehold estate never 
occurred to Meagher until on or about April 22, 1949 
when he proposed his third amended complaint. Cer-
tainly the change in Meagher's state of mind, prompted 
by self-interest and after the discovery of oil, could not 
change the legal effect of or give added weight to a writ-
ing which he acquired almost five years before in Oc-
tober of 1944, at which time, by language, he character-
ized his own purpose and intent to the contrary of what 
he now claims. 
3 Corbin on Contracts, Section 539 says: 
"The courts do not love an 'objective' theory 
of contract or apply it in the process of interpre-
tation merely because it is 'objective.' They apply 
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it only "\Yhen they find in faet that one of the par-
ties understood the words of agree1uent in har-
mony "\Yith such an interpretation and that the 
other party had reason to know that he did. In-
deed, the court may be convinced that both parties 
so understood the 'vords and that subsequently 
discovered self -interest has caused one of them to 
assert a different meaning.* * *" (Italics ours). 
In view of the facts and circumstances and the re-
citals included in the instrument, the court may construe 
the recitals as conditions and hold that the conditions 
were not met-rendering the instrument ineffective. 
Another thing equally indicative that there was no 
intention. to convey anything by the Stock instrument 
is the practical construction given by the parties. 
In 3 Corbin on Contracts, Section 558, page 141, we 
find: 
"The process of practical interpretation and 
application, however, is not regarded by the par-
ties as a re1naking of the contract; nor do the 
courts so regard it. Instead, it is merely a further 
expression by the parties of the meaning that they 
give and have given to the terms of their contract 
previously made. There is no good reason why 
the courts should not give great weight to these 
further expressions by the parties, in view of the 
fact that they still have the same freedom of con-
tract that they had originally. In cases so numer-
ous as to be impossible of full citation here, the 
courts have held that evidence of practical inter-
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pretation and construction by the parties is ad-
missible to aid in choosing the meaning to which 
legal effect will be given." 
To the sarne effect, see Restatement, Contracts, Sec-
tion 235 (e). In Lawrence National Bank v. Rice, 82 F. 
2d 28 (lOth C.C.A. 1936), a case unrelated on its facts, 
the court quotes from Brooklyn Life Insurance Company 
v. Dutcher, 95 U. S. 269, 273, 24 L.Ed. 410, as follows: 
" 'There is no surer way to find out what 
parties meant, than to see what they have done. 
Self-interest stimulates the mind to activity, and 
sharpens its perspicacity. Parties in such cases 
often claim more, but rarely less, than they are 
entitled to.' " (Italics ours.) 
During the first trial Meagher based his claim only 
upon the forfeiture provision in the lease. Stock and 
his successors in interest defended only on the ground 
that there had been no forfeiture. Was there any reason 
why Meagher could not have used the Stock instrument 
as a separate count at the outset if he thought he had 
gained an interest through that instrumentY 
Another point by which we assert that the instru-
ment should not be interpreted as a conveyance· is the 
doctrine that in interpreting the meaning of a word or 
words a meaning should be given which is the fess favor-
able in its legal effect to the party who chose the words. 
(Meagher prepared the rele~se.) 3 Corbin on Contracts, 
Section 559; Restatement, Contracts, Section 236( d). 
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Another factor is that the type of instrument signed 
by Stock is not of a type which is usually used to trans-
fer oil and gas leasehold rights. 
24 .L-1nl. J ur., Gas and Oil, Section 87 : 
H'Vhile the contents of an assignment or a 
sublease necessarily depend upon the desires and 
necessities of the parties, it seems that most such 
instruments specify the nature and amount of the 
consideration to be paid by the transferee, outline 
any developmental duties that may have been 
imposed upon him, and require him to keep and 
perform the covenants of tbl) lease. Thus, a 
grant of this kind may accord the grantor an 
overriding royalty, consisting of a designated 
fraction or percentage of the 'working interest' 
or of the 'total production,' or it may require the 
grantee to pay a designated sum in cash and an-
other out of the proceeds of production. Not in-
frequently it calls upon him to drill one or more 
wells. Other provisions met with from time to 
time include a forfeiture clause, a provision for 
liquidated damages, and a warranty of title by 
the grantor." 
In addition this court is now called upon to deter-
mine the effect of the instrument by the sheer weight of 
its words. Was it a release or surrender which failed 
because of the absence of an immediate estate in the 
surrenderee, or was it a transfer of the subleasehold 
interest of Stock, creating a new tenancy, with Meagher 
becoming the tenant of Ashley Valley~ 
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It is true that the courts are not generally concerned 
with the technical wording in instruments and that they 
~ 
will sometimes give effect to an instrument in some man-
ner other than intended where it is not effective hecause 
of a technical defect. What the courts are trying to 
ascertain, of course, is the intention of the parties. The 
words used are very strong evidence of intention. Our 
basic question is whether this instrument shows any 
intention on the part of Stock to create a new interest 
in Meagher by assigning to him an interest in the oil 
mineral estate. 
The words used are "cancel, release, relinquish and 
surrender." What is the natural and ordinary meaning 
of these words~ 
In Clegg v. Schvaneveldt (1932), 79 Utah 195, 8 P. 
2d 620, 621, the court in defining the word "canceled" 
said: 
"The word 'canceled' means to make void or 
invalid. It is synonymous with annul, abolish, 
revoke, abrogate, repeal, make void, do away 
with, set aside, etc." 
See also 6 Words and Phrases (Perm. Ed.) 33, 12 C.J.S. 
936. 
In 3 Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Rawle's 3rd Rev.) 
2863, 2864, we find the following concerning the word 
"release": 
"The giving up or abandoning a claim or 
right to the person against whom the claim exists 
or the right is to be exercised or enforced. 
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Releases n1ay either give up, discharge, or 
abandon a right of action, or convey a man's 
interest or right to another who has possession of 
it or some estate in the same. Shepp. Touchst. 
3~0: Littleton 444. In the former class a mere 
right i~ surrendered~ in the other not only a right 
is given up, but an interest in the estate is con-
yeyed and beco1nes vested in the release (sic.). 
* * * 
In general, the words of a release will be 
restrained by the particular occasion of giving it; 
T. Raym. 399. It cannot apply to circttmstances 
of which the party had no knowledge at the time 
he executed it; and if it be so general as to include 
matters never contemplated, the party will be en-
titled to relief; 6 H. & N. 347. (Italics ours.) 
* * * 
In estates. The conveyance of a man's in-
terest or right which he hath unto a thing to 
another that hath the possession thereof or some 
estate therein. Shepp. Touchst. 320. The relin-
quishment of some right or benefit to a person 
who has already some interest in the tenement, 
and such interest as qualifies him for receiving or 
availing himself of the right or benefit so relin-
quished. Burton, R. P. 15*." 
See also 36 Words and Phrases (Perm. Ed.) 760. 
Relinquishment is defined by Bottvier (Id. 2869) as 
"a forsaking, abandoning, or giving over of a right." 
And in 3 Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Rawle's 3rd Rev.) 
3211, we find that "surrender" means: 
"A yielding up of an estate for life or years 
to hin1 who has an immediate estate in reversion 
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or remainder, by which the lesser estate is merged 
in the greater by mutual agreement. Co. Litt. 
337b. See Welcome v. Hess, 90 Cal. 507, 27 Pac. 
369, 25 Am. St. Rep. 145." 
For additional definitions of "relinquish" and "surren-
der" see 36 Words and Phrases (Perm. Ed.) 797, and 
40 Words and Phrases (Perm. Ed.) 873. 
All of these words give the impression of a "letting 
go" of rights already had against the person to whom the 
instrument was addressed. None of them, alone or 
together, tend to show an intention to transfer interests 
of the signer, either by way of quitclaim deed or assign-
ment. 
In connection with the above the definitions of can-
cel, surre~der, release and relinquish, the case of 
Benton et al. v. Jones et al.J 220 S.W. 193 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1920), should be mentioned. In this case there was 
an issue as to the effect of an instrument which pur-
ported to "bargain, sell, and release and quitclaim" cer-
tain interests of the signer. In construing the instru-
ment, the court said : 
"It is manifest this is simply a release. While 
it proposes to convey an interest, yet its evident 
meaning is to release liens held by the grantor. 
Every part of the instrument must be taken to 
ascertain the intention of the parties to it. The 
form used will not so much control as the relation 
of the parties at the time and their intention. 
As said by Judge Williams in the case of Sanborn 
v. Crowd us, 100 Tex. 605, 102 S.W. 719: 
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•An intention to convey land which had not 
been before sold and conveyed could not be 
gathered fron1 a reading of this release. Such a 
meaning 'Yould never be imputed to it by any 
one looking alone to its tern1s. * * * Now here does 
an intention appear to make a new grant of any-
thing. * * * But by its recitals it connects itself 
with the former conveyance recited, and the two 
are thus made the complements of each other. 
* * *The two are to be construed together.' " 
(Italics ours.) 
The words, taken as they appear in the instrumeut 
are not words of conveyance. It is provided by statute 
that a quitclaim deed when executed as required by law 
shall have the effect of a conveyance of all right, title, 
interest and estate of the grantor in and to the premises 
described in the deed. Section 78-1-12, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1943. The instrument involved in the present case is 
not in the form prescribed by the statute, so we have a 
question as to whether it is effective as a quitclaim. 
This court held in Ruthrauff v. Silver King Western 
Min. &MiU. Co., supra, that the words of the statute are 
permissive only and that it is not necessary to use the 
statutory form in order to convey property by quitclaim 
deed. 
We can concede that any one of' the words used 
in the present instrument might be sufficient to operate 
by way of quitclaim if the proper intention appeared. 
For instance, if it appeared that Meagher was a stranger 
to the title, and that he paid to Stock a valuable con-
sideration for the instrument, we might well find that 
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there was an intention to convey property. And there 
is no reason why such an intention should not be given 
effect by the courts. If the instrument does not operate 
under the statute it still might operate by the common 
law. What are the requisites for such operation~ What 
factors must be present in order to give to an instru-
ment the effect of a conveyance when it fails as a sur-
render or release~ 
This problem has been considered by the courts of 
New Jersey, a state in which there has been no statutory 
regulation of conveyance by quitclaim deed. In Havens 
et al. v. Sea-Shore Land Co. (1890), 20 A. 497 (N. J. 
Eq.), the court, in discussing the problem of giving the 
effect of a conveyance to a release, said : 
"* * * a deed which has failed of effect as a release, 
for want of an estate in possession in the releasee, 
may, if it is founded on a valuable consideration, 
be given effect as a bargain and sale." 
The court in Meeks v. Bickford (1924), 125 A. 15 
(N. J. Eq.), states: 
"* * * equity will interfere and give the effect of 
a bargain and sale deed to one of quitclaim where 
it appears that the releasor had an interest in the 
land and intended to convey such interest to the 
releasee. This interest may be a contingent one. 
But there must be an interest which the releasor 
may lawfully convey and it must also appear that 
a valuable consideration was paid therefor." 
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See al~o JJ[errill ct al. v. Pete1~son (1931), 154 A. 9 
(N.J. Eq.) . 
.. A.s before shown, there \vas an intervening estate 
between that of the releasor and the releasee (Ashley 
Valley) and, therefore, the instrument must fail as a 
release or surrender of the premises unless the sur-
render is consented to by the owner of the intervening 
estate. The cases above cited indicate that this is not 
a situation in which an instrument, failing as a sur-
render, will be given effect as a conveyance. This be-
cause there was (1) no intention to convey, as shown 
by the recitals and the operative words used; and (2) 
there was no consideration for the instrument; and cer-
tainly no valuable consideration. 
Assuming, for the purposes of argument, that the 
instrument is effective, either as a release, surrender, or 
quitclaim, there is still a question of construction as to 
just what interest was surrendered. The "release" 
signed by Stock refers in the recitals to an oil and gas 
lease dated the 4th day of June 1924, and to the pages 
of the county records in which the instrument was re-
corded. There is no reference to the modification agree-
ment of May 21, 1927, nor to its place of record. Because 
of the wording in the recitals and the reference in the 
operative clause to "said lease", a question is raised 
as to just what interest was "surrendered," if any. Even 
though a quitclaim deed, or release, contains general 
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words of grant these words niay be limited by other 
portions of the deed if it appears that there was no 
intention to quitclaim all rights in given property. 
This is indicated by a number of cases. 
Allen v. Hall (1903), 73 P. 844 (Colo.): 
In this case the plaintiff had taken a deed from the 
defendant of certain real property as security for a loan. 
Thereafter the plaintiff executed to defendant a quit-
claim deed which recited, in substance, after the general 
statement, that the grantor conveyed all her right, title, 
and interest in such premises; that it was given to the 
grantee for the sole purpose of surrendering to the 
grantee the same title plaintiff had acquired from the 
defendant in the security transaction. In holding that 
the plaintiff did not convey all of her right, title, and 
interest in the land, but only the security interest, the 
plaintiff having prior to the making of the deed ob-
tained another conveyance of the land, the court said: 
"According to the plain language of the deed 
which the plaintiff gave to the defendant, the 
plaintiff only conveyed that title which she had 
obtained through the conveyance of the defend-
ant to her. The intention of parties to a convey-
ance, as gathered from the whole instrument, will 
control, so that a general description of title, fol-
lowed by a clause stating the intention of the 
parties as to the particular title conveyed, con-
trols the prior recitations on the subject. (Citing 
case.) Plaintiff only purported to convey the 
title which she had received from the defendant; 
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consequently, \YhateYer other title 1nay have been 
vested in her at the tiine of that transfer was not 
affected by the one given defendant." 
Plnn1mer 1-·. Gould, et al. (1892), 52 N.W. 146 
(Mich.): 
Defendants conveyed to plaintiff all their right, title 
and interest in all the lands in certain counties. A sub-
sequent clause in the deed recited: 
~' ~The purpose and intent of this deed being 
to convey to the said second parties all and each 
of the right, title, claim, and interest, either in 
possession or expectancy, of the said first parties, 
of, in, and to the above-described premises. by 
virtue of certain deeds of conveyance to the said 
John F. Driggs, deceased, viz. : * * * (describing 
grantors of conveyance referred to).' " 
The facts showed that none of the described grants 
had been effective to convey any interest to the defend-
ants and that, therefore, the plaintiff would take nothing 
if the grant were limited to the interests described. The 
court said: 
"The intention of the parties, as gathered 
from the whole instrument, will control; and in 
case of a general description followed by a clause 
sun1ming up the intention of the parties as to the 
premises conveyed, it has a controlling effect 
upon all the prior phrases used in the description 
(citing cases)." 
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. 
In Haynes v. Hunt et al. (1939), 96 Utah 348, 85 P. 
2d 861, construing a deed, the court adopts the general 
rule that the intention must be found from a reading 
of the whole instrument. The issue was the nature of 
the estate created, whether a grant or a license. The 
court says: 
"'When the intention of the parties to a deed 
or contract can be ascertained from it, such inten-
tion 'vill prevail, unless in contravention of some 
rule of law; and, when such intention can be 
ascertained, arbitrary rules of law are not to be 
invoked, and will not control the construction of 
the instrument.' Kirwin v. Farr, 17 Utah 1, at 
page 5, 53 P. 608, at page 609; Coltharp v. Colt-
harp, 48 Utah 389, 160 P. 121." 
In the instrUment executed by Stock reference was 
made only to a lease of 1924, and the operative words 
of the "release" referred only to that lease. Should this 
be construed to release or surrender rights in an instru-
ment of 1927 which is not referred to and not conten1-
plated by the parties~ This may depend upon whether 
the parties regarded the instrument of 1927 a "new 
lease" or merely an amendment of the old one. 
It is true that the 1927 document was titled "Modi-
fication Agreement," but the nature ·of instruments is 
generally the guide as to what they are. What they are 
called is not controlling. The modification agreement 
of 1927 is a lengthy document providing in great detail 
the duties and rights of the lessees thereunder. It abro-
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gated virtually eYery provision which was contained in 
the lease of 19:24. This being true, \vhat \Vas its effect~ 
In Peterson et zt.r. v. Betts et al. (1946), 165 P. 
2d 95 ('\""ash.), the court \vas called upon to determine 
whether a ne"~ agreement between landlord and tenant 
was a continuation of the old lease or was in effect a 
new lease. Said the court : 
"The April lease is for enlarged premise8, 
for enlarged term, for a very different rental, 
and whereas the January lease provided for cer-
tain alterations, the April lease did not, but, on 
the other hand, specifically provided that the 
lessor should not be responsible for repairs. It 
then went on and repeated, word for word, all 
the general provisions of the January lease, such 
as, guaranteeing the lessee first chance of a fur-
ther lease, the first option to buy in case of sale, 
the right of lessor to reenter in case of lessee's 
failure to pay rent, covenant against assignment 
or subletting without lessor's written consent, and 
lessee's covenant to surrender the premises upon 
expiration of the lease in as good repair as they 
are now, any ordinary wear and tear and dam-
ages by fire excepted. In other words, it was in 
every way a complete lease, effective as of April 
1st, and lessor (sic) accepted the premises 'in 
the condition as is of this date.' That date, it 
seems to us, can only be taken to be April 1st. 
But what the parties intended in this re-
spect was not a question for the jury, nor is it 
open to the court to speculate as to their intent. 
The instrument being a complete lease, the law 
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says that it superseded the January lease, and, 
although there was no physical surrender of the 
premises covered by that lease, that there was, 
nevertheless, in law, a surrender and a new entry 
on Aprillst." 
And see Diamanti et al. v. Aubert et al. (1926), 68 Utah 
582, 251 P. 373, wherein the court announces the general 
rule that the execution of a new lease to one of the 
original tenants, and its part performance, amounts to 
a surrender of the old lease by operation of law. 
The letters from Meagher, the recitals in the Stock 
instrument, all indicated that Meagher intended to obtain 
no interest by the Stock instrument, and that Stock had 
no interest to convey. If the language of the Stock "re-
lease" is taken to refer only to the 1924 lease, Meagher 
will have received exactly what he wanted-nothing. 
There certainly was no donative intent to transfer 
from Stock to Meagher one-half of the oil mineral estate, 
nor do we think that such will be argued or contended 
for by respondent. Meagher himself stated that he 
would not expect a transfer of inte·rest without consider-
ation, Exhibit A-28. A consideration is not stated in the 
release. There being no consideration, the inadequacy 
of the situation is apparent. Under the circumstances 
of this case and as in the rule announced in H allorar1r 
Judge Trust Co. et al. v. Carr et ux. (1923), 62 Utah 10, 
218 P. 138, the release, as a conveyance or transfer, 
should be set aside : 
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~'The remaining question is as to inade-
quacy of the consideration. The general rule is 
that a conYeyance based on an inadequate con-
sideration 'vill not be canceled or set aside for 
that reason alone unless the inadequacy is so 
great as to shock the conscience and furnish of 
itself evidence of fraud. 1 Black on Rescission 
and Cancellation, Sections 169 and 175; 9 C. J. 
Section 35, p. 117 4; Bruner v. Cobb, 37 Okl. 228, 
131 Pac. 165,_ L.R.A. 1916D, 377, and annota-
tions." 
That there must be a consideration for a deed ib 
the implication of the recent statement of this court in 
Williams et al. v. Barney et al. (1950), 224 P. 2d. 1042: 
"There is however a presumption of con-
sideration, 16 Am. Jur. p. 653, and there appears 
in the record not one word refuting the adequacy 
of the consideration. The deeds, making plain-
tiffs' chain of title including this one, were ad-
mitted in evidence without objection, and the 
question of adequacy of consideration, or that 
the instrument was other than a deed was never 
raised." 
In the instant case a presumption of consideration 
is dissipated by the Meagher letters and the recitals of 
the so-called release. That a consideration was thought 
to be necessary is the statement of the same by counsel 
in the pretrial hearing at Vernal, hereinbefore referred 
to, and of Finding of Fact numbered 42, also previously 
referred to, both of which, the assertion on the one hand 
and the finding on the other, have been conclusively 
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shown not to be supported in fact or in law. Any am. 
biguity in the release itself is resolved against Meagher-
and answered by the positive testimony of Stock that 
he did not intend to transfer any leasehold interest (R. 
262-266). 
9. MEAGHER'S ALLEGED OIL ROYALTY INTEREST 
CANNOT BE ADJUDICATED IN THIS ACTION. 
By amendment to the second amended complaint, 
made at the time of trial June 26, 1950 (R. 230), a new 
issue wa.s injected into the case, respondent fearing that 
he might be subjected to res judicata on the issue of 
whether Meagher is entitled to 2% or to 1-1/3% of the 
so-called landowners or oil royalty interest (R. 233). 
It was stipulated that appellants, without. the necessity 
of amendment or further pleading, should be deemed 
to have controverted the allegation (R. 232). The issue 
is concerned prirnarily with Exhibit A-40, a photostat 
of a recorded agreement, whereby, and under date of 
October 11, 1930, Meagher divested himself of one-third 
of his oil royalty interest with the understanding that if 
a test well was not drilled upon the Ashley Valley 
structure, as specified in the agreement, Stock and Phe-
bus, to whom the interest was sold, would "reconvey" 
the same to Meagher. 
The oil royalty interest originally assigned by 
Smith, 1% to Meagher, Exhibit A-46, and 1% by Smith 
to Alexander and from Alexander to Meagher, Exhibit 
A-55, while carved out of the normal landowners royalty, 
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is, nevertheless, a covenant running with the land or a 
chose in action. ....\.-46, and sin1ilar language in A-55, 
requires the holder of the oil lease or the purchasers of 
the oil produced from the leased lands to pay the holder 
of the royalty interest a percentage based upon the 
value of the oil produced and saved, thus creating a 
covenant for the pay1nent of money rather than a setting 
apart of the oil itself. It is fair to say that the holder 
of the oil royalty interest does not have an interest in 
the oil in place or the oil produced, except the percentage 
in money of the value of the oil calculated as in the 
assignment and agreement specified. Furthermore, the 
assignment and agreement acts in the nature of a divi-
sion order requiring production of the instrument or a 
certified copy thereof to enforce recovery from the 
holder of the lease or the purchaser of the oil, with the 
assignment and agreement expressly being made assign-
able by the so-called grantee therein. 
The 1/3 of 2% oil royalty interest follows the same 
chain of title as does the interest in the leasehold as it 
affects the oil mineral estate, i.e., Stock and Phebus 
transferred to the Standard Oil Company of California, 
Exhibit A-12, which company transferred to T~e Cali-
fornia Company, Exhibit A-13. The California Com-
pany transferred back to Stock and Phebus, Exhibit A-
1-t, the latter instrument being dated March 21, 1934. 
So far as the record discloses, Meagher made no attempt 
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to obtain a reconveyance at any time prior to the 
amendment in June of 1950, assuining the amendrnent 
to be deemed such an attempt. 
After March 21, 1934, one-half of the one-third of 
2% oil royalty interest was transferred by Phebus to 
Juhan and the other one-half of the same by Stock, 
through mesne conveyances and assignments, to Juhan. 
· From Juhan the interest is traced in part back to Stock, 
in part to Weber Oil Company through Equity Oil Con1-
pany and then deemed merged in the working interest 
owners, Juhan, Stock and Weber, with Equity Oil Com-
pany the operator, by the operating agreement of De-
cember 30, 1948, Exhibit A-25. 
A cause of action accrued in favor of Meagher not 
later than, and probably before, March 21, 1934, when 
The California Company transferred back to Stock and 
Phebus. Giving Meagher the benefit of the most extreme 
point of time, approximately three months short of six-
teen years elapsed between the transfer back and Mea-
gher's assertion by the amendment. His action would, 
therefore, be barred by subsection 2, Section 104-2-22, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, requiring an action upon a 
written contract within six years from the accrual of 
the cause of action. 
The amendment was made approximately one year 
and nine months after the discovery of oil on September 
18, 1948. On the face of the record and under the con-
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ditions indirated, l\Ieagher is guilty of laches in assert-
ing an obviously stale de1nand. The defenses of laches 
and the statute of lilnitations arise on the face of the 
record, and, in accordance with the stipulation above 
referred to, were not required to be pleaded. 
Exhibit A-40, by "'"hich Meagher divested himself 
of one-third of the 27o oil royalty interest, on its face is 
promissory as it pertains to a reco-nveyance and cannot 
be construed as a conditional divestiture. 
In the case of Pfister et al. v. Cow Gulch Oil Co. 
et al., supra, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held, 
under circumstances in point with the case at bar, where 
Pfister assigned a lease to the Cow Gulch Oil Company 
with a provision that unless Cow Gulch discovered oil on 
or before August 2, 1945 it should surrender the lease 
and assign it back to Pfister, there was no automatic 
termination of the assignment on the failure to discover 
oil within the stipulated period. The court said: 
"It is too plain to require further exposition 
that under no theory of terminati<;>n could the 
rights of Atlantic in the new lease, which was 
lawfully acquired by Cow Gulch and which had 
lawfully passed to Atlantic by assignment, be-
come vested in Pfister." 
There being no evidence of a reconveyance, the obli-
gation to pay the royalty interest to the record owner is 
still outstanding. Finding of Fact numbered 59 is incon-
sistent with Conclusion of Law numbered 3 of B, which 
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in turn is unsupported in fact or in law and likewise un-
supported is that portion of the decree to the effect that 
Meagher is the owner of an oil royalty interest of 2%. 
The record title is uncontroverted to the effect that 
~{eagher cannot claim, under any circurnsta.nce, rnore 
than two-thirds of 2% of the oil royalty interest. He 
effectively transferred, assigned and divested himself of 
one-third of his former 2% oil royalty interest by A-40. 
As the record stands, Equity Oil Company is in 
possession of the property and is extracting and selling 
the oil. It is not a party to this suit nor is Weber Oil 
Company. The trial court, in its memorandum decision, 
stated that its holding in favor of Meagher could not 
become res judicata as to Equity Oil Company nor Weber 
Oil Company, the holding being somewhat diluted by 
Conclusion of Law numbered 13, wherein it is concluded 
that the conclusions are not res judicata with respect to 
Weber Oil Company. In any event, Meagher's action, 
as it concerns the agreement to reconvey the oil royalty 
interest of which he divested himself on October 11, 1930, 
is one in personam and not in rem. Meagher is fully 
aware, by the record, of the fact that the oil is being 
produced and sold by a party or parties not before the 
court. The contract, Exhibit A-40, speaks for itself and, 
whe~ther Meagher's action be one to enforce a covenant 
running with the land or one. for breach of contract, it 
cannot be enforced in a suit to quiet title and in the 
absence of the necessary parties. 
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.At this point it is interesting to observe that the 
findings, conclusions and decree do not proceed on the 
theory that at least one-half of the one-third of 2% oil 
royalty interest passed by the release, A-30, through 
'vhich ~leagher claims a transfer or an assigniuent of a 
leasehold interest, like,vise a chose in action. The trial 
court's fifty-five page me1norandun1 decision, cutting the 
lease in half on the theory of surrender, would seem to 
arrive at that point, but not so when the theory was 
reversed by the findings, conclusions and decree submit-
ted by counsel, and later adopted by the court, with the 
simple expression that it makes no difference whether 
the Stock instrument of October 21, 1944 be denomin-
ated a surrender or a transfer. 
CONCLlTSION 
It is not our purpose nor intent to burden this 
brief with a restatement of the several points which, 
we believe, in the mere statement of the same most 
thoroughly and cogently den1onstrate the fallacy of the 
decree appealed from. At this point, however, we feel 
that it is appropriate and pertinent to point out a ve-ry 
striking and incongruous fact. 
The trial was in a court of equity. And yet, by the 
decree appealed from, the greatest inequity has been 
done. Respondent, Meagher, has been awarded far more 
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than he could have ever obtained even upon the assump-
tion that he owned the fee title together with all mineral 
rights in the property. 
Meagher is a banker. He is not an oil man and, 
so far as the record shows, has never had any oil busi-
ness experience. Upon the assun1ption that Meagher 
was the unquestioned owner of the fee title, together 
with all mineral interests thereunto appertaining, not 
even burdened by the previous landowners royalty or 
the covenants created by Smith, and that he might deal 
with the property as he saw fit, the very best thing he 
could have hoped to accomplish would have been to 
induce some qualified oil company to undertake a pro-
digious gamble in a territory never before explored and 
lying at a remote distance from any actual oil pro-
duction. If Meagher had been able to induce some quali-
fied oil company to undertake this grossly speculative 
venture, the very best that Meagher could have received, 
as land and mineral owner, would have been the usual 
and prevailing one-eighth landowners royalty interest 
in accordance with the custom, usage and practice of 
the oil business. 
Thus, had Meagher been the unquestioned fee and 
mineral interest owner, he could have obtained no better 
than a one-eighth royalty interest. 
Yet by a decree in a court of equity Meagher was 
awarded an undivided one-half interest in a now fully 
developed and producing, multi-million dollar oil field 
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toward which he contributed not one cent; for which he 
risked absolutely nothing; and during the development 
of \Yhich he sat silently by speculating upon the outcorne. 
Is it to be believed that if the result had produced 
a ~·dry hole" that Mr. Meagher would have rushed in 
and offered his 50% contribution of the costs in a failure~ 
We think not. 
The very result obtained by Meagher, under all the 
circumstances, is on its face so grossly inequitable as 
to be unconscionable. This result in itself gives imme-
diate pause to a careful and critical consideration and 
inspection of the facts and circumstances by which such 
an anomalous conclusion could have been reached. The 
result is so inequitable and unfair that it immediately 
condemns and contaminates the foundations and the 
structure upon which it rests. Meagher paid nothing 
for the instrument nor did he forego anything. His posi-
tion was not changed by reason of it and to cancel the 
document would not take away anything that he had 
before its deiivery. On the other hand, to give vitality 
to the instrument one would have to ignore the purposes 
for which it was given; the total lack of consideration; 
Meagher's lack of diligence; the contrary construction 
that he placed upon it by his own words and conduct; 
the language of the instrument; and would permit him 
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to perpetrate a fraud. There is nothing in Meagher's 
conduct that commends itself to the court even if he had 
a legal position, which he has not. The equities are, 
without exception, in favor of :these appellants. 
It is not necef?sary to remind this court that this 
is perhaps the first case of consequence in this state and 
in this court dealing with the problems pointed out as 
affecting oil and gas leases. Of the several problems 
affecting these appellants is the matter of maintaining I I I I 
a continuity of ,leasehold interest when, after the lease-
hold has been broken up into fractions, an extension, 
rene,val or rewriting in favor of one fractional interest 
holder inures to the benefit of the entire leasehold. 
While we cannot claim, as stated at the outset, any 
interest by conveyance or assignment in the North Forty, 
nevertheless, it is a part of a leasehold purposely recog-
nized as such by respondent when he, with the other 
royalty holders, joined in and approved of the modifi-
cation agreement of May 21, 1927, committing himself 
to the lands, the subject of said agreement, as being 
the en tire 480 acres. 
So far as these appellants are concerned the work-
ing or leasehold interests in 440 acres of the tract are 
held 50% by Weber, 25% by Stock and 25% by Juhan 
as reflected by the operating agreement of December 
30, 1948. So far as Ashley Valley Oil Company is con-
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cerned, and as against nleagher and those claiming 
under hin1, the working interests or operating rights in 
the ren1aining acreage, or the North Forty, is held by it. 
We submit that for all the reasons hereinbefore 
stated the decision of the trial court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HARLEY W. GUSTIN 
EDWARD F. RICHARDS 
CARVEL MATTSSON 
Attorneys for Appellants Ray 
Phebus, Paul Stock and Joe T. 
Juhan 
OLIVER W. STEADMAN 
Of counsel for Paul Stock 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Outline analysis of Smith-Ashley Valley modification 
agreement, A.-5, giving lessee the limited privilege of 
surrender. 
RECITALS: 
(1) Sheridan t.o Hi'll lease, June 4, 1924, Exhibit 
A-1, to 480 acres. 
(2) Grant by Hill to Utah Oil Re·fining Company, 
October 30, 1924, Exhibit A-2, of exclusive right of pos-
session and occupancy during the life of lease of June 4, 
1924 of all but the North Forty. 
~ 
(3) "Assignment", Hill to Ashley Valley Oil Com-
pany, November 10, 1924, Exhibit A-3, of all Hill's rights 
in the above Hilt-Utah Oil Refining Company agreement. 
(4) Ashley Valley Oil Comp-any. represents ~that as 
of the date of A-5 it is the owner of the rights, p-roperty 
and interests acquired under A-3, the "assignment" Hill 
to Ashley Valley Oil Company, insofar as the same per-
tains to the 440 acres. 
(5) Warranty Deed, November 14, 1924, Exhibit 
A-4, Sheridan et al. rto·M. P. Smith of fee title, including 
mineral estate, subject to R. C. Hill lease of June 4, 
1924. 
(6) Grants of royalty interests by Smith, (a) to 
Sheridans 3%, (b) to Dick 0 of 1%, (c) to N. J. Meagher 
1%, to W. N. Preas 1%, to T. G. Alexander 1%, to 
1 
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Columbia Trust Company 4%, and to W. H. Lovesy 2%; 
in all totaling 120o/o and having ·to do with the entire 
480 acres. 
(7) The desire of the parties (Smith-Ashley Val-
ley Oil Company) "insofar as they have the legal right 
and power so to do, to change and modify the terms" 
of June 4, 1924, R. C. Hill lease. 
OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS: 
I. Defines "the lands the subject of this agree-
ment" as meaning and applying to the entire 480 acres. 
II. Defines rthe term "R. C.. Hill Lease" to mean 
the lease of June 4, 1924. 
III. That insofar as the lands "the subject of this 
agreement" are concerned paragraphs numbered 2 to 
22, both inclusive, of the R. C. Hill Lease at all times 
from and after the date of Exhibit A-5, "do and shall 
have no further application, force and/or effect, but, 
for all purposes are hereby fully discharged, superseded 
and replaced by the following paragraphs numbered 2 to 
______ ,both inclusive, to-wit: * * *". (The Hill lease, Exhibit 
A-1, contains 22 numbered paragraphs with all before 
paragraph numbered 2 being the formal statement of 
the date, the parties, the consideration, the grant and 
the description of rthe land, including the 480 acres . 
. Land outside of the p-roperty herein invoived is also 
included in the original Hill lease.) 
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AMENDING PARAGRAPHS: 
2. The lease to re1nain in effect so long as the lessee 
complies with the "obligations" of A-5. 
3. Promise of lessee to endeavor to secure profit-
able market for gas encountered in the test well on Sec-
tion 23 and for other gas that may be found, subject to 
the right of surrender and agreeing to market and pro-
duce gas regardless of whether oil is encountered. 
4. On or before September 1, 1927 to commence 
or cause to be commenced the drilling of an oil well to be 
continuously drilled, with certain exceptions, until the 
Sundance formation has been drilled through, unless 
there shall have been encountered within the Sundance 
formation oil in commercial quantity, as in said para-
graph defined. The drilling to be "upon the geologic 
structure upon which the lands the subject of this agree-
ment are located,* * *". 
4a. Lessee may use either oii or gas developed on 
the property for development or production operations 
and shall not be chargeable for unavoidable loss or held 
responsible for unavoidable delays. 
5. If well is drilled upon lands other than the lands 
"the subject of this agreement", resulting in commercial 
discovery of oil, lessee, subject rto the right of surrender, 
shall commence or cause to be commenced, the drilling 
of an oil well at some point to be selected by the lessee 
"upon the lands the subject of this agreement", or to 
deepen a test well previously commenced, if any, subject 
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to the right of surrender, all in order to adequately and 
thoroughly test for oil, the horizon in which oil 1night 
have been discovered by the lessee outside of the lands 
subject to the agreement, with exceptions excusing drill-
ing when igneous rock or other geologic formations or 
conditions might prevent. 
6. Provisions for further drilling if oil in commer-
cial quantities, as in said paragraph defined, is encoun-
tered in any geological horizon deeper than the Sundance 
in any well by whomsoever drilled in the Vernal, Utah 
District, or in Northwestern Colorado, and if such deeper 
horizon 'lies within a depth of 3500 feet beneath the sur-
face of any portion of the lands located upon the geologi-
cal structure upon which the lands the subject of this 
agreement are located, subject to the right of surrender. 
I 
7. Provision for arbitration if parties cannot agree 
as to whether igneous or other geological formations or 
conditions have been encountered preventing further 
drilling or whether a deeper horizon than the Sundance 
lies within a depth of 3500 feet beneath the surface. 
8. Lessee to offset any commercially producing well 
upon other lands located within 300 feet of :the exterior 
boundaries of the lands "the subject of this agreement". 
9. Provisions with respect to testing upon encoun-
tering oil in any appreciable quantity and subject to the 
right of surrender to develop the lands consistently 
with the current prevailing condition of the market for 
the products thereof. 
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10. Provisions. for the diameter and other specifica-
tions of wells and for adequate drilling rigs and equip-
ment. 
11. Provisions for the payment of 120% of the 
value of all oil and/or gas produced, with certain exce·p-
tions. 
12. Provisions for the payment of a royalty of 
120% of the net proceeds realized from the sale or 
other disposal of gasoline manufactured from casmg-
head gas produced, with certain qualifications. 
13. Royalties provided by paragraphs 11 and 12 
shall be paid in cash on the 20th day of each calendar 
month upon production or net proceeds, as the case may 
be, for the preceding calendar month, it being agreed 
that the royalties in paragraphs 11 and 12 "are the 
same identical royalties upon production from the lands 
the subject of this agreement which are by the te-rms 
of said Oil and Gas Lease of June 4th, 1924, provided 
to be paid by the Lessee to the Lessors" and not in 
addition thereto. 
14. The lessee shall pay all taxes, including sever-
ance or production taxes, except upon production belong-
ing to the lessors; provided, that, if the lessee shali exer-
cise his right to surrender, his obligation to pay taxes 
shall be reduced rto correspond with retained rights, if 
any. 
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15. Lesse·e to kee·p records of production and sales. 
16. Lessee- to keep record and log of wells. 
17. Lessors have right to inspect records. 
18. Indemnification of lessors for damages, mech-
anics' liens, debts etc., and lessee to comply with laws 
regulating insurance of employees. 
19. Lessors to defend title; lessee to have the right 
to redeem mortgages or other liens against the property 
and be subrogated to the rights of the holders. 
20. With subparagraphs (a) and (b), this num-
bered paragraph contains specific rights of surrender 
to be exercised by the lessee. Under subparagraph (a) 
he can surrender to Smith or to Smith's nominees all 
of the lessee's rights and privileges under the lease and 
be relieved and released of all obligations thereafter 
accruing. Under subparagraph (b) he can surrender to 
M. P. Smith or to said Smith's nominees all the lessee's 
rights and privileges under the lease in and to any and 
all oil which may be contained in the lands "the subject 
of this agreement" and retain the right to prospect for 
and produce gas and all portions of the lease consistent 
with the retained rights. A proviso is contained in each 
of subparagraphs (a) and (b) substantially the same 
as the hereinafter quoted portion of paragraph 28, with 
the necessary changes being made applicable under (a) 
when the surrender is to the entire lease and under (b) 
when the surrender is limit.ed to the oil mineral estate. 
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21. Right of ~I. P. Smith to purchase casing at 
fair cash market Yalue in the event of surrender by the 
lessee under subparagraph (a) of 20; right of M. P. 
Smith to purchase rigs and related equipment, and pro-
vision for arbitration in the event of surrender by the 
lessee under subparagraph (b) of 20. 
22. After completion of drilling requirements in 
paragraph 4, and provided he is not then in default, 
subject to the rights of Smith to purchase as in para-
graph 21 provided, lessee shall have the right to remove 
tools, machinery etc., with provisions for Smith in case 
of default by the lessee in the drilling obligations of 
paragraph 4, at his election, to have limited right, rent 
free for six months, to use rigs, tools etc. 
23. Smith has the right to exhibit to the lessee bona 
fide written offer or proposition to drill a well to any 
horizon deeper than completed drilling under paragraph 
4 in the event oil in commercial quantity is not found; 
lessee has ninety days from notice to commence or con-
tinue upon the lands the subject of this agreement the 
actual drilling of an oil well to the depth sp·ecified in 
such offer; upon lessee's failure so to do all of the rights 
of the lessee in and to "oil" shall automatically cease 
and terminate. 
24. If within thirty days after receipt by the 
lessee from Smith of written notice of default, specifying 
in detail the default complained of and the lessee shall 
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fail to correct or repair such default, then at Smith's 
e'lection, if the default is in the lessee's drilling obliga-
tions under paragraph 4, all rights of the lessee in both 
oil and gas shall automatically cease and terminate. 
25. Provisions for easements and rights of way. 
26. Provisions for reciprocal rights of possession 
and control in the event of the forfeiture, cancellation, 
surrender, or other termination for any cause, of the 
lessee's rights to drill for or produce oil so far as rights 
of way upon, under and through the lands are concerned; 
provision for reciprocal rights of possession and control 
relating to rights of way etc., if the gas rights are retain-
ed by the lessee. 
27. If the lessors drill a well for oil but find gas 
1n commercial quantities, the lessee having retained 
the gas rights, then the gas shall belong to the lessee, 
provided the lessee, within the time specified, shall reim-
burse the lessors in cash for one·-half of the fair value 
of the casing in the we'll and for one-half of the actual 
cost of drilling, the latter to be paid for by delivering 
to the lessors the total value at the well of all com-
Jnercial production of gas therefrom until one-half of 
the actual cost of drilling said well has in this manner 
be~en paid; the 'lesse·e has the same or reciprocal rights 
if drilling for gas and encountering oil when he does 
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not have the oil rights; provisions for a completed well 
drilled upon the lands by either party while the other 
party has oil or gas rights only a~d there is encountered 
both oil and gas in commercial quantities; protection 
of well by party drilling from entry of water and other 
damage. 
28. Right of 'lessee to surrender gas rights after 
oil rights have been surrendered under paragraph 20, 
providing lessee is not in default under paragraph 4; 
the surrender to be made to M. P. Smith or to said 
Smith's nominees of all the lessee's rights and privileges 
in and to all gas which may be contained in the lands 
the subject of this agreement, with the further provision: 
"* * * that said such surrender shall not 
become effective until the Lessee shall have de-
livered to said M. P. Smith or his order properly 
executed all necessary instruments of transfer 
and do all necessary things in order to fully vest 
said Smith and/or his nominees with all the rights 
and privileges so surrendered and with such rights 
of exclusive possession and control of all of the 
lands the subject of this agreement as may be 
necessary for the full enjoyment and exercise 
by said Smith or his nominees of said such rights 
and privileges so surrendered." 
29. Stipulation that lease shall be binding upon 
and inure to the benefit of the respective heirs, legal 
representatives or assigns of the parties thereto. 
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FURTHER OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS:/ 
IV. It is agreed that in all particulars said Oil and 
Gas Lease of June 4th, 1924, insofar as same relates 
or pertains to the lands the subject of this agreemen4 
shall remain in full force and effect in accordance with 
the terms thereof, except as herein in this Modification 
Agreement same is modified and/or changed. 
V. That the parties hereto shall co-operate in an 
effort to procure the written approval of this agreement 
by all. owners of royalty interests in the lands the sub-
ject of this agreement. 
VI. Agreement binding upon the heirs, legal rep-
resentatives or assigns of the parties. 
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APPENDIX "B'' 
Chronology of ~ngnif'icant Events 
Date 
June4, 1924 
Exhibit number or 
Record page 
Sheridan et al.-R. C. Hill 
O&G Lease "A 1" 
October 30, 1924 R. C. Hill, Trustee, Assign-
Inent to Utah Oil Refining 
Company "A 2" 
November 10,1924 R. C. Hill Assignment to 
Ashley Valley Oil Company "A 3" 
November 14,1924 Warranty Deed from Sher-
idan et al. to M. P. Smith "A 4" 
February 3, 1925 Assignment from M. P. 
Smith and Ellen M. Smith, 
his wife, in favor of N. J. 
Meagher 1% Royalty In-
terest "A 46~' 
April 20, 1925 Warranty Deed- 1/5 in-
terest, T. G. Alexander and 
wife to N. J. Meagher "A 9" 
May 21, 1927 Modification Agreement be-
tween M.P. Smith and wife 
and Ashley Valley Oil 
Company "A 5" 
June 9, 1927 Modification Agreement Af-
fecting So-Called Sheridan 
Lands between Ashley Val-
ley Oil Company and Utah 
Oil Refining Company "A 6" 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
November 19,1927 Assignment of 1% Royal-
ty Interest, T. G. Alexan-
der and wife in favor of 
N. J. Meagher "A 55" 
December 19, 1927 Quitclaim Deed--4/5 inter-
est-with reservations and 
exceptions, M. P. Smith 
and wife to N. J. Meagher "A 7" 
December 19, 1927 Quitclaim Deed -1/5 in-
terest - with reservations 
and exceptions, · M. P. 
Smith and wife to T. G. 
Alexander "A 8" 
Ap·ril 24, 1929 Assignment Agreement of 
Utah Oil Refining Com-
pany to Ray Phebus and 
Paul Stock "A 11" 
May 13, 1929 Exhibit A-ll recorded, 
Uintah Co. 
May 29, 1929 Ray Phebus and Paul 
Stock Assignment to Val-
ley Fuel Supply Company 
(gas rights) "A 15" 
October 11, 1930 Assignment of Royalty In-
terests, N. J. Meagher et 
al. to Paul Stock and Ray 
Phebus (reduction of out-
standing royalties by one-
third) "A 40" 
Octobe-r 30, 1930 Assignment of Edward 
Watson, Trustee ( succes-
sor to R. C. Hill), to Ash-
ley Valley Oil Company 
(NE·lJ± SE:lJ± Section 15, 
the North Forty) "A 16" 
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April30, 1931 Contract (Assignn1ent) be-
tween Ray Phebus, Paul 
Stock and Standard Oil 
Company of California "A 12" 
May 28, 1931 Quitclaiin Deed-1/5 inter-
est-T. G. Alexander and 
wife toN. J. Meagher "A 10" 
December 31, 1931 Standard Oil Company of 
California Assignment to 
The California Qompany "A 13" 
October 31, 1932 Assignment of Right to 
Purchase Gas signed by 
Ray Phebus and Paul 
Stock in favor of Valley 
Fuel Supply Company "A 41" 
March 21, 1934 Agreement (Assignment) 
between Paul Stock, Ray 
Phebus and The California 
Company "A 14" 
November 7, 1941 Valley Fuel Supply Com-
pany Assignment to Joe T. 
Juhan (gas rights) "A 17" 
January 7, 1944 Letter to Paul Stock sign-
ed by N. J. Meagher "A 26" 
January 7,1944 Letter to Ray Phebus 
from N. J. Meagher "A 31" 
January 17, 1944 Letter to N. J. Meagher 
signed by L. G. Hinkley 
on behalf of Stock "A 32" 
January 25, 1944 Letter rto N. J. Meagher 
signed by Ray Phebus "A 33" 
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March 21, 1944 Letter to Joe T. Juhan 
signed by N. J. Meagher "A 34" 
October 11, 1944 Affidavit of Attorney for 
Publication of Summons R. 10 
October 16, 1944 Letter to Paul Stock sign-
ed by Katherine C. Meagher "A 27" 
October 16, 1944 Letter to Ray Phebus sign-
ed by Katherine C. Meagher "A 35" 
October 16,1944 Letter to Jos. T. Juhan 
signed by Katherine C. 
Meagher "A 56" 
October 17, 1944 Complaint filed R.l 
October 17, 1944 Order for Publication of 
Summons R. 11 
October 21, 1944 Release-Paul Stock to N. 
J. Meagher "A 30" 
October 31, 1944 Letter to Katherine C .. 
Meagher signed by Ray 
Phebus "A 36" 
·November 9, 1944 Letter to Ray Phebus sign-
ed by N.J. Meagher "A 28" 
.November 13,1944 Letter to N. J. Meagher 
signed by Ray Phebus "A 37" 
November 18, 1944 Letter to Ray Phebus sign-
January 4, 1945 
January 8, 1945 
ed by N. J. Meagher "A 38" 
First Publication of Sum-
mons 
Declaration of Trust sign-
ed by Joe T. Juhan m 
R.13 
favor of Ray Phebus "A 47" 
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(~uitelainl Deed and As-
signnlent, Ray Phebus and 
wife to Joe T. Juhan "A18" 
February 1, 1945 Last Publication of Sum-
nlons R.13 
February 19, 1945 .A.nH?nded Complaint filed R. 14 
April14, 1945 Quitclaim Deed and As-
signment, Paul Stock to 
Charles S. Hill "A 19" 
April14, 1945 Declaration of Trust sign-
ed by Charles S. Hill in 
favor of Paul Stock "A 48" 
April18, 1945 Second Amended Com-
plaint filed (Stock omitted 
in caption) R. 17r 
May 4, 1945 Lis Pendens "A 42" 
May7, 1945 Filed Answer of Juhan to 
Plaintiff's S·econd Amend-
ed Complaint R. 20 
May 22, 1945 Filed Answer of the De-
fendant Ashley Valley Oil 
Company R. 37 
June 18,'1945 Letter to Paul Stock sign-
ed by N.J. Meagher "A 39" 
September 1,1945 Reply of N. J. Meagher 
verified (denying lease-
hold) R. 41 
January 5, 1946 Quitclaim Deed and As-
signment, Charles S. Hill 
and wife to Joe T. Juhan "A 20" 
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January 5, 1946 Declaration of Trust sign-
ed by Joe T. Juhan in 
favor of Charles S. Hill "A 49" 
January 8, 1946 Phebus adopts Answer of 
Juhan R.43 
January 11, 1946 Quitclaim Deed and As-
signment, Juhan and wife 
to Equity Oil Company "A 21" 
October 27, 1947 Decision of Supreme Court R. 57 
December 30, 1947 Quitclaim Deed and As-
signment, Equity Oil Com-
pany to Weber Oil Com-
pany "A 24" 
January 27, 1948 Quitclaim Deed, N.J. Mea-
gher to his children "A 22" 
March 15, 1948 Petition for Rehearing de-
nied R. 56 
March 16, 1948 Remittitur issued R. 56 
June 29,1948 Release signed by Ray 
Phebus and Ella G. Phebus 
in favor of Joe T. Juhan 
confirming quitclaim pre-
viously executed by Phe-
bus and wife· in favor of 
Juhan "A 50" 
July 9, 1948 Letter Agreement written 
by Joe T. Juhan, approved 
by Paul Stock "A 51" 
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July 9,1948 
July 10, 1948 
J nly 12, 1948 
July 13, 1948 
August 1, 1948 
17 
Letter Agreement signed 
by J. L. Dougan as Presi-
dent of Equity Oil Com-
pany and approved by 
Paul Stock and Joe T. 
Juhan "A 52" 
Paul Stock-Charles S. Hill, 
Release confirming quit-
claim previously executed 
by Hill and wife in favor 
of Joe T. Juhan "A 53" 
Quitclaim Deed, Joe T. 
Juhan and wife to Paul 
Stock "A 23" 
Charles S. Hill and wife-
Joe T. Juhan, Release con-
firming previous quitclaim 
deed by Hill and wife in 
favor of Juhan "A 54" 
Equity Oil commenced drill-
ing operations "A 25" 
September 11, 1948 Deed, Ellen M. Smith et al. 
to Clyde S. Johnson "A 60" 
September 14, 1948 Deed, Clyde S. Johnson 
and wife to Edward F. 
Richards "A 61" 
September 18, 1948 Discovery of oil in com-
mercial quantities R. 255 
December 30, 1948 Operating Agreement be-
tween Equity Oil Com-
pany, Weber Oil Company, 
Joe T. Juhan and Paul 
Stock "A 25" 
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April 22., 1949 
May 9,1949 
June 10, 1949 
June 10, 1949 
June 10, 1949 
August 3, 1949 
August 3, 1949 
August 17, 1949 
Octobe·r 15, 1949 
18 
Third Amended Complaint 
proposed R. 67 
Filed Objections to filing 
Third Amended Complaint R. 78 
Filed Withdrawal of Mo~ 
tion to file Third Amended 
Complaint R. 80 
Filed Motion for Order au-
thorizing filing of Amend-
ed Reply to defendants' 
Answers R. 81 
Filed proposed Amended 
Reply R.87 
Filed Objections to plain-
tiff's Motion to file Amend-
ed Reply (asserting lease-
hold) R. 83 
Order authorizing filing of 
Amended Reply (Stock re-
appears in caption) R. 85 
Filed Answer and Counter-
claim of Paul Stock R. 92 
Served Reply to Answer 
and Counterclaim of Paul 
Stock R.107 
Amendment to Answer and 
Reply to the Counterclaim 
of Paul Stock R. 115 
November 12, 1949 · Pretrial proceedings at 
Vernal, Utah "A 58" 
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November 26, 1949 Filed Second Amended Re-
ply to the Answer of 
Juhan and Phebus R. 121 
February 25, 1950 Pretrial proceedings at 
Provo, Utah "A 59" 
June 26, 1950 Second trial held at Provo, 
Utah R.135 
June 26,1950 Second Amended Complaint 
amended to include oil roy-
alty issued involving 1/3 of 
March 6, 1951 
A pril14, 1951 
June 4, 1951 
June 8,1951 
June 8,1951 
July 7, 1951 
July 17, 1951 
July 17, 1951 
2% R. 230 
Trial Court's Memoran-
dum Decision R.140-194 
Filed Objections to Pro-
posed Findings R. 196 
Trial Court's Supplement~ 
al Memorandum R.l97-198 
Filed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law R. 200-219 
Filed Judgment and De-
cree R. 220-2.24 
Filed Notice of Appeal R. 342-343 
Filed Appellants' Designa-
tion of Record on Ap-
peal R. 34 7-350 
Filed Stipulation on Desig-
nation of Record R. 344-346 
Chart of Chain of Title, 
excluding landowners roy-
alties "A 57" 
Chart, Chain of Title with 
reference to Exhibit num-
bers "A 62" 
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